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ABSTRACT
The United States Air Force Academy is a specialized institution of higher learning
dedicated to producing military officers in the U.S. Air Force. Specialized graduation
requirements, like a required Military History course, present the opportunity for the
implementation of unique pedagogical methodologies. Further, as a technologically forwardlooking branch of service designed to control air, space, and cyberspace in a contested
environment, the Air Force places a premium on twenty- and twenty-first century military
history. Unfortunately, pre-airpower American military history gets overshadowed compared to
later conflicts to the point where cadets attending the Air Force Academy get relatively little
exposure to the American Revolution. Yet the American Revolution is a well-defined war in
terms of leadership and the delineation of strategy, campaigns, and battles. An in-depth
examination of the Revolutionary War gives cadets the opportunity to more easily learn about
warfare and military history while gaining historical research skills.
A study of American Revolution historiography shows a gap in work that transitions
across the three levels of war. Further, a study of modern pedagogical methods highlights
innovative techniques that foster an active learning, student-centered classroom environment
instead of adhering to the traditional lecture. Combining military theory with pedagogy, one can
create a classroom that incorporates gamification and teaches a military history of the American
Revolutionary War while preparing cadets to enter the twenty-first-century Air Force.

x

This study concludes with a semester-length military history course on the American
Revolutionary War that includes all lesson plans and a complete syllabus. It places a high
premium on briefing skills, primary source material, and a deep understanding of the levels of
war. In addition, the course elucidates the fact that each level of war influences the others, and
that actions at the tactical level can have a drastic effect on the operational and strategic levels.
Since cadets will graduate from the Air Force Academy and enter the military as officers at the
tactical level of war, this course will directly apply to their immediate future.

xi

CHAPTER I
I. INTRODUCTION
History revolves around human decisions and actions. To many, historical events are
exciting, educational, and worthy of detailed examination. In a pedagogical setting, however, the
same progression of events bore, alienate, and contribute to a disdain for history, especially
among STEM-focused students.1 Therefore, historical events inside the classroom must be
subordinated to a framework, or system, that drives the educational model towards a complete
understanding of history as applied to modern undergraduates. A well-designed and wellthought-out system in an educational setting will utilize events to promote an overarching
framework of human history. Teaching through the levels of war is such a system. For students
attending the national Service Academies, their knowledge of the levels of war will apply to their
military careers, regardless of if they go to the Middle East, the Pacific, Africa, or anywhere else.
The U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) exists to educate and train knowledgeable
officers of character for the U.S. Air Force. Directly after graduation, newly minted Second
Lieutenants will be expected to perform at the tactical level throughout the range of international
conflicts. Therefore, it is imperative that these future leaders understand the levels of war, their
interaction with each other, and the individual role of the tactician in the implementation of
1

Interestingly, several articles found that the widely-believed poor student reception towards history comes
from within academia rather than the students themselves. Most students think that history is useful and interesting,
but administrations continue to dwindle the time allotted for historical studies. These articles do elucidate that bad
secondary-school experiences with the discipline can taint student’s thoughts toward history. Thus, it is important
that teachers maintain engaging classrooms. See James B. M. Schick, “What Do Students Really Think of History?,”
The History Teacher 24, no. 3 (May 1991): 331. Joanna Moorhead, “Education: Why Teenagers Think History Is so
Yesterday: Historians Are Worried about Falling Numbers of Students. Don’t Young People See the Subject Has
Soul?,” The Guardian (London, August 4, 2009), sec. Guardian Education Pages.
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strategy. Seeing these interactions come to fruition throughout history allows cadets to glimpse
the triumphs and tragedies, the successes and failures, of their predecessors.
While debates rage throughout academia regarding the various methodologies and
pedagogical techniques in the teaching of history, this paper will argue from a unique
perspective: teaching a military history of the American Revolution at the U.S. Air Force
Academy; a specialized, technologically forward-looking, national Service Academy where
students enter intending to graduate and earn an officer’s commission in the U.S. Air Force. This
paper is not intended to criticize USAFA or its history department. Military History is taught
well at the Air Force Academy – it is a required course – but the focus is so heavily tilted
towards the post-heavier-than-air flight era that useful modern lessons from pre-airpower
American Military History get lost. Except for those actively seeking pre-twentieth century
American Military History, most cadets at USAFA will not examine the American Revolution in
any detail. A Colonial Warfare class comes the closest, but it spans the fifteenth through the
eighteenth centuries, leaving minimal time to dissect a pivotal conflict in American Military
History.2
The Department of History does offer recurring, semester-length, dedicated courses of
nineteenth and twentieth-century major American wars, including the Civil War, World War I,
World War II, Korea and Vietnam. There is not, however, a course that revolves around the
American Revolution. At best, cadets will spend minimal time discussing the military aspects of
the creation of the United States in either a survey class or the Colonial Warfare class, yet the
Revolution presented unique leadership problems across the levels of war that can help them in
their Air Force careers. Problems involving communication, logistics, propaganda, and morale

2

Dean of the Faculty. “Curriculum Handbook,” 2017. https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/CHB.pdf; 291-

299.
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are still common today, yet commanders during the American Revolution had to solve them in a
pre-industrialized country not dissimilar from the remote, third-world developing nations that the
military operates in today.
The counter-arguments against pre-nineteenth century Military History courses still
revolve around technology. Satellite communications, airstrike and airlift capabilities, and instant
media availability convince skeptics that pre-industrialized problems will not occur in the
modern military. Unfortunately, “third-world” countries often do not have the infrastructure
required to support “first-world” militaries. Weather and terrain can render aircraft and satellite
communications non-operational. For a forward-deployed unit, it would not be unreasonable for
them to lose most, if not all, of the technologies that detractors claim would never fail. Except for
high-powered rifles, a unit may need to operate in a similar fashion to small units during the
American Revolution. Doug Stanton, in his work 12 Strong (originally published as Horse
Soldiers), provided numerous examples of the technological failures that hindered the initial
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. In one instance, Stanton recorded that the Special Forces team’s
insertion failed twice in a row because the combat weather forecasters relied too heavily on
technology.3
Further, George Washington’s military strategies often mirror modern insurgencies. The
control and pacification of citizens in a foreign environment, coupled with the need to traverse
large swaths of unfamiliar territory safely presented massive difficulties for the British in the
eighteenth century. Washington’s strategic ability to exploit those difficulties is eerily similar to

3

Doug Stanton, 12 Strong: The Declassified True Story of the Horse Soldiers, Kindle Edition. (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2009), 68.
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that deployed by the leaders of modern insurgencies, as evidenced by the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.4
In that vein, this paper will argue that there is a way to teach the American Revolutionary
War as a pre-airpower military history course in a STEM-focused environment and make it
relevant for twenty-first century military officer-candidates. Using the levels of war, primary
sources, and gamification, a USAFA History professor can create an engaging, practical course
that meets institutional outcomes while preparing cadets for their future military careers in a
technologically forward-looking service.5 History 999, “Tactical Implementation of Strategic
Guidance During the American Revolutionary War,” is such a course.

Military Theorists and Teaching Models
The Air Force Academy does a remarkable job discussing the prominent military
theorists throughout history. The Academy's “American Way of War,” “History of Military
Thought and Strategy,” and “Great Americans” courses all touch on the works of prominent
theorists. Unfortunately, the military theorists most often studied at Service Academies blur the
line between history and social science by seeking constants throughout history. If there are
constants, as they argued, then the military framework must grab ahold of those constants and
expose them to the forefront of military education.
Most prominent military theorists, like Antione de Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred
Thayer Mahan, and Giulio Douhet, argued that there are indeed constant, universal, and eternal
principles inherent in the history of warfare. For example, Jomini was formulaic. To him, mass

4
Peter R. Mansoor and David Petraeus, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the
Remaking of the Iraq War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). Mansoor and Petraeus argue for the
importance of historical knowledge in military strategy. Mansoor chronicles Pretraeus’s ability to fight the Iraqi
insurgency by utilizing the cultural foundation of the Iraqi people instead of fighting against it.
5
Gamification is addressed in Chapter III.

4

and maneuver won the day as he sought decisive points in war.6 Clausewitz espoused a strategic
trinity comprised of the people, the military, and the government that all coalesced to seek a
political end.7 Mahan sought the decisive climactic naval battle that gave the victor unfettered
economic access to the sea.8 Douhet believed that strategic bombing of civilians would end war
quicker than traditional means.9 All thought they had found the universal principle that would
lead to victory, and all cited history to prove their case. While each developed their theories
within the specific historical context of their era, they believed that their strategies would endure.
For instance, Alfred Thayer Mahan specifically said, “from time to time the superstructure of
tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as
though laid upon a rock.”10 In other words, according to Mahan, tactics change in relation to
technology, but strategy does not.
Some modern scholars, such as Andrew Bacevich, argue that technology has flipped the
levels of war. They claim that technological advancement has placed the highest premium on the
tactical level to showcase the benefits of expensive new equipment. The need to show off new
technology now drives strategy. To prove his assertion, Bacevich quotes several American
strategic commanders that claim Clausewitz’s “fog and friction” is a thing of the past thanks to
the perceived U.S. monopoly on technology.11 If the belief that technological tactical superiority

6
Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008), 64-65. Jomini included
all capital cities, communication centers, and seats of government as strategic points. Viewed through that lens, the
British strategy in the American War of Independence was Jominian as they captured both New York and
Philadelphia.
7
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Peter Paret, trans. Michael Eliot Howard, First paperback printing.
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.
8
A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (New York: Dover Publications,
1987), 82.
9
Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), 194195.
10
Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 88.
11
Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War, 2nd Updated
edition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1, 21-22.

5

can eclipse strategic principles is pervasive among military members, as Bacevich argues, then
future Air Force officers must regain the idea that strategy is paramount.
The fact that Sun Tzu, Jomini, Clausewitz, Mahan, Corbett, Douhet, Mitchell, and other
high-profile military theorists are so widely read and studied in the twenty-first century suggests
that their works strike a chord of truth in modern combat. The importance of strategy formed the
basis of their theses; thus, if the theorists were correct and there are strategic constants in
warfare, then there must be universal, eternal principles inherent in teaching military history.
Every traditional American military conflict has experienced three levels of war.12 By separating
military history into the strategic, operational, and tactical, one can trace the strategic guidance
through the operational and tactical actions to see how strategic direction was implemented on
the battlefield. The results then flow backwards from the tactical to the strategic level, altering
the course of the war. A complete understanding of this process can apply to any conflict in
American history. Further, war is human despite technological advancement; victory often
depends of the tactical implementation of strategic guidance. This project utilizes the American
Revolution as the primary case study to highlight the importance of adhering to this framework
for teaching military history.
It is true that there are an abundance of effective ways to teach American Military
History. Each individual professor has a method that works for them, and this does not suggest
that other teaching styles are wrong. However, the framework presented here has three main
characteristics that, if used collectively, greatly benefit the student. Teaching the levels of war
offer simplicity, continuity, and application.
12
In this sense, “conflict” is defined as a struggle involving a traditional state military that contains a
hierarchical chain of command and is subservient to a higher political power. In the American Revolution, the
Continental Army fit the mold as it incorporated a rank structure yet allowed the Congressional Congress to impart a
political strategy. The British Military used a similar structure. Thus, for the purpose of this paper, “conflict”
occurred whenever a hierarchical state military was used to achieve a political end.

6

First, presenting Strategy,
Operations, and Tactics as major,
Strategy

overarching themes is simplistic. Any

Operations

student can break down their area of focus

Tactics

into three parts. Three levels of war are

Logistics &
Administrations

especially straightforward compared to
many other complicated and confusing

Military Professionalism

strategies. For example, some professors
use the Threads of Continuity as a visual
guide. While effective when fully
understood, it is dense and difficult to
comprehend, necessitating continual

GEOGRAPHY

The Threads of Continuity
Figure 1. The Threads of Continuity. This diagram depicts
various factors in civil-military interactions. The circle
represents civilian-controlled factors, while the triangle
represents military-controlled factors.

explanation throughout the semester. Students spend an inordinate amount of time trying to
memorize a diagram rather than learning the material. Other instructors prefer the DIME model
of the instruments of national power (DIME stands for Diplomacy, Information, Military, and
Economics). The DIME model is easier to understand than the Threads of Continuity, but it is
also incredibly wide-ranging, covering every aspect of a state’s internal and external policy.
There is simply not enough time in a single semester to discuss all the Diplomatic, Informational,
Military, and Economic aspects of American warfare without overloading the students. The
DIME model is simply too broad.13

13
In this instance, the DIME model is too broad for an undergraduate military history course centered on
the American Revolution. The integration of national policy within the diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic realms is extremely important, but simply too significant to segregate them all under a single military
history class like H999.

7

Teaching through the Spectrum of War, or the Limited to Total War scale, is another
popular method. While important to understand, the Spectrum is too subjective for most
undergraduate classes to apply to specific historical events. It works for overall conflicts but gets
lost when one discovers that the Spectrum is largely idiosyncratic and can differ from person to
person. Thus, the levels of war provide the best combination of simplicity and specificity as a
useful classroom method.

Figure 2. The Spectrum of War. This diagram depicts the entire range of state conflict.

Second, the levels of war framework offers continuity throughout America military
history. Every major war can be separated into the strategic, the operational, and the tactical.
Thus, once a student grasps these concepts, they can understand them throughout the totality of
American military history. The same concepts used to examine the American Revolution can be
used to study World War II, or the Vietnam war, or Afghanistan.14

14

The critique surrounding Vietnam and Afghanistan is the notion that the U.S. had no clear strategy. The
argument is valid and can provide an example of how the levels of war can get muddied depending on a multitude of
political, diplomatic, economic, societal and military factors. Both wars had clear tactical engagements and
operational movements, but no clear strategic national objective. Thus, the evaluation turns to the determination of a
strategy instead of an analysis of the strategy itself. Thankfully, the American Revolution had the clearly defined
strategic goal of independence.
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Defining the Terms
To introduce these concepts, students and faculty must have a solid grasp of the terms.
The levels of war have specific definitions but are broad enough to be adaptable. Modern
understanding of the three levels of warfare did not fully emerge until the nineteenth century.15
Even then they were not adequately studied until Clausewitz and Jomini had been prominently
examined within professional military education.16 While strategy and tactics were understood
and employed since the sixteenth-century beginning with the Military Revolution in Europe, the
terms were often (and still are) confused and used interchangeably. It is crucial that these terms
be clearly defined, especially in any type of course where the military is examined. Further, they
emphatically cannot be used interchangeably. There is no such thing as “tactical strategy” or
“strategic tactics.” In military and political circles, the three levels of war are fundamentally
separate aspects of power.
The difficulty for the modern history professor is how the levels of war should be
defined in class. From a purely historical perspective, the definitions of strategy and tactics have
evolved since the Military Revolution in Europe that occurred between the fifteenth and
eighteenth centuries. Further, the operational level has emerged as a distinct and separate level of
war which did not occur until the twentieth century (or some would argue the latter half of the
long nineteenth). In either case, the levels of war became ingrained into the American military
parlance when West Point introduced the writings of Antoine de Jomini and focused on his
15

Eighteenth-century strategic military education did not fully exist as we know it today. Instead, it relied
on onsite training and experience rather than classroom study, wargaming, or theoretical application. Drill and
discipline manuals were prominent, but books on strategic studies were much more difficult to acquire. See Stuart
Reid, Redcoat Officer: 1740-1815 (Oxford, U.K.: Osprey Publishing, 2002). Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard
Augustin Steuben, ed., Baron von Steuben’s Revolutionary War Drill Manual: A Facsimile Reprint of the 1794
Edition (New York: Dover Publications, 1985). Sandra L. Powers, “Studying the Art of War: Military Books
Known to American Officers and Their French Counterparts during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century,”
The Journal of Military History 70, no. 3 (July 2006): 781–814. Oliver L. Spaulding, “The Military Studies of
George Washington,” The American Historical Review 29, no. 4 (July 1924): 675–680.
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scientific theories of warfare. When Carl von Clausewitz’s On War became the de facto military
guide in the twentieth century, the levels of war became solidly defined and ingrained into
military education.17

Levels of War

This poses a challenge to the

Grand Strategy

twenty-first century educator in that,
as historians, we aim to be true to the

Strategic

Theater Strategy

period in which the author wrote and
was understood; unfortunately, the
slightly different definitions of the

Operational

eighteenth century create unnecessary
confusion in undergraduates who are

Campaigns
Major Operations
Battles

Tactical

Engagements
Small Unit Action

seeking to comprehend the bigger
picture without fixating on semantics.

National Strategy

Figure 3. The Levels of War. This is a diagram of the three levels of
war and the actions that take place within them.

Therefore, with the acknowledgment that Clausewitz is widely considered to be the first to
codify the definitions of strategy and tactics, this paper will use the modern definitions as
outlined in the Department of Defense’s Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 for two reasons. First, these
definitions are taught throughout the United States military’s commissioning sources and are
therefore universally understood amongst today’s American officers. While the general
population at large does not follow the DoD definitions, all cadets at the Air Force Academy will
adhere to JP 1-02. Second, using modern definitions allows students and faculty to compare and
17

In his introductory essay to On War, Michael Howard points out that there is little evidence of exactly
when Clausewitz became widely studied in American Service Academies, elucidating that Jomini had a near
monopoly on military thought in the early twentieth century. Howard did point out, however, that Clausewitzian
definitions had entered the U.S. Army Field Service Regulations in 1923. While he lists examples of military
leadership using Clausewitzian principles during World War II, Howard elucidates that On War was widely studied
by the start of the Korean War in 1950. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Peter Paret, trans. Michael Eliot
Howard, First paperback printing. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1989), 42.
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contrast between wars without deviating to discuss the evolution of the terminology. In an
undergraduate course, such deviations break the continual narrative of the class, creating a major
pedagogical problem with anachronistic terminology. Thus, using modern terms will create the
conditions for wider discussion and debate. The following definitions are listed in the 2017
Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02 referenced by all branches of the military:
Strategy: “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of
national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater,
national, and/or multinational objectives.” (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)
Strategic level of war: “The level of war at which a nation, often as a member
of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or
coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses
national resources to achieve those objectives.” (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)
Operational level of war: “The level of war at which campaigns and major
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives
within theaters or other operational areas.” (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)
Tactical level of war: “The level of war at which battles and engagements are
planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or
task forces.” (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)18
In other words, strategy is the big picture – the overall game plan designed to win the war
and achieve the political aims. Without strategy, everything else is aimless. Campaigns conflict,
objectives get muddled, commanders disagree, and the military spends its time arguing internally
rather than executing an external strategy. Battles may still be won at the tactical level, but
without strategy, the tactical victories do not contribute to a greater overarching plan. Of the
three, strategy is the most important level of war.
The operational level is the most often confused of the three. In simplistic terms, the
operational level is concerned with carrying out the strategic aims on a large scale – how the
18
“DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (DOD Dictionary),” Joint Publication 1-02, August
2017, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, “Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations” (Department of Defense, 17 January 2017),
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf.
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armies maneuver on campaigns to set up the tactical engagements that will accomplish strategic
goals. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, one goal was that an army could campaign
effectively, without a tactical engagement, and emerge opposite an enemy in a massive show of
force. This show of force, it was hoped, would convince the enemy that their numbers were
inferior and seek terms for peace.19 Put another way, maneuvering an army operationally to
achieve strategic aims did not necessarily precipitate a tactical engagement.
The tactical level is where the physical fighting occurred. It is where the belligerents
employed their technologies of violence, and where a decisive battle could potentially knock an
enemy out of the game, leading to a political and diplomatic position of strength for the leaders
from which to bargain. Effective strategies, and their strategists, needed tactical (and sometimes
operational) victories.20 Washington needed Bemis Heights and Freeman’s Farm during the
Saratoga campaign; Lincoln needed Antietam; Eisenhower needed Omaha Beach during the
Normandy invasion. At the same time, tactical —or even operational— losses did not negate a
strong strategic vision. The insurgent Americans retreated from Lexington and Bunker Hill. They
ran again in New York, and again outside of Philadelphia. Nathanael Greene retreated from every
tactical engagement in the South, yet historians credit him with driving Lord Cornwallis to

19

Much of traditional European warfare revolved around the tactical and operational size of the military in
the field. War plans were built around numbers; use a larger force to attack a smaller force. The thought was if a
much larger force appeared opposite a small force, the leadership would decide that it would not be economically
feasible to replace their losses even if they performed well in battle. The social-economic ramifications of European
warfare is a large part of the “Military Revolution Debate” between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. For more
on the Military Revolution, see Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military
Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); or Geoffrey Parker, The Military
Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996).
20
The definition of “victory” is inconsistent throughout history, especially at the tactical level.
Traditionally, the forces that retreat “lose,” whereas those that hold or take ground “win,” though this is not always
the case. Guilford Courthouse is widely considered to be an American victory because of the casualties inflicted
upon the British. On the other hand, the Redcoats took the ground when the Americans retreated, justifying their
claim of victory. Thus, it would be inappropriate to level a consistent definition of victory on all tactical,
operational, and strategic engagements. Instead, the cadets should assess each victory or defeat on a case by case
basis throughout their studies.
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Yorktown — his place of surrender and the effective termination of hostilities in the American
Revolution.21 Thus, while tactical victories are important, it is the strategy that is crucial. A
tactical loss supporting an overarching strategic goal is vastly better than the opposite.22 As one
modern General put it, the U.S. can lose a tactical skirmish in Afghanistan or Iraq and survive,
but America cannot survive a strategic loss to a Russia or a China.

Military Jargon in History
Another major problem that educators, specifically military historians, must confront is
the manner in which the military theorist’s models are retroactively applied to previous conflicts,
including the American Revolution. As the “father of the modern military,” Clausewitz formed
the bedrock for twenty-first century strategy, yet he and Jomini did not write until after the
American Revolution. Clausewitz’s On War was originally published in 1832 but was not
translated into English until 1874. Even then, his work remained largely unknown outside of
Europe. The first American edition did not appear until 1943.23 Jomini did not publish his
seminal work The Art of War until 1862, though his work was immediately translated into
English and incorporated in the West Point syllabus.24 Obviously, no one who fought in the
American Revolution lived to read Jomini or Clausewitz, much less employ any of their military
lessons. The pedagogical reasoning behind using their models is not to promote anachronisms,
but rather to use widely understood writings as a basis for an argument regarding the conduct of
American warfare since the mid-eighteenth century. Again, the goal is not to disregard historical
21
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methods, but rather to teach American military history in a digestible and relevant manner to
twenty-first century students. With that understanding, one can use these classic military theorists
to examine the American Revolution.
The American Revolution is relatively easy to define using military terms and principles
compared to later U.S. conflicts. Strategic guidance was limited exclusively to George
Washington because there was no federal government. The Continental Congress did have input,
but otherwise Washington had near total control over American strategy. Future American wars
only got more complex as the various Presidents attempted to work in conjunction with, or
contrary to, the Generals who set military strategy as well as an increasingly intrusive Congress.
The legislative branch of government asserted more and more control over military matters as
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries progressed, adding extra layers to the strategic framework.
Likewise, the operational and tactical levels in the American Revolution were
comparatively straight-forward. The major campaigns were well-defined, and, with the exception
of la petit guerre that occurred around the edges of the major areas of operation, the campaigns
rarely overlapped. Battles were also defined and limited to set engagements (again, with the
exception of the continual skirmishing in the back-country between Indians, colonists, foraging
parties, and riflemen). For example, the Saratoga campaign highlights the operational level,
while the Battles of Freeman’s Farm and Bemis Heights showcase the tactical. The overarching
British strategic guidance was to separate the colonies along the Hudson River/Lake Champlain
corridor. The strategic result of the tactical and operational level outcomes was the fact that
France officially entered the war against Britain.
Pedagogically, the relative straightforwardness of the American Revolution allows an
instructor to build a framework around the three levels of war and highlight the interaction
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between them. Once established, the same framework provides guidance throughout American
military history. Yet without a fundamental understanding of how the levels of war operate both
independently and collectively, as well as how the leadership at each level corresponds and
reacts to the established guidance, students miss out on the intricacies of historical national
power. Thus, the framework that flows from the Revolution is applicable to all other American
wars in a Military History course. In other words, the American Revolution offers a greater
opportunity to separate the tactical from the operational and the operational from the strategic
due to the relatively small size of the American forces compared to more recent conflicts.
Further, the claim that there are universal tenets to military history justifies the
incorporation of various prominent military theorists who state that there are eternal principles of
war into the classroom. Scholars like Jomini, Clausewitz, Mahan, Corbett, Douhet, and Mitchell
provide a bridge for examining the economic, socio-political, and cultural aspects of war.
Though such an examination is not the focus of this work, it does open the door for multidisciplinary military discussions to take place within academic classrooms at Service Academies.
Therefore, this paper seeks to establish a fundamental framework useful for cadets at the
U.S. Air Force Academy through the implementation of a dedicated semester-long course on the
American Revolution. Using primary sources, cadets will examine the three levels of war in a
chronological format while assessing the interaction between strategy, operations, and tactics.

Levels of War Pedagogical Methodology
This paper defines the levels of war pedagogical methodology as a three-step process.
First, the professor must clearly define and delineate between the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels of war. The students must understand the three levels and their boundaries.
Second, the instructor needs to highlight the interaction between the three; that is, he/she must
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show how the strategy provides guidance to the operational, and how the operational can dictate
the situation for the tactical. The same is true in reverse. The Professor should display how the
actions at the tactical level necessitate operational and strategic flexibility. Finally, the
pedagogical methodology requires placing students in simulated contextual situations across the
three levels of war.
In short, the levels of war pedagogical methodology seeks to get students to view
American military history through the lens of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and
understand that the actions at one level impact the others. Once a student understands the levels
and their interaction, they can more easily understand historical context and critically think about
historical causation. Further, cadets at Service Academies can analyze leadership styles across
various levels of war while placing themselves in similar simulated situations to experience, on
some small level, the decisions that went in to certain military engagements. It has the added
benefit of creating an engaging, student-centered, active-learning environment that promotes the
growth of student metacognition.
To provide more detail, this examination of the American Revolution will focus on
George Washington at the Strategic level of war, Nathanael Greene at the Operational level of
war, and Daniel Morgan at the Tactical level of war.
First, Washington was a terrible tactician, mediocre at the operational level, but a master
strategist.25 To argue this assertion, one only needs to view the New York campaign where
Washington attempted to fight British General Sir William Howe in traditional European
25
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warfare. Only Howe’s reluctance to push his victory and eradicate Washington’s retreating and
battered force allowed the Continental Army to survive. Three times Washington proved his
ineptitude at the tactical level. Some may argue that it was not George Washington who
performed poorly, but rather the barely-trained and poorly disciplined American troops.
Nonetheless, one of the prominent jobs of a tactical leader is to assess the ability of the soldiers.
Using these simple criteria, Washington failed. If the argument stands that the American troops
were unequal to the British in open combat, then Washington clearly did not know the tactical
ability of his own men. In any case, the New York campaign substantiated how unskilled
Washington was at the tactical level. Thankfully, he made up for those failures with successes at
the strategic level.
Most historians believe that one of Washington’s strongest attributes was his ability to
learn and adapt. After New York, he switched to a Fabian strategy often referred to as the
Strategic Defensive, a posture that required the Army to resist traditional engagements with the
British and fight smaller battles under more advantageous conditions. Yet again, however,
Washington allowed himself to fall prey to poor tactical decision-making. When he engaged
Howe at Brandywine creek, Washington committed tactical blunders that nearly cost him his
army.26 His tactical ability had not improved, yet his ability to maneuver the Continental Army at
the operational level saved the American cause. Unfortunately, each time he showed success at
the operational level, it was because of a tactical failure and his campaigns became retreats.
Second, Greene was also a terrible tactician, mediocre at the strategic level, but was
brilliant at the operational level.27 Tactically, he retreated from every battle he fought. At the
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same time, he was able to exact high casualty counts from the British, denoting he understood
that the American strategy revolved around maintaining a functional military. By allowing the
British to gain Pyrrhic victories, Greene fatally compromised their ability to maintain a credible
operational threat without reinforcements or resupply. The most famous example of this was
during the Southern Campaign of 1779-1781 where he led Cornwallis on an operational goose
chase through the Carolinas, slowly eroding his manpower in the process and staying just enough
out of reach to make the British believe they could catch up and force a decisive battle. When
Greene, not Cornwallis, did decide to engage tactically at Guilford Courthouse, the result was a
“victorious” yet dilapidated British force that retreated to the coast. Greene used his operational
prowess to erode Cornwallis’s army.
Finally, there is little evidence that Daniel Morgan ever thought strategically, and he was
only marginal at the operational level. Yet he proved to be the best tactician in the American
Revolution.28 His actions throughout the war, from the assault on Quebec in 1775, to the tactical
engagements during Saratoga campaign, to George Washington’s reliance on him to “annoy” the
British, and finally to his tactical victory over the feared Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens, proved
Morgan to be a master at the tactical level of war. His results often forced both belligerents to
reconsider their strategic direction.
Thus, H999 “Tactical Implementation of Strategic Guidance during the American
Revolutionary War” will focus on how the various commanders utilized the tools at their
disposal to influence their respective level of war. In turn, the course will examine how each
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action impacted the other levels of war, creating a symbiotic relationship as the Continental
Army attempted to defeat the British during the Revolutionary War and gain independence.

Chapter Layout
This particular work is primarily designed as an American military history course
examining the Revolutionary War for the Air Force Academy’s Department of History. The
following chapters are therefore a combination of historiography, pedagogy, and usable lesson
plans. In that regard, the rest of this document is broken down as follows:
Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the historiography of the American Revolution.
This paper is a primer on an American Revolution undergraduate course, so the historiography
will remain short and focus more on military history rather than on socio-culture, political,
diplomatic, or economic historiographical areas and examine the field with that specific mindset.
Chapter 2 will introduce the need for a hierarchical pedagogical approach in higher
education, arguing that it is an effective method for fostering complex thinking across various
sub-fields of history, such as social, political, diplomatic, economic, or military history. This
chapter will illuminate three major areas in modern academia. First, it will elucidate several
growing problems in modern academia, among them the divergence between STEM and
humanities, the lack of student engagement, and the overuse of the ill-defined term “critical
thinking.” Next, it will show how the levels of war pedagogical methodology are useful in
highlighting the relevant nature of the humanities in a STEM-centric environment. In the
process, students become more engaged in class because they see how the subject will impact
their immediate future. Finally, several common pedagogical examples will showcase how
professors can incorporate the levels of war into their military history classrooms.
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Chapters 3 through 6 will detail the American Revolution as a semester length course and
emphasize the viability and feasibility of using the levels of war to teach a class. Each chapter
will also highlight various methods in which to engage students throughout the semester. In
addition to a syllabus, various assignments, readings, in-class exercises, and lesson examples,
these chapters will allow a professor to implement a primary-source driven military history
course on the Revolutionary War. These chapters mark a sharp contrast from the narrative of the
first two chapters because they move to a bullet-point format designed for in-class use. The goal
is for an instructor to be able to print off the specific lesson plan and use it during class
preparation.
Specifically, Chapter 3 will provide the overview and act as an introduction to the
Revolutionary War military history course. It will detail the goals, outcomes, and objectives as
well as explain the assumptions inherent in developing a class for Air Force Academy cadets.
Chapter 3 also contains a reference guide for the following three chapters, explaining how the
Block Guides and Lesson Plans are set up in a straight-forward, usable manner.
The course itself will be divided into three blocks of instruction, which will become
Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Each one begins with a Block Guide, which explains the primary goals and
objectives for that particular set of lessons. Following that, the chapter contains daily lesson
plans, written in bullet format, that allow the instructor to read, print, and take to class as notetakers and preparation guides. Everything from class timing, to homework assignments, to
specific cadet and instructor roles are included in the lesson plans. Ultimately, these three
chapters guide the professor through the course, reducing the workload throughout the semester.
Comprehensively, the simplicity, continuity, and application of H999 “Tactical
Implementation of Strategic Guidance during the American Revolutionary War” will not only
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develop historical knowledge but will increase cadet’s critical and complex thinking abilities
while cultivating their understanding of military planning across the levels of war. At the end of
the semester, the students will have examined primary source material across the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels while exercising clear communication skills. They will have
debated the political, diplomatic, economic, military, and socio-cultural interactions that led to
the American Revolution and carried it through to a successful conclusion. In doing so, H999
will challenge their biases and assumptions as they relate to the war. In an active-learning,
flipped-classroom, gamified semester, cadets will graduate with a greater historical appreciation
for the interactions of culture and the warrior ethos inherent in American society. Therefore, after
successfully completing H999, cadets at the Air Force Academy will be more prepared to engage
with national security issues in the twenty-first century as officers in the United States Air Force.
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CHAPTER II
II. A BRIEF HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
The winter of 1779-1780 was brutal in its severity, or so we are told. On the 19th of
November, John Adams wrote that “the gale continues. Nothing else remarkable.”29
Simultaneously, George Washington penned letters to his opposing British Generals about the
virtues and vices of warfare, extolling the American cause while vilifying the claims and actions
of the Crown.30 He did not mention his troops nor the harsh weather. Yet that same winter,
Private Joseph Martin remarked that the season “was very stormy, a good deal of snow fell, and
in such weather it was a mere chance if we got any thing at all to eat. Our condition, at length,
became insupportable.”31 Three men, from three vastly different backgrounds, wrote three
separate primary accounts of the Revolutionary winter of ’79-‘80. John Adams’s primary
concern was diplomatic and political. George Washington concerned himself with the strategic
level of military endeavors. Private Martin was cold and hungry.
Similarly, much like Adams, Washington, and Martin, historians have focused on distinct
aspects of the Revolutionary War from differing perspectives. Traditionally, scholars have
focused on the Founding Fathers and their ability to craft a new nation out of the splintered
29
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British colonies. This “Great Man” approach detailed the political, economic, military, and
diplomatic roles of American leaders, nearly all of whom were wealthy landowners. Even
traditional military history revolved around troop movements and set-piece battles, but not the
troops themselves. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that historians examined the war
from the bottom-up, highlighting characters like Joseph Plumb Martin or John Greenwood.32
Also, around that same period, scholars began to examine areas outside of military or politicaldiplomatic spheres, focusing instead on the civil war that raged throughout the countryside.
Today, historians hold as many different views of the Revolutionary War as did those who
experienced it, from the political to the military-strategic to the common soldier. In the end, those
viewpoints provide a rich historiography for future scholars to synthesize and a key lesson for
future military officers who must understand that wars are not waged in a military vacuum but
include complex social and cultural interactions.

The Sweeping Narrative33
The historiographical context of the American Revolution falls into three main categories.
The first is the sweeping narrative that includes works such as The Glorious Cause by Robert
Middlekauff and The War of American Independence by Don Higginbotham.34 These books
attempt to combine the social, political, economic and military events together to produce an
overarching view of the war for American independence. While they succeed in showing
relationships between the different ideological forces and detail the actions generated by those
32
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movements, their shortcoming is the massive scope of the narrative that omits important details.
Yet because their primary goal is to educate an unfamiliar audience with a basic understanding of
the American Revolution, their works are valuable sources.
On the other hand, the sweeping narratives miss many of the important intricacies that led
to the development of crucial events. For example, Don Higginbotham covers the origins,
colonial traditions, civil-military tensions, international conflicts, frontier warfare, and major
campaigns of the American Revolution from 1763 until 1789 in The War of American
Independence. He does all that, and more, in less than five-hundred pages. While comprehensive
in scope, Higginbotham devotes only one paragraph to Cowpens and two to Guilford
Courthouse. The entire Southern Theater of the war, from 1778 until 1783, gets one chapter.35
While The War of American Independence is an excellent work of scholarship, its scope prevents
any in-depth study. Higginbotham’s Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Riflemen, on the other hand,
is still widely considered one of the premier biographies of Daniel Morgan despite being
published in 1961.36 Both works highlight the differences in historiographic genre, with the
sweeping narrative encompassing the breadth while the biography covers the depth of scholarly
analysis.
The Glorious Cause, by Robert Middlekauff, similarly casts a wide-ranging net. Though
he covers the same time period, 1763-1789, Middlekauff used over seven-hundred pages which
allowed him to focus slightly more on military strategy. His descriptions of the competing
strategies, which he called a War of Posts versus a War of Maneuver, were necessary additions
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that elucidated the Revolutionary leadership’s debates regarding how to militarily win the war.37
Despite a more military-focused work, The Glorious Cause still quickly discussed much of the
detail regarding the socio-political, economic, diplomatic, military and informational aspects of
the American Revolution. His scholarship is excellent, and The Glorious Cause is critically
acclaimed for a reason, but it is still broad enough that researchers must look elsewhere for
depth-of-knowledge concerning specific aspects of the Revolutionary War.
In addition to Higginbotham’s The War of American Independence, the similarly titled
The War for American Independence by Brigadier General Samuel Griffith II is, once again,
comparable in its overarching ability to present as many converging aspects of the Revolution as
possible into a single work. Griffith accomplished his task effectively, and while he delved into
the strategic military aspects of the Revolution, he highlighted the international diplomatic
tensions at the expense of the tactical.38
Other works examining colonial warfare offer additional insight into the sweeping
narratives of the American Revolution, and while most are military-centric in nature, they are
extremely broad. For example, Wayne Lee’s Barbarians and Brothers traced Anglo-American
warfare from 1500 to 1865. The ability to cover 365 years in 245 pages is a skill indeed, and Lee
did so effectively. He devoted two chapters to Revolutionary warfare and covered the three levels
of war, elucidating how all three levels changed depending on the belligerents.39 Violence against
Redcoats differed from violence against natives, as did the accompanying strategies, operations,
and tactics. While military-centric, Lee’s wide-ranging timeframe required a cursory overview of
37
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the American Revolution, and as with Higginbotham, Griffith, and Middlekauff, the limitations
of such a broad scope prevent any in-depth examination of the Continental Army.
Douglas Edward Leach and Howard Peckham follow the same trajectory as Lee in their
works Roots of Conflict and The Colonial Wars, respectively. Each one covers nearly a century
of colonial violence leading towards the American Revolution, and while they are also centered
around the military, or militias, their work sweeps through the era and highlights the interactions
between those who take up arms.40
The benefits of the sweeping narratives overshadow their drawbacks when one desires a
complete overview of the war, yet this category of American Revolution historiography is a
starting point – a place for researchers to begin their analysis. Once a scholar understands the
whole, they can delve into the specific aspects of the Revolution’s historiography.

The Socio-Political and Economic Causes41
The second historiographical category focuses on the social, political and economic
forces that combined to create the American Revolution. Unfortunately, this group leaves out
most of the military details. For these scholars, seeking causation for the American Revolution
negates the military aspect since the physical war was a byproduct of socio-political, cultural,
economic, and diplomatic facets of the conflict. Thus, the importance of determining the causes
and consequences of the Revolution relegates the military to a negligible role, or so these
scholars argue. Bernard Bailyn’s The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution and
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Gordon Wood’s The Radicalism of the American Revolution espouse the socio-political and
economic importance of the War at the expense of any military examination.42 Wood and Bailyn
convincingly argue for the socio-cultural, economic, and political break with England that
directly led to the hostilities. Wood claimed that the American Revolution was different than any
other revolution in history in the sense that class warfare did not manifest itself through
unnecessary, bloody violence. The poor did not overthrow the rich. Instead, the American
Revolution fundamentally altered social relationships to form “a new society unlike any that had
ever existed anywhere in the world… It was the Revolution, more than any other single event,
that made America into the most liberal, democratic, and modern nation in the world.”43 To him,
economic paternalism was the means to ensure the prosperity and growth of the local
community. Those who “had achieved economic and social superiority” were expected to lead
the government, both physically and materialistically.44
Wood further argues that Republicanism itself was as radical in the eighteenth century as
Marxism was for the nineteenth. It pervaded everything and fundamentally altered how
Westernized citizens viewed and responded to their society, culture, economy, and politics. This
distinct colonial ideology of Republicanism coalesced around the evils of the British empire and
Americans’ desire to manage their own affairs free from the Crown’s or Parliament’s
interventions. However, Wood and Bailyn’s analyses, while fair in their own right, do not
acknowledge the fact that without the threat of force, the colonial complaints and desires were
hollow. Only violence, specifically displayed through the actions the Sons of Liberty, brought a
greater concentration of Redcoats to America. The attempt to seize the weapons depot at

42
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1992). Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1991).
43
Wood, Radicalism, 6-7.
44
Ibid, 83.

27

Lexington in April of 1775 forced the colonial militia into action. While Republicanism may
have led the colonists to resist Imperial action, it was the use of force that sparked the war and
ultimately brought independence.
The threat of violence and its employment stirred discourse to action, yet a reading of The
Radicalism of the American Revolution would have one believe that physical conflict was an
unfortunate aftermath because the war had already been fought and won in the minds of the
colonists prior to Lexington and Concord. Wood’s choice to exclude military aspects in his
analysis portray the notion that the physical war itself was unimportant compared to the socialpolitical upheaval during the American Revolution. Political discourse is powerful, but bullets
draw blood. Further, wartime public opinion influenced strategy. Though Wood does not
specifically address the military, he does admit that “nearly everyone in the eighteenth century
had believed in the power of public opinion and had talked endlessly about it.”45 He was right.
George Washington and Thomas Paine took great effort in using public opinion to recruit
soldiers into the Continental Army. The timing of the Trenton and Princeton campaign in late
December of 1775 revolved around public opinion. The Commander-in-Chief needed a victory
before many of his troops’ enlistments expired, and the resultant publicity after the Hessian
defeat convinced many soldiers to remain with the Army. The victory was a success on all three
levels of war, and Thomas Paine followed it with his famous “Sunshine Patriot” exposé in The
Crisis, garnering renewed public hope in the American cause because of the combination
between military and social spheres.46 The critique of Wood is that he appeared to use an
integrative approach in his analysis, but by excluding the Continental Army or the militia, he
lacked any exploration of how military successes or failures influenced the radicalization of
45
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public opinion. While his work is a success in the socio-political sphere, one cannot determine
any military-political interaction as a result of his research.
The causes and consequences that Wood sought defined a historiographic generation.
Given the aims of Wood's project, examinations of the socio-political and economic causes of
the Revolution were appropriate, and his thesis illuminated the reasons and motives for the
behavior of the Revolution's leaders. For example, Wood explored the “new republican ideas of
what it was to be a gentleman.”47 The idea was so important that it described George
Washington’s behaviors and actions through the lens of virtue and republicanism. Though Wood
never specifically connected the importance of civility and gentlemanly behavior to
Washington’s military actions, Wood’s thesis does offer an explanation of Washington’s desire
to mold the Continental Army into a similar model as the British and to use it in “gentlemanly”
conduct. Through the lens of the Wood/Bailyn theses, one can sense the tension that Washington
and his fellow Generals felt when they decided to employ less-than “gentlemanly” tactics, such
as the targeting of Redcoat officers. Further, the notions of civility, virtue, and republicanism
were at odds with the stereotypical mannerisms of the tactical level soldiers. Thus, while they
effectively explore historical causation, the Wood/Bailyn theses made no mention of combat and
so unfairly portray the consequences of the Revolutionary War. In other words, the lack of
discussion about the role of the military prevents the authors from giving the consequences of the
American Revolution a full and fair assessment. Nonetheless, their work effectively congealed
pre-Revolution historiography around the eighteenth-century ideals of New Republicanism.
The American Revolution by Colin Bonwick and From Resistance to Revolution by
Pauline Maier similarly describe the socio-political and economic reasoning behind the War for
Independence at length, often consigning the military factors to a minor role or ignoring them
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altogether. Although both discuss the importance of the Continental Army, Bonwick describes its
importance solely as an entity that “provided an image of unified purpose and political
respectability” while Maier mentions the British discussions about Colonial “technical military
advantages” in passing.48 T. H. Breen’s American Insurgents, American Patriots does discuss the
importance of violence during the War for American Independence, but highlights the insurgency
within the American population and their willingness to use violence against British troops.
According to Breen, the insurgent’s beliefs were more important than military strategies,
campaigns, or battles.49
The American Revolution was, after all, a war. It was a war that upended the westernized
social and political order, but it was still a military conflict. The historical interest in non-military
aspects of the War for American Independence overlook the fact that wars manifest themselves
violently. Without the threat of military retaliation, any outside nation able to forcefully impose
its will on another’s internal population can dominate the social, political and economic aspects
of society. Dismissing the military ignores the most prominent, and arguably most pedagogically
popular, instrument used to defeat the British. The authors in the Wood/Bailyn historiographic
category conclude that the Revolution ultimately took place in the social order of the colonies
and that the American patriots waged their war for independence in socio-economic and political
spheres. While they would not be wrong, they fail to prove how the citizenry effected national
change free from British interference without military intervention. In short, American
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independence required the military just as it did any other socio-cultural, political, economic, or
religious element.
One cannot divorce the military from the American Revolution. There is no
independence without Trenton and Princeton, no international intervention without Saratoga, no
strategic shift without Guilford Courthouse, and no peace negotiations without Yorktown.50
Thus, leaving out the military aspect of the Revolutionary War promotes Robert Shalhope’s
assertion that the Wood/Bailyn theses are “one-dimensional, causing republican ideology to
appear centrally, even exclusively, political.”51

The Military
The final historiographic category focuses purely on the military aspects of the American
Revolution. They chronicle the battles, campaigns and the leadership traits of certain men. Works
such as Battles of the American Revolutions by W. J. Wood; Almost a Miracle by John Ferling,
Washington’s Crossing by David Hackett Fischer, and Benson Bobrick’s Angel in the Whirlwind:
The Triumph of the American Revolution detail military campaigns throughout the war. Only
occasionally do they attempt to reconcile the socio-political elements into the grander narrative.52
Not one is truly able to capture the military aspects of leadership. Even biographical sketches of
prominent generals, such as Joseph Ellis’ His Excellency: George Washington; Ron Chernow’s
50
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Washington: A Life; Nathanael Greene by Gerald M. Carbone or the indispensable Daniel
Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman by the late Don Higginbotham, struggle to capture fully the
military essentials crucial to victory across the entirety of the three levels of war. A true study of
the leadership elements that brought about the American victory can only come about by
assessing the primary leaders at their respective levels of war and examining their interaction
with one another.
More recently, historians have examined the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of
war from the British perspective. Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy sought the consequences of
the British defeat within their own strategic decisions in The Men Who Lost America. He argued
that Britain had a superior military force, but not one that could occupy an unruly population,
especially in light of an international conflict. It was the leadership’s assumption that a large
Loyalist population existed in America that led to poor strategic decisions, and ultimately to the
end of the war.53 With Zeal and Bayonets Only, by Matthew Spring, follows the same trajectory
from an operational and tactical standpoint. Concluding that the war was unwinnable because “it
had no political center of gravity,” Spring instead highlights the British belief that a colonial
perception of Redcoat invincibility would lead to their eventual capitulation.54 Unfortunately, the
British were continually harassed through la petit guerre and their tactical victories were often
Pyrrhic, negating any kind of perceived invincibility.55 Combined, both O’Shaughnessy and
Spring detail the effectiveness of the levels of war throughout the American Revolution, but from
the British perspective.
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One other historiographic category that is still emerging attempts to place the American
Revolution into a larger military context. Russell F. Weigley began the trend with his work The
American Way of War, in which he argued that the United States has developed a uniquely
American method of warfare throughout its history. While he included the American Revolution
as a prominent moment in the establishment of this way of war, he claimed that because the
Continental Army was so small, it was not powerful enough to create its own way of war. The
American way of war, according to Weigley, did not occur until the Civil War, culminating with
Grant’s siege of Richmond and Sherman’s march to the sea.56 Historians Wayne Lee and John
Grenier disagree, citing colonial warfare between settlers and Native Americans as the beginning
of a uniquely American method of fighting. Grenier’s The First Way of War is the antithesis to
Weigley, whereas Lee attempts to fit the totality of early American warfare into context in
Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865, highlighting the differences in
violence between those of European descent and those with ethnic differences, in this case the
Native Americans. In effect, Lee provides the synthesis of Weigley’s and Grenier’s work.
This American way of war would be drastically different than the European model, yet it
would still rely on the three levels of war with specific commanders at each level. Despite the
fact that George Washington continued to train and equip his forces after the European model,
his tactical commanders employed a combined American-European model. Some engagements
were so completely American that the British complained of “unfairness” and “savage
warfare.”57 Thus, tactical action impacted strategic thinking.
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John Grenier discussed strategy in his work The First Way of War, and cited Russell F.
Weigley’s The American Way of War extensively, but neither author discussed the importance of
keeping the right leaders in place; instead they focused on strategic level planning.58 In effect, the
combined leadership of Washington, Greene and Morgan proved superior to the battle-tested
career soldiers in the British military. They formed an indispensable triad of knowledge in their
respective areas of expertise, setting in motion an American way of war that Grenier labeled
“Petite Guerre.” The indispensable triad of Washington, Greene, and Morgan was necessary to
achieve an American victory and the current historiographic discourse only dances around the
subject, focusing instead on the socio-economic and political motives or the biographical Great
Man model.

Primary Sources
Researchers have used the thirteen-volume set of The Papers of General Nathanael
Greene to develop a biographical sketch of the operational commander’s ability to wage war.59
They have gleaned great insight into the man, and authors such as Gerald M. Carbone and Terry
Golway dissected his personal and military traits.60 Yet Greene’s papers detail more than just the
man. His correspondence with George Washington at the strategic level and Daniel Morgan at
the tactical level can illuminate how the operational commander carried out strategic-level orders
to satisfy the direction set forth by his commander-in-chief. Furthermore, his letters to Daniel
Morgan demonstrate the way an operational commander set the objective for his tactician while
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still allowing him to do his job unencumbered by micromanagement. Using The Papers of
Nathanael Greene along with an understanding of Clausewitz, one can see the essential nature of
having the right leaders in the right places at the right time, and keeping them there free from
unnecessary bureaucracy as a precursor to waging war against a superior foe. These papers are
the primary sources that demonstrate the team cohesion between Washington, Greene, and
Morgan and can give cadets insight into the necessary correspondence between leaders up and
down the chain of command.
The fifty-two-volume set (and counting) of the George Washington Papers also provide
meaningful insight into early America. While all of his papers are noteworthy, the twenty-four
volume Revolutionary War Series give the best information for the purposes of this paper.
Unfortunately, they are not yet complete. Volume Twenty-Four takes the researcher through 9
March 1780, before Nathanael Greene’s famous Race to the Dan campaign.61 Even though they
are unfinished, Washington’s extensive papers provide the researcher with an exhaustive look
into the mind of one of the nation’s most revered leaders.
Further, The Papers of George Washington provide insight into the strategic guidance he
sent to the operational and tactical level commanders, often after consulting with Congress or
other strategic thinkers. Comparing these writings with the Papers of General Nathanael Greene
and the correspondence of leaders at the other levels of war, such as Daniel Morgan or Benedict
Arnold, highlight how strategic vision gets implemented on the battlefield. Further, one can
reverse the process and trace primary accounts from the battlefield up through the chain of
command to see how the overall strategy is affected by a tactical outcome. An understanding of
this process is extremely important for cadets to grasp as they will begin their professional
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careers at the tactical level. Using the levels of war as a pedagogical framework is an effective
way to shape a student’s worldview and hone their critical thinking.
Daniel Morgan was not a prolific writer, and therefore his correspondence was minimal
compared to Washington and Greene – not nearly enough to be published into volumes like the
Papers of George Washington or the Papers of Nathanael Greene. Thankfully, most of Morgan’s
letters during the American Revolution were to Washington or Greene. Those that were not, and
were still of a military nature, are recorded in the footnotes of Don Higginbotham’s Daniel
Morgan or North Callahan’s biography of the same name.62 Combined, a researcher can piece
together Morgan’s most influential writings from other widely available sources.
Besides Morgan, there are several other important tactical accounts that give insight into
the ground level of war. Of these, Joseph Plumb Martin is perhaps the most well-known. His A
Narrative of a Revolutionary Soldier provides a superb account of the daily life of a common
troop in the Continental Army throughout the American Revolution. He describes the hardships,
boredom, hunger, privation, exultation, and excitement only experienced by foot soldiers. He
rarely speaks of strategy (if at all) yet gives the reader a unique view of the tactical level of war.63
The course presented in this paper recommends several other prominent works that will
aid an instructor in preparing to teach a class on the Revolutionary War. In addition to the works
previously mentioned, specifically those by Ron Chernow, W.J. Wood, Robert Middlekauff, John
Ferling, David Hackett Fischer, and Don Higginbotham, the course relies heavily on primary
source material. Thomas Paine’s writings feature prominently throughout H999, as does Baron
von Steuben’s Revolutionary War Drill Manual and various newspaper accounts from the era.
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George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Rankin’s Rebels and Redcoats: The American Revolution Through
the Eyes of Those Who Fought and Lived It provide another exceptional repository of primary
sources that are expertly worked in to the overall narrative.64
One other manuscript is worthy of mention, as it provides another unique view of the
tactical level from both land and sea. John Greenwood was a soldier who fought at Bunker Hill,
scouted for Benedict Arnold on the way to Canada, continued with him to Ticonderoga, and
witnessed firsthand the Battle of Trenton. After his ground exploits, Greenwood went to sea as a
privateer. His A Young Patriot in the American Revolution provides another opportunity to
understand the tactical level of war. Interestingly, Greenwood would later become a prominent
dentist in the early Republic -- so prominent that he became the first President’s dentist.65
Finally, as an important side note regarding the conduct of H999, when students are
conducting research for their reading and writing assignments, they are restricted to the authors
listed in this historiography. While not all encompassing, the noted scholars within these pages
are prominent American Revolution historians. Therefore, students are required to begin their
research with these names and books before branching out to the deep, dark internet.66 Should
they find new research or articles from credible sources, like JSTOR or other scholarly journals,
they will not be restricted, but as history majors they should rely on the prominent Revolutionary
War-era scholars first before they branch out.
Overall, the historiography of the American Revolution is ripe for a synthesis between the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The purpose of this paper is not to fully flesh out
64

Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin Steuben, ed., Baron von Steuben’s Revolutionary War Drill
Manual: A Facsimile Reprint of the 1794 Edition (New York: Dover Publications, 1985). George F. Scheer and
Hugh F. Rankin, eds., Rebels and Redcoats: The American Revolution Through the Eyes of Those Who Fought and
Lived It, A Da Capo paperback (New York, N.Y: Da Capo Press, 1987).
65
John Greenwood, A Young Patriot in the American Revolution 1775-1783 (Westvaco, 1981).
66
In H999, the student requirement to use the noted scholars within this essay is enforceable through their
individual bibliography. Internet citations without instructor approval will cost them course points for not following
directions.

37

this synthesis, but rather to argue for the benefits of using the levels of war as a pedagogical
framework in the classroom. A focus on primary sources first, before viewing other historian’s
research, will enable the students to engage in a scholarly debate about the military-societal
relationship during the late-eighteenth century. To that end, the synthesis between the three levels
of war during the American Revolution will provide a necessary and useful example to future
officers in the U.S. Military. Hopefully, the students will conclude the semester with an
understanding of the historiographical interaction of both the levels of war and the diplomatic,
economic, military, and political elements of national power and their corresponding research
variants. With any luck, after the semester ends, they will at least be unable to echo John
Adams’s sentiment on 19 November 1779 when he wrote that there was “nothing else
remarkable.” 67
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CHAPTER III
III. PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICES AND APPLICATIONS
War, no matter the technological advancement, remains human. Modern developments in
military technology, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Fifth-Generation Fighters,
combined with an American way of war that believes people can separate themselves from the
realities of military conflict, has created an erroneous myth that relegates warfare to a computer
terminal. While technology may indeed create situations that enable the U.S. to keep troops out
of immediate danger, real-world decisions will continue to be made in real-time, affecting lives
and altering the military and political situation. Tactical implementation of strategic guidance has
always been, and always will be, the foundational undertaking of military endeavors. Creating a
pedagogical framework around that idea is essential to the education of the next generation of
national leaders, especially in the Service Academies.
Technological tools help win wars, but it is the knowledge and actions of people at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels that make the difference. Besides, if war is human, as
many historians and theorists continue to argue, then John Lewis Gaddis’s notion “that historical
consciousness helps to establish human identity” remains crucial in American society.68 Further,
to achieve an American identity based on a historical consciousness, especially one that
advocates peace and prosperity on the world stage in the twenty-first century, then Gaddis is
correct in his assertion that “the single most important thing any historian has to do… is to
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teach.”69 Educators must have a clear point of departure and a cogent framework in order to
guide students in their intellectual journey. Young cadets need to graduate ready to engage in
their chosen military field and must understand that their tactical decisions have strategic
consequences. Finally, they must comprehend that technology does not trump critical or complex
thinking. The “real world” relies on the humanities and “true” critical, complex thinking.
With that in mind, this chapter will illuminate three major areas in modern academia that
H999 will confront throughout the semester. First, it will elucidate several growing problems in
modern academia, among them the divergence between STEM and humanities, the lack of
student engagement, and the overuse of the ill-defined term “critical thinking.” Next, it will show
how the levels of war pedagogical methodology is useful in highlighting the relevant nature of
the humanities in a STEM-centric environment. In the process, students become more engaged in
class because they see how the subject will impact their immediate future. Finally, several
common pedagogical examples will showcase how professors can incorporate the levels of war
into their Military History courses, using the American Revolution as the primary case study.
History reveals that humans gravitate into hierarchies; people strive to better their
condition, often at the expense of others. Utopias do not work. No major system has ever been
able to promise and provide full equality to all its citizens, all the time. Historians William H.
and J. R. McNeill point out in The Human Web that “what drives history is the human ambition
to alter one’s condition to match one’s hopes… and how they pursued their hopes, depended on
the information, ideas, and examples available to them.”70 In other words, people throughout
history have attempted to move up the societal hierarchy from where they began towards where
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they hoped to be. While many history courses examine this phenomenon, the one major a priori
assumption is that hierarchy exists.
Modern society was built on a hierarchical foundation. While the evolution of a societal
class framework is not the purpose of this essay, few would argue against the fact that an
Americanized worldview is based on a chain of command -- businesses have Chief Executive
Officers and Vice Presidents; Universities have Provosts, Deans, and Chairs; the military has a
rank structure -- yet when hierarchical-societal functions are discussed in the classroom, they are
often treated in a purely academic manner. Rarely does a course focus on where the
undergraduate, in this case an Air Force Academy cadet, will fit into the hierarchy immediately
after graduation. Although the debate continues regarding the main purpose of higher education,
whether it be to produce a workforce or critically-minded citizens, a Service Academy has the
specific duty to produce officers both immediately ready to join a military workforce and trained
to think critically about national security and the defense of the nation. Thus, this paper will
argue primarily from a military and Service Academy point of view.
Modern undergraduates are transitioning away from the humanities in favor of STEMcentric fields. A 2016 study highlighted a decline of humanities majors by nearly nine percent, a
trend that began in 2012.71 Presumably, students believe that the STEM fields will give them a
better chance to alter their condition to match their intended hopes. Administrators complicate
the situation by reducing the budget for departments that do not have as many students,
exacerbating the problem for the humanities. Further, non-STEM departments have failed to
adapt to a changing collegiate environment, preferring instead to rely on the hope that the
pendulum of time will swing back. The humanities, history in particular, is stereotypically a
71
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discipline of traditionalists who favor the “sage on the stage” lecture model over more recent,
and thus less accepted, methods of instruction. The pedagogical pendulum might reverse, but in
the meantime, military history classrooms within Service Academies should alter their
educational framework to highlight the hierarchical position in which recent graduates will find
themselves immediately after graduation. Instead of focusing on either the lowest levels of the
hierarchical system (the enlisted soldiers – E-4s and below) or the political, financial, or military
leaders (the Generals – O-7s and above), courses can use the three levels of war to elucidate
where a graduate will emerge into the military and where that officer can advance.72 Currently,
there is no longitudinal study focusing on a cadet’s understanding of the levels of war, or how
that understanding changes as they move through the military ranks. Without it, or a similar
study, there is no firm way of knowing if this method will work. At the same time, there is
evidence that suggests students become more engaged when they realize that what they are
learning will directly affect their lives.73
Understanding how tactical leaders implement directives from the operational and
strategic levels should highlight the relevance of military history to the student’s lives. With
further comprehension about their place in a military hierarchy, cadets will be able to focus their
critical thinking along these pedagogical lines.
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In short, instead of viewing history from either top down or bottom up, a blended
hierarchical model can become relevant to cadets in the twenty-first century. Thus, using the
levels of war pedagogical methodology allows the STEM-centric student to realize the benefits
and relevancy of history by simultaneously teaching both a top down and a bottom up approach
and placing the cadet in the middle.

The Problem of Time
The issue devolves into time; there is simply not enough of it each semester to teach
everything there is to teach. This is not new. Teachers from kindergarten through college have all
lamented that there is not enough time to cover everything that they would like the students to
know, nor is there sufficient time to allow students to practice what they have learned. In his
1913 book entitled The Teaching of History, E. C. Hartwell lamented the time constraints in
which to develop “a citizen of the Republic… [whose] vote will shortly influence, for good or ill,
the destinies of the nation.”74 Over one hundred years later, history professors still make the
same complaint.
Things since 1913 have changed though. In addition to another extremely eventful
century of history, pedagogical methods, techniques, and technologies have transformed. When
Mr. Hartwell wrote his influential work, he alluded to the notion that scholars and students
should only study the great men and women of history and that instructors should prioritize
verbatim memorization from their students.75 In the information age, the Internet of Things
provides students with instantaneous access to limitless historical information; thus the Great
Man model and rote memorization seem unnecessary as pedagogical techniques because
historical contextualization is available without memorization. At best, students view
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memorization as a tedious waste of time, and at worst, the “Great Man” model and rote
memorization discourage students from studying history because they view both model and
memorization as outdated modes of scholarship. Thankfully, professors today can rely on the
proliferation of tools, often internet or technology-based, to flesh out a more fully immersive
historical narrative and engage undergraduates. In other words, even though there are still time
constraints, modern teachers can use their time more efficiently and effectively.
At the same time, the enormous amount of information so readily available can make it
difficult to determine what is important enough to require student effort and attention. As a
result, instructors often pick and choose specific aspects of history to teach and how to teach
them, usually based on the Professor’s area of expertise. Thus, a social historian will likely focus
on the experience of the masses and highlight how the people have influenced the events of
history. A political historian will elucidate the actions of the law-makers and national leadership.
A military historian will discuss war. All will usually thread the major events into their narrative
over the semester in an effort to cover the material. All will do their best to present the
information in a way that will foster critical thinking, because the political historian, the military
historian, and the social historian understand that critical thinking is the ultimate goal of the
University.

The Problem with “Critical Thinking”
Unfortunately, the term “critical thinking” itself only exacerbates the problems faced in
higher education today. “Critical thinking” has become a buzz word, loosely thrown around
without any universal, standard definition. If it has one, that definition is often redefined at will
in each academic department to suit their needs. In reality, critical thinking has become closer to
disciplinary-specific problem-solving.
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The Foundation for Critical Thinking itself has a difficult time with its definition; on one
page there are no less than four different definitions.76 All of them are nebulous, broad, vague,
and non-objectifiable so as to be near unusable in an academic setting. Without a standard, easily
and universally definable end-state, an organization cannot expect to produce the characteristics
it claims to engender in recent graduates.
The University of North Dakota’s own “Bush Longitudinal Study: What Students Tell Us
About Cross-Disciplinary General Education Goals and Learning” admits that most students
define the “thinking and reasoning” skillset as something that has to do with artistic ability.77 If
undergraduates cannot define the objective they are working towards, how can they be expected
to succeed? In the findings from the UND Longitudinal Study, recommendations included
methods to improve student’s critical thinking, including the ability to “synthesize and analyze
texts… evaluate the logic… and come to reasoned conclusions,” but the document never defines
what critical thinking is.78 While it is true that professors can recognize critical thinking when
they see it, that does not give the student a quantifiable goal to work towards. While every
individual goal may not need to be quantified to be meaningful and attainable, the lack of
quantification eliminates the ability to objectively document attainment. In other words, though
the professor may deem a goal complete, they struggle to prove it to an administration bent on
metric-driven assessment. Thus, a nebulous definition of “critical thinking” is a disservice to
students, teachers, and administrators.
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The U.S. Air Force Academy recently defined Critical Thinking in its Curriculum
Handbook as “the process of self-aware, informed, and reflective reasoning for problem-solving
and decision-making in the absence of ideal information.” 79 While this definition works well for
USAFA and is accepted amongst academic departments, it is still, unfortunately, a definition
limited to a single university. A comprehensive definition, or another term entirely, is necessary
across institutions to allow future military officers from every commissioning source to become
“critical thinkers.”80
While this paper does not seek to dispense with critical thinking throughout academia, it
does highlight the problem inherent in poorly defined nomenclature or overused buzzwords.
“Critical thinking” is defined and applied differently across institutions. With that in mind, this
essay will use the USAFA definition of critical thinking as defined in its 2017 Curriculum
Handbook.81 It is a definition that cadets can understand, one that is relevant to them, and one
that complements the levels of war methodology. All can agree that the goal is to get students to
see the “bigger picture”; to view the world with an analytical eye and see the connections across
disciplines, humanity, time and space. The USAFA definition of critical thinking can establish an
emotional connection in students with those at the tactical level and trace the implications of
their actions to the strategic level, bridging the gap between subfields and fostering the required
“critical thinking” institutional objective.
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Problems and Experiences
Education is emotional. Learners, especially young undergraduates, enter college and
immediately have their long-standing beliefs and world-views challenged. Ella Kahu speaks of
the “culture shock” undergraduates encounter in their collegiate experience and notes that how
they handle it becomes a crucial step towards developing them into a complex thinker and a
lifelong self-learner.82 Often, however, the "hard" sciences have the stereotype of being
emotionless because they claim to be based on absolutes, concrete data sets, and scientific
principles. Susan Ambrose and her co-authors of How Learning Works label this a "quantitative
view of knowledge," where the accumulation of the "right facts" constitutes knowledge.83
Indeed, some of that may be true. On the other hand, an emotionally sterile environment skips
the essential psychological growth that young students need. Between STEM and the
Humanities, it is the Humanities that deal with the complexities of emotion, necessitating at least
a minimal amount of interdisciplinary studies.
Teaching the levels of war model introduces emotion at a relatable level. Once cadets
understand that they will become a part of the tactical level immediately after graduation, they
begin to relate to those who have gone before them. Introducing ambiguous orders from the
operational or strategic level generates similar frustrations in the student that many historical
figures felt as recorded in the primary sources. One pedagogical example would include issuing
the same order that General Washington gave to Daniel Morgan outside of Philadelphia: “give
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them every degree of annoyance in that quarter.”84 The cadets would then have to develop and
present a plan to “annoy” the British with the knowledge that their strategic-level commander
expected results. In this example, the Professor would need to agitate the ambiguity and generate
student frustration, which she/he could accomplish through attaching academic points to the
event or placing students in competition with each other. Introducing emotional historical
problems forces students to come to grips with their frustrations while gaining a relatable
historical perspective. Further, research suggests that Problem Based Learning and Experiential
Learning inside a Learning Community can generate multidisciplinary knowledge and create an
understanding of the importance of historical, humane, and STEM fields. Courses should focus
on real-world applicability in every lesson, which allows students to process how the material
fits into the larger picture, thus highlighting the relevancy of history in the twenty-first century.
Modern pedagogy is awash with various teaching methods and interesting approaches to
use in the classroom. The Chronicle of Higher Ed, Inside Higher Ed, EDUCAUSE, the NMC
Horizon Report, various peer-reviewed journals of pedagogy, and countless teaching resources
provide the instructor with numerous ways to present material creatively. Several approaches
appear more often in the literature, and of those, this paper will focus on the following four:
Problem Based Learning, Experiential Learning, Learning Communities, and Gaming. These
four common areas closely align with military training methods, and thus are predominately used
in the service academies, specifically the Air Force Academy.
Problem Based Learning (PBL) differs from traditional methods of instruction by
presenting the students with situations needing solutions. STEM fields traditionally utilize
problem sets, but the humanities are only recently beginning to understand the effects that the
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PBL model has on higher-level thinking. New research carried out in collegiate history classes
show that presenting students with ambiguous problems develops their metacognition more
quickly than traditional methods.85 In one study, researchers presented the class with a situation
in which the U.S. Navy discovered a new Pacific island. The students were divided into
Expansionists, Anti-Expansionists, and Senators. Each group needed to convince the Senatorial
committee, who had their own agendas and biases, on the course of action that the United States
should pursue. Following the exercise, the events were compared to the annexation of the
Philippines in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War of 1898.86 The post-exercise surveys
showed that the students brought a multidisciplinary approach to the problem, seeking all
possible solutions and arguments for near and long-term stability as they fought to convince the
student-senators to accept their respective positions.87
Professors could ask that students also attempt to find technological solutions in addition
to historical, political, economic, or socio-cultural answers, thus bridging the gap between STEM
and Humanities. Overall, this method “has a significant relationship with the development of
postformal thinking skills,” justifying an inter- or multi-disciplinary approach in the
humanities.88
While this example resides exclusively at the strategic level, it could be easily expanded
to the operational and tactical. Asking the students about the logistical efforts involved in
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supplying and protecting a new island chain highlights the operational, whereas the tactical level
could wrestle with an insurgent population or an imperial rival attack. Both scenarios correspond
to actual historical events and could be tied into Brian Linn’s The Philippine War.89 Solving illdefined problems clearly benefits cadets across all fields of study.90
Another way to highlight the levels of war using Problem Based Learning in the
classroom would be to split the students into three groups; one simulating the strategic level,
another the operational level, and the third the tactical level. Only students at the strategic level
are allowed to see the overall problem. As an example, they could be given the same information
that George Washington had when he learned that the British captured Charleston in 1780. The
instructor would then require this group of students to give direction to the operational-level
students on a 3x5 card, simulating the difficulty of communications in Early America. Likewise,
the operational-level students would need to give more specific direction to their tactical-level
classmates, who would attempt to develop a battlefield plan in accordance with their directives.
If the scenario is based on a historical example such as Horatio Gates’s disastrous Battle at
Camden, the results could be given to the tactical level students, and they would have the
challenge of communicating those results, again on a 3x5 card, up through the levels of war.
The culmination of the exercise would come when the three groups are brought together
to discuss their roles in relation to the other levels and discover if they were successful in
accomplishing their mission. The instructor could then reveal the actual historical scenario that
the situation was based on, highlighting what the students either did or did not do that matched
historical characters. This technique is similar to gaming as discussed below.
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These Problem Based Learning exercises combine the levels of war methodology with
exercises shown to develop metacognition at a quicker rate than traditional lecture. It further
demonstrates an active-learning methodology in a humanities classroom that incorporates
decision-making across disciplines, making it relevant to students regardless of their academic
major.
Introducing students into real-world environments to enhance their knowledge has been
used for some time. Health professionals routinely bring students into clinics; biologists take
learners into the field; educators include teaching internships; psychologists and communication
students all utilize experiential learning in some form to significant effect.91 Unfortunately, most
of this experiential learning takes place in a discipline-specific environment, and the military is
no different. The Air Force Academy routinely allows cadets to use flight simulators, gliders, or
powered aircraft to generate the three-dimensional thinking that pilots require. Further, many
courses connect those experiences with aeronautics, giving the cadets a truly immersive
experience in the learning. Pre-airpower history courses traditionally have more difficulty since
two-dimensional warfare is extinct.92 Thankfully, experiential learning can exist in such a
historical setting. The Department of History at the Air Force Academy takes cadets on a
“Historical Weapon’s Shoot,” giving them a chance to fire weapons beginning with the 1766
Charleville musket and advancing through the weapons of American history.93 Each weapon
station is manned by a professor dressed in period uniform. For instance, the Korean War station
will allow students to fire Korean war-era weapons while being instructed in period garb. Thus,
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cadets participate in the evolution of weaponry from the American Revolution through the
modern wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while experiencing the differences in uniform and
equipment. Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Watanabe, Assistant Professor of History at USAFA,
explains, “The smell of damp wool mixed with gunpowder added to the historical experience.
Many shooters got to try on various pieces of (gear), increasing their understanding of soldiering
through the ages. The shooters smell the powder, feel the recoil and hear the report of the
weapons, but they also experience the challenge of loading and firing these weapons of history in
all sorts of conditions.”94 Cadets can touch and smell the changing technology since the
eighteenth-century and comprehend how technological advancements need to be backed up with
sound decision-making. The students know that their future involves warfare, so this type of
experiential learning is directly relevant to every cadet involved.
Incorporating experiential learning early in an undergraduate’s career enhances cognitive
development in the same way as Problem Based Learning while encouraging multidisciplinary
thought, once again bridging the gap between STEM and Humanities and creating relevancy.
Timothy Stanton argues that public service is another excellent way to develop socially
responsible and civically minded students. Most institutions claim that their mission is to
produce intelligent and culturally-minded citizens, so it is surprising that this approach is not
used more often in academia.95 Integrating public service early in collegiate life focuses students’
ability to determine what they want out of their college experience leading to an understanding
that each discipline is unique and critical, whether it is STEM or the Humanities. For example,
cadets at the service academies have a very diverse core curriculum, including Aeronautical
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Engineering, Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, Engineering Mechanics, as well as
History, English, Political Science, Military Strategic Studies, and Philosophy.96
Most courses incorporate some type of experiential learning exercise, but rarely do they
cross disciplines. Inserting a multidisciplinary exercise across the levels of war would engender
the type of complex interdisciplinary thinking necessary in twenty-first century leaders. Further,
this type of partnership is exactly what Barbara Gross Davis suggests in Tools for Teaching.97
The Academies are able to tailor parts of the curriculum to relevant subjects because they know
where their students are headed. While civilian universities do not have the same luxury, USAFA
can still tailor their curriculum to the a priori assumption that graduates will enter the Air Force
at the tactical level. In other words, cadets will most like not be demoted to lower enlisted ranks,
nor will they emerge as a Colonel or General strategist directly after graduation. Rather, they
must know how to interpret and implement the strategic guidance of their superiors. Ultimately,
the goal would be to have cadets engage in public service, determine causation for the situation
based on a study of the humanities, and attempt to find a STEM-based technological solution to
aid the service, thus practicing a multidisciplinary approach to PBL and Experiential Learning.
Problem-Based and Experiential Learning are not new pedagogical techniques; David
Kolb formalized experiential learning theories in his aptly-titled Experiential Learning:
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Experience as the Source of Learning and Development in 1984.98 Yet these frequently utilized
techniques are usually kept in a strict field-specific setting among undergraduates cordoned off
within their major. While this benefits the students inside each discipline, it fails the holistic
liberal arts mission of producing civically-minded complex thinkers. The solution is to
incorporate Learning Communities immediately upon students’ arrival to a university.99 Wynn
defines learning communities as "classes that are linked or clustered, often around an
interdisciplinary theme, and that enroll a common cohort of students.”100 If new students were
strategically placed into grouped learning communities based upon categories such as their
career aspirations, projected fields of study, hobbies, and personality traits, the institution could
create unique multidisciplinary groups that incorporate teamwork throughout their academic
endeavors. Further, placing these strategic Learning Communities within the pedagogical
framework of PBL and Experiential Learning courses, specifically in the humanities, can rebuild
the cohesiveness of a fractured disciplinary university system. A cohort of multidisciplinary
students who understand the importance of both STEM and the humanities can illuminate the
pedagogical benefits to a weak institutional leadership team. Revamping the system would
require a significant shift in university policy, but the benefits of creating a culturally-inclusive
and disciplinary-diverse class of students would be worth the effort.
To further express the levels of war methodology, these Learning Communities could
blend between class years, with Seniors mirroring the strategic level, Juniors and Sophomores
the operational, and Freshmen the tactical. Thankfully, the Military Academies do this already.
Cadets enter with no responsibility other than to follow orders. Each year they gain more
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responsibility until as Seniors, they work with the Academy leadership to shape the strategic
policy of the institution.
While difficulties exist in implementing this, the benefits to students are enormous. For
one, they experience the hierarchical form of the military in an academic environment and
understand the necessity of a liberal arts education. This alone has the potential to show the
relevancy of the humanities in a STEM-centric environment.
Service Academies are at a natural advantage creating Learning Communities; something
that derives from the common calling inherent in members of the military. Even though their
academic interests are as diverse as students in a civilian university, cadets have the shared
knowledge that the common defense of the nation continues to be their collective mission after
graduation. Thus, instructors have the ability to use their military experiences to bridge
disciplinary differences. Effective academic projects focus on military problems while utilizing
cadets from a variety of undergraduate majors. War gaming is one way to engage students while
implementing the levels of war pedagogical methodology.

Gamification
Games in the classroom have been a topic of pedagogical debate for many years;
however, Jane McGonigal asserts that gaming is the cure for lagging student engagement.101
Additionally, The History Teacher routinely devotes space to thought-provoking articles
extolling the virtues or detriments of using games to enhance student engagement in the
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classroom.102 The proliferation of modern console games has only strengthened the argument,
but games have not yet made large headway into the academic environment. A traditional
problem that teachers often face is how to incorporate gaming into a course when timing is
already a critical issue. Survey courses are especially problematic. They need innovative,
entertaining, and engaging techniques to draw in students that are bombarded with distractions,
from social media to sports to video games to music all in the palm of their hand. Modern
undergraduates struggle to focus on the traditional lecture necessitating instructors to modify
their teaching techniques. For many professors, this includes games.
Some survey courses have managed to utilize traditional board games into their
classrooms with success. For instance, John Pagnotti and William B. Russell III explain how
they incorporated chess into their World History classroom in “Exploring Medieval European
Society with Chess: An Engaging Activity for the World History Classroom.”103 In their article,
they elucidate how chess “provides educators with a classroom-tested lesson activity for teaching
medieval European society content using the game of chess by providing background
information on the history of chess, a rationale for including chess in the classroom, and step-bystep procedures to infuse this activity when the topic of feudalism is covered.”104 In the
classroom, they discuss the history of chess, trace the evolution of the game from inception
through its modern variant, and compare the game to feudal society. During the unit, students
learn and play the game against each other, discussing strategy and developing different ways to
adjust the rules to match various historical societies. Their approach is a worthwhile endeavor
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and seems to engage the students, but unfortunately it is not applicable across various historical
courses other than feudal societies.
Similar problems exist for many other games, some sacrificing historical accuracy for
student engagement while others necessitate large blocks of time. Professor Solomon K. Smith
uses war-games to teach the American Revolution in his Colonial America class, and praises the
pedagogical benefits that games provide. He states that “wargames force students to participate
in the decision making process… [and] allows the students to engage in real-time research as
they try to understand how the actual battles progressed in history.”105 He then asks the
participants to write a short paper describing what they experienced, noting that the students
write with a new perspective — one that contains emotion and personal involvement. Although
Smith saw great pedagogical benefit in using war-games, he had to adapt his syllabus to
accommodate the extra time, going so far as to require hours of gaming outside of the regular
class period. To fix the problem, he made the war-games voluntary for his students, seeing ten to
seventeen of twenty-five students participate.106 Unfortunately, his approach re-introduces the
major problem for instructors: time and interest. While those that volunteered to play gained
pedagogical and historical benefits, the instructor cannot penalize those that did not participate.
Thus, while educational, these games could not be used as overarching examples in class without
alienating non-participants, nor could they be used in course-wide tests or papers. Further,
Professor Smith’s article does not divulge if he tried wargaming with a class size larger that
twenty-five students or if he attempted to war-game in a survey course. One can imagine that the
larger the class, and the quicker the pace of instruction, the less likely a war-game could work.
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A counter-argument might suggest that because officers in the military, particularly at the
War Colleges, engage in wargaming on a large scale, that it can also be done with many students
in a fast-paced course like a U.S. History survey. And while it is true that military schools,
including the Service Academies, routinely war-game as a part of their curriculum, their
pedagogical focus is extremely specific compared to civilian universities.107 The military
conducts wargames as a tool for fighting future conflicts rather than imparting historical
knowledge. Though many historical strategic, operational, and tactical situations are used in
military wargaming, the base objective is to examine how better decisions could be made in the
future instead of the historical value of the game itself. Further, the Service Academies and War
Colleges build entire departments around the military arts and sciences. At the Air Force
Academy, the Department of Military and Strategic Studies conducts several in-class wargaming
scenarios as well as oversees an extra-curricular war-gaming club for cadets.108 So while
wargaming is pedagogically effective as a learning tool, it is extremely time consuming. When
time is at such a premium during a survey course, adding a new time-consuming exercise is not
something many professors want to try. Thus, games have not become prominent inside of
undergraduate classrooms.
The idea that a student could play a game as homework and write a short paper about it is
well founded. Board games like Axis and Allies, Diplomacy, or 1776 are useful for teaching
strategy to those students who enjoy that style of play, whereas video games provide another way
for students to learn and engage in strategic decision making. Europa Universalis is commonly
cited as one of the best historically accurate strategic video games on the market that also
107
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incorporates diplomacy, economics, operational and tactical levels, as well as the ability to play
over a myriad of historical time periods. This makes it a wonderful choice to highlight the levels
of war. At the same time, it is notoriously difficult to learn. Nonetheless, there are a myriad of
games that span the levels of war. Thus, if the goal is to get students to understand, experience
and engage with the strategic, the operational, and the tactical in a historical setting, games
provide an excellent tool.
In his article “Teaching History with Digital Historical Games: An Introduction to the
Field and Best Practices,” author Jeremiah McCall cites the most prominent and popular
historical games available as of 2016. His list includes tactical first-person shooters like Call of
Duty, third-person adventures in historical settings such as Assassin’s Creed and overarching
strategic games like Total War.109 Throughout his article, McCall emphasizes that video games
can be an pedagogically effective when combined with teacher oversight and historical
instruction. The critical element is that professor’s must take the time to “explicitly connect the
game to course instruction” while continuing to “discuss, debrief, and evaluate” the student’s
gaming throughout the semester.110 When done correctly, games can add a level of realism and
emotion to historical instruction.
Games also help differentiate between the levels of war while allowing the students to
make choices and see the consequences of their decisions. Choice, consequences, and
replayability are key benefits in the usefulness of gaming in the classroom.111 In addition to
understanding the levels of war, cadets can see how the decisions at one level affect the others.
For example, if, during a game such as Civilization or Europa Universalis, a student focuses on a
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tactical victory at the cost of a large percentage of their overall forces, their subsequent choices
will require either small units or waiting to rebuild the expended troops before embarking on any
strategic gains.
Once again, time constraints exist, especially in a survey class. Therefore, the ability to
assign a variety of pre-determined games as homework, combined with a reflective historical
analysis writing assignment, provides another pedagogical method that could increase complex
thinking while promoting student metacognition. In short, when used effectively, games would
reasonably enhance the levels of war pedagogical framework while engaging today’s distractionprone undergraduates.
A trend has emerged recently called “gamification.” Gamification involves using
elements of gaming, such as role-playing or using arbitrary point systems to determine winners
and incorporating them into classroom exercises. In the video-game era, researchers found that
even using avatars or digital medals increase student engagement.112 Since 2010, entire gamified
courses have been developed, complete with leaderboards, badges, and points. Proponents claim
that modern undergraduates respond to a gamified approach over more traditional, often tedious,
coursework.113 At the same time, other studies show mixed results. A 2014 longitudinal study
argued that gamified courses led to less motivated students and lower final exam scores. 114
Unfortunately, the studies contained widely variable methodologies that led to the differing
outcomes. Nonetheless, gamification remains a powerful classroom technique that continues to
affect modern pedagogy.
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In any case, the aforementioned techniques are just that: techniques. They are useful tools
to engage modern students in the classroom while extolling the relevancy of history in the
twenty-first century, especially in a STEM-centric environment. Though the techniques listed are
suggestions, there are ways to impart the hierarchical military structure.115 Once cadets
understand their role and how their actions impact the other levels, they will comprehend the
value of a liberal arts education, its relation to the modern military, and their role immediately
after graduation.
This chapter has focused on three main objectives. First, it highlighted some of the issues
and problems inherent in modern academia, mainly how military history classes inside of liberal
arts Service Academies fail to provide relevant training for future graduates. Instead, much of the
time is spent on either the enlisted masses or the military leaders; the Great Men of history.
These approaches miss the level that cadets will find themselves after graduation; namely, the
tactical level. To remedy this, academia needs a concrete, standardized definition of “critical
thinking” that will help breed a generation of multidisciplinary students. The U.S. Air Force
Academy offers one such definition.
Second, levels of war were used to show that instructors could examine the
interrelationship between the strategic, the operational, and the tactical, adapting them between
sub-disciplines to provide a more relevant student experience. The Service Academies do a
decent job with this model, but admittedly it would be a challenge to incorporate a similar
environment into a civilian university.
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Finally, the four examples of Problem Based Learned, Experiential Learning, Learning
Communities, and Gaming showcased how they might change the traditional lecture-model in
the classroom to produce higher orders of metacognition within the student body, regardless of
major. Each example highlights techniques that can make the levels of war relevant to
undergraduate cadets. As a reminder, the levels of war pedagogical methodology seeks to get
cadets to view military history through the lens of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels
and understand that the actions at one level impact the others.116 Once a student understands the
levels and their interaction, they can more easily understand historical context and critically think
about historical causation. Further, cadets at Service Academies can analyze leadership styles
across various levels of war while placing themselves in similar simulated situations to
experience, on some small level, the decisions that went in to certain military engagements. It
has the added benefit of creating an engaging, student-centered, active-learning environment that
promotes student metacognition.
A STEM-Centric academic environment requires the humanities to defend their
importance in today’s society. Students who believe advancements in technology will solve
national and international problems, particularly in war, must understand that war is still human
despite technological advancement. Ultimately the goal is to produce critical-thinking,
multidisciplinary students who understand that the humanities are relevant, even essential, in a
STEM-centric society. This is especially true in the military. People fight wars and make combat
decisions, not machines — not yet, anyway.
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CHAPTER IV.
IV. COURSE DESCRIPTION
Historians, like every single person, are biased, a fact that gets reiterated in every
methodology course in higher education. Thankfully, the realization of bias allows scholars to
strive for objectivity in their work, furthering the field through new or updated research and
generating discourse in modern academia. The quest to reduce bias lowers the impact of sociocultural blindness and opens the door for the inclusion of multiple causes outside of the
traditionally-held nationalistic viewpoints.
Military professional education, on the other hand, struggles to separate bias from the
historical discipline. While there is a search for objectivity in the field, it is often tainted with a
modern westernized understanding of military affairs steeped in Clausewitz, Jomini, and the
Military Revolution in Europe. Further, students at military schools today struggle to understand
the strategy, operations, and tactics of pre-twentieth-century warfare. At the United States Air
Force Academy (USAFA) for example, cadets have difficulty comprehending the arguments for
eighteenth-century line and volley fire. The absence of a “better way” – whatever that means –
confounds the average cadet. To make matters worse, early American warfare, including the
American Revolution, is often crammed into one or two lessons or skipped altogether in favor of
modern conflicts.
Unfortunately, skipping eighteenth-century American warfare limits a students’ ability to
wrestle with conflicts that do not have a powerful economic, diplomatic, political, and industrial

juggernaut behind the military forces, like they did in the twentieth-century. Further, military
history courses omit much of what the cadets will see immediately after graduation; namely,
planning, staff work, and recommending courses of action to superiors. Therefore, the goal of
History 999 is to place the cadets into an early American mindset and force them to understand
the American Revolution across the three levels of war while attempting to eliminate hindsight
or modern anachronistic thinking.
To accomplish the goal of an immersive military experience during the American
Revolution, the course will run chronologically through the war, beginning shortly before
George Washington’s arrival outside of Boston to take command of the Continental Army in
1775 and finishing after Charles Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown in 1781. Each lesson on
the syllabus has a corresponding date from the American Revolution. Most of the dates were
chosen because they occur just before a major event during the war. The cadets, using only the
primary sources available to the commanders at that specific date in history, must pour over the
material and develop three options to brief to the “commander” (played by the instructor) at the
end of each lesson. In their planning, they will have access to eighteenth-century maps, military
correspondences, or available intelligence from which to make their decisions. Newspapers and
pamphlets will give the cadets insight into the minds of the people.
To incorporate the socio-cultural aspect of the war, their homework will incorporate the
same writings available to Americans during the Revolution. Cadets will read eighteenth-century
newspapers, pamphlets (including Common Sense and The Crisis by Thomas Paine), and
eyewitness accounts of the war. They will also read the various military proclamations, such as
Dunmore’s Proclamation in 1775, the Philipsburg Proclamation in 1779, and other militarycivilian documents available to the general population.
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Reading this material should give the cadets an immersion into colonial life and lead to
an appreciation of the worldview that led to the demand for independence. Hopefully, student’s
modern-day assumptions and biases will disappear as they become engrossed in primary source
material and colonial decision-making.

Assumptions
History 999, “Tactical Implementation of Strategic Guidance during the American
Revolutionary War,” was built around several assumptions regarding course size and timing.
First, it is expected to be a one-semester upper division elective comprised of forty lessons across
sixteen weeks. The Air Force Academy operates on a unique schedule in that each class is
offered every other day. For example, if the class met on Monday, then it would meet on
Wednesday and Friday of the same week. The following week, however, it would only meet on
Tuesday and Thursday. In short, each class always has an open business day between lessons. 117
To alleviate any confusion, USAFA has directed that each semester contains exactly forty
lessons. As a one semester course, H999 is planned for forty lessons.
Second, History 100 “An Introduction to Military History” is a prerequisite for H999.
H100 is a requirement for all cadets at the Air Force Academy, and nearly all take it as a
freshman due to the nature of its “100” level designation and prerequisite status for many other
upper division courses. The class covers basic military doctrine and much of American military
history, but places far more emphasis towards twentieth-century airpower history at the expense
of early American warfare. In 2014, H100 began the course with the American Revolution. Since
then, the course has evolved to skip colonial America entirely, instead beginning in mid-
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nineteenth century Europe.118 The new digital history textbook that the Department of History
(DFH) adopted was originally created for West Point’s yearlong survey course and intended for
seniors. Because Military History at USAFA is a one semester survey for Freshmen, DFH
adopted only the second half of the textbook which begins in 1848 and centers on Europe. The
first discussion of any American military history is in Chapter 2 with the Spanish-American
war.119 Thus, while cadets still learn basic military doctrine and terminology, including the
Levels of War, the Spectrum of Conflict, and the Threads of Continuity, there is no mention of
pre-nineteenth American warfare including the American Revolution, the War of 1812, or the
Civil War.120 Therefore, H999 offers cadets a chance to learn and understand the human aspect
of planning and decision-making in a pre-modern society.
Since H100 is a required class taken as freshman, and because the Air Force Academy
places a large number of core courses at the sophomore level, Juniors or Seniors will make up
most of the students in H999. While difficult to assess, the hopeful benefit of teaching
upperclassmen is that they will have had more experience at the collegiate level and will have
improved their study skills over those of freshmen or sophomores. Further, as upperclassmen,
their course load is tailored towards their majors which allow for more focused interaction with
their interests. Combined, that means that they can dedicate more effective study time to H999.
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Finally, because H999 is a history class, it is assumed that a large percentage of the
students will be history majors or minors. Cadets outside of the discipline are welcome and
expected, although typically an elective course will not see an abundance of STEM-field
students. On the other hand, cadets from the humanities or social sciences usually enroll in
similar electives. Overall, H999 expects to have between twelve and sixteen cadets enrolled in
the course, with fifteen being the ideal number.

Goals and Outcomes
The major goals of the course include an understanding of the interaction between the
three levels of war, a thorough comprehension of the American Revolutionary War, and
increased critical thinking and source analysis.
The United States Air Force Academy incorporates institution-wide outcomes aimed at
growing Air Force leaders to enable twenty-first century national security. As such, the directed
outcomes have a decidedly military application. Each one gives a broad description, a detailed
definition, and specific proficiencies cadets must master throughout their time at USAFA.
Further, each outcome is designed to impart characteristics necessary for military leaders in a
dynamic international environment. Out of the nine USAFA-level outcomes, seven apply to
H999. These include critical thinking; clear communications; the human condition, cultures, and
societies; leadership, teamwork, and organizational management; ethics and respect for human
dignity; national security of the American Republic; and warrior ethos as Airmen and Citizens.121
The two institutional outcomes that do not directly apply deal specifically with STEM-related
fields. They are the application of engineering methods, and scientific reasoning and the
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principles of science. Therefore, H999 is a relevant course that directly impacts the majority of
the institution’s core outcomes desired for every cadet.

Lessons and Readings
H999 incorporates a flipped classroom inside of an active-learning environment. It also
relies heavily on primary sources that have similarities to role-playing or gaming scenarios
within a historical setting. In other words, a form of gamification is used throughout the semester
as the bedrock of historical examination.
Each lesson throughout the course, with the exception of the first five and the last two, is
assigned a specific historical date. Usually, the chosen date corresponds closely to a significant
event in the American Revolution, requiring the students to develop their three courses of action
to brief at the end of the class around that event. Further, cadets are not allowed to research
material prior to the date given during class, forcing them to think critically about the plan of
action in the eighteenth century. As the lesson progresses, the instructor must ensure that
students are not projecting twenty-first century tactics onto eighteenth-century situations.
To aid the instructor, the homework assignments deal entirely with the published documents
widely available in the era. Thomas Paine’s The Crisis and Common Sense feature prominently
throughout the semester as they highlighted the arguments for Independence and influenced the
American population.
The reading goal is twenty to twenty-five pages of reading per lesson. The Dean has
mandated that cadets spend two minutes of preparation for every minute of class. Thus, in a 53minute class, cadets are expected to have 106 minutes of homework. Twenty-five pages of
reading should not be a problem. The expectation is that students use the extra time to prepare
for their SITREP, papers, or other outside research.
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Class Timing and Materials
The fifty-three-minute class period itself is split into three distinct phases. The first is
dedicated to the daily SITREP from one cadet that will last between twelve and fifteen minutes.
Next, cadets will divide into three groups and pour over the daily primary sources while arguing
for appropriate courses of action; this phase should last approximately fifteen, but no more than
twenty minutes. The final phase will last fifteen minutes total, with each group having five
minutes to convince the instructor/commander of the desired course of action. Thus, forty-five to
fifty minutes of class time are spoken for, with three minutes of slop, which will most likely be
used to gather the materials at the end of the lesson.

Block Guides and Lesson Plans
Excessive rules eliminate classroom creativity. Because rules hamper creativity, the
following short guide is designed to be brief, informative, and flexible. Brevity in these lesson
plans is paramount, allowing the instructor room to explore the possibilities inherent in a studentcentered, active-learning classroom that incorporates elements of gamification using primary
sources. Thus, the instructor can adjust his or her role during each lesson based on the content
and structure of the class. Because it is a student-driven course, most lessons only need the
instructor to act as a facilitator to guide students towards the most appropriate primary sources
and steer them away from “rabbit trails” or topics perpendicular to the flow of the course.
Therefore, the block guides and lesson plans presented here will aid the professor in maintaining
a coherent, albeit busy, semester.
The purpose of this guide is to provide an instructor with a basic plan for implementing
H999. In that vein, this guide is geared toward a professor familiar with Early American History,
but not necessarily an expert in the American Revolution or Colonial Warfare. Since the course
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itself uses an active learning model centered around primary sources, the instructor only has to
be familiar with the historical background; all other relevant information will emerge through the
daily assignments and primary source material.
Similarly, this guide was written with two people in mind. First, it was written to remind
the regular instructor of the course trajectory. During the busyness of the semester, it is easy for
class preparation to diminish in the wake of other, more pressing administrative duties. This
guide allows the instructor the freedom to review the lesson notes prior to class, ensure the
proper materials are on hand, and proceed to the classroom. In short, this guide saves time during
the year. Second, it was written with the substitute professor in mind... someone who is required
to fill in with short notice and run the class. A quick examination of this material allows the fillin instructor to understand the lesson and administer his/her role. While not common, professors
are sometimes absent for multiple lessons due to temporary military assignments, abrupt
deployments, or government shutdowns. This ambiguity in a military academy necessitates the
occasional substitute instructor.
The next three chapters are all structured similarly. The Block Guide starts each chapter
and provides an overview for the next ten to thirteen lessons. It delivers a broad spectrum of
what the block entails, including its main purposes, goals and objectives. For the regular
instructor, it provides a reminder of the common themes and issues that students should
understand throughout the specific years that encompass the Revolutionary War.
Following each Block Guide are the corresponding lessons. Each one depicts the flow of
the class and acts as an outline for the fifty-three-minute allocated timeframe. Before class, the
instructor can (and should) print out the lesson guide as an in-class note-taker or reference
sheet. While not required, it provides an easy method for keeping track of the discussion and
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contains areas designed for notes. Further, at the end of the semester, they can all be compiled
to create a comprehensive instructor assessment for the overall course.
The first five and last two lessons are not included in the guide. The first five lessons act
as a review of the terminology learned in the prerequisite Military History course that is required
of all freshmen cadets at the Air Force Academy. They will also act as traditional,
lecture/discussion-style classes examining the prelude to hostilities prior to the Revolutionary
War. These first lessons are fast-paced as they cover the major events from the French and
Indian War through Lexington and Concord. Thus, they resemble a survey-level course rather
than an upper-division elective and should be treated as such. Because of that, they are not
included in this guide.
The last two lessons are “reflection” classes. The classroom shifts from collaborative
primary source examination back to a discussion, and the students are expected to talk about
their overall understanding of the American Revolution as well as their learning experiences
throughout the course. In short, the last two lessons provide a formative assessment of the class
as a whole, allowing the instructor and the students the opportunity to reflect on the effectiveness
of the pedagogical and historical methodology.
With that in mind, the following guide details the three main blocks of instruction in
bullet-format, encompassing from lesson six to lesson thirty-eight. The next section contains a
basic overview of the Block Guides and Lesson Plans and is intended to be used as a reference
sheet rather than a narrative of the course. Thus, what follows was written using short, bulletpoint-style sentences that define each section and sub-section that the reader will encounter in the
next three chapters.
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CHAPTER V
V. BLOCK GUIDES AND LESSON PLANS
This section departs from the traditional narrative and instead gives an overview of
Chapters VI, VII, and VIII. The following layout is consistent with the Block Guides and Lesson
Plans that make up the next three chapters, making it easier to navigate the individual sections.
The heart of this project is History 999, and in that vein the formatting for the lesson plans
deviate from traditional Chicago/Turabian formatting into one designed for usability in the
classroom. Each lesson plan is single-spaced, allowing it to print double-sided onto one sheet of
paper that the instructor can bring to class. Additionally, ample white space allows one to take
notes throughout the fifty-three-minute class for future reference or student assessment. Further,
this chapter is intended to operate as an instructional guide on how to read Chapters VI, VII, and
VIII.
The short definitions listed below are for reference use when reviewing the Block Guides
and Lesson Plans in preparation for teaching History 999, “Tactical Implementation of Strategic
Guidance during the American Revolutionary War.” In keeping with the ease of use for the
professor, the explanations below are short and somewhat curt by design. It is also expected that
they are read in conjunction with Chapters VI, VII, VIII and the attached H999 Syllabus.

Block Guides
PURPOSE:
This section describes the main, broad purpose of the block, which is typically comprised
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of ten lessons.
OBJECTIVES:
These are the main ideas that students should understand at the end of the block. Each
lesson was designed with these objectives in mind, and instructors should self-assess several
times throughout the block to ensure that they are fully covered.

TIMELINE:
Each lesson adheres to a specific historical date. In the interest of gamification and roleplaying, the students must adhere to the “here and now” of the specified date. This section in the
block guide lists all of the dates for the next ten lessons, allowing the instructor to glimpse the
events highlighted throughout the course.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW:
For those that are only marginally familiar with the American Revolution and early
American history, this section provides an extremely short synopsis of the era. Again, it is
assumed that the instructor will be somewhat familiar with the American Revolution — at least
to a survey level — in order to be able to administer the course. Thus, this brief historical
overview will be a reminder of the background information leading to the corresponding
historical date.

ISSUES:
Similar to the objectives, these are the main issues that students must wrestle with
throughout the block. Written in the form of a question, each one can be asked in class in an
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effort to get the students to think about the bigger picture in the midst of briefings, battles, and
primary sources. The open-ended questions should lead cadets to the objectives but are not
designed to replace the objectives.

BLOCK ASSIGNMENT:
Each block contains a short paper assignment. In addition to the syllabus, the
requirements are listed here. The Block Assignment is the one time where students are required
to use secondary sources, but they must be pre-approved. Cadets are only authorized to us
prominent scholars of the American Revolution or Early America. Hopefully, this will prevent
the cadets from attempting to cite non-scholarly, internet-based sources like “Billy-Bob’s
Basement Blog."

Lesson Plans
PURPOSE:
Similar to the Block Guide, the purpose section is a quick overview of what the lesson is
designed to accomplish. Usually it provides some background information and details what level
of war the lesson revolves around.

STRUCTURE:
The structure of each class rarely changes. It allocates twelve to fifteen minutes for the
student-led Situational Report (SITREP), fifteen minutes to read through the primary sources,
and fifteen minutes to brief the three separate Courses of Action (COAs). Each period is fiftythree minutes long, leaving seven minutes as “slop” to use in whatever manner works best for
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that particular lesson.
The first few lessons of each block will provide slightly more detailed notes in this
section, but in the interest of brevity, they will not appear in subsequent lessons because they do
not change. This section also dictates the role of the instructor and the particular level of war for
that lesson.

READING/HOMEWORK DUE:
A quick review of what the students should have read in preparation for the class. The
instructor can decide how much in-class time to devote to a review of the homework. In most
cases, the homework reading was chosen because it was material widely disseminated during the
Revolutionary War and affected or influenced the civilian populace.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DATE:
This subsection contains an overview of why the specific historical date was chosen and
its relevance to the American Revolution. The lesson should adhere to the listed date, and
students should not research “future” events. Often, this includes the historical outcome of
certain battles.

SITREP STUDENT:
In this guide, each student is labeled “Cadet X.” The individual’s name should be filled in
during class and kept as a reference.
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SITREP AREAS OF FOCUS:
The student should brief these aspects as they relate to the specific level of war in
addition to what is listed in the syllabus. Some SITREPs are more involved than others, and it
would behoove students to seek instructor guidance prior to beginning research. Each lesson will
list specifics of what needs to be covered during that particular SITREP.

SITREP QUESTIONS:
Any additional questions that the instructor should ask after the briefing, not including
things left out during the briefing itself, are listed in this subsection.

CORRESPONDENCES, MAPS, PRIMARY SOURCES:
While the correspondences could engulf the entire fifty-three-minute class, the goal is to
force the students to determine which writings are relevant to their task and which are not while
simulating a wartime planning environment. The easiest way to view correspondences is through
www.founders.archives.gov, which has digitized most of the major correspondences during the
American Revolution, specifically George Washington's. The site also has the ability to filter the
results based on date, so the instructor or student could enter the date of the previous lesson and
the date of the current lesson to view everything written between the two. While astronomical at
first, the number of letters should be narrowed down by excluding diary entries or personal
letters. The students, acting as staff, should only have access to the correspondences that the onscene historical commander could grant them in the field. The same is also true of the maps.
Only primary source maps available by that specific historical date are allowed in class (with
some minor exceptions listed in the corresponding lesson plan).
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The sources listed in this section are the most important ones that are instrumental for the
students to read. The professor should not instruct them to read these particular sources — the
students should find them on their own — but they must be available. If the students miss them
by the start of the COA briefings, they need to be queried.

COURSES OF ACTION (COAs):
Each lesson culminates with the students, still acting as the Commander’s Staff,
presenting three projected courses of action based on the information gained through their
primary source research. Hopefully, the first one will be similar to the actual, historical COA
during the Revolutionary War. The other two should be realistic considering the situation in the
eighteenth century. If not, the instructor must point out any anachronistic thinking or inherent
twenty-first-century bias.
This section is also designed for notes. The instructor should quickly list the chosen
COAs for future reference.

FINAL THOUGHTS:
A “final thoughts” section is included for any last-minute, big-picture revelations.
Sometimes these are primarily for the instructor, and sometimes they are for the students. In any
case, they should be reviewed before dismissing the cadets at the end of the lesson.

HOMEWORK:
A reminder of what the students need to accomplish prior to the next class is listed here.
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CONCLUSION:
Chapters four, five, and six comprise the meat of H999. Hopefully, this short guide
clarifies any confusion about the layout, structure, or methodology of the course and can act as
reference during the semester. Overall, the reliance on primary sources and the flippedclassroom, role-playing mentality of the class is paramount. Other than that, flexibility is built in
to the fabric of H999, allowing both the instructor and the cadets to develop critical and complex
thinking in the most conducive manner possible.
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CHAPTER VI
VI. BLOCK GUIDE: Part I -- Strategic Survival, 1775-1776
PURPOSE:
The main lessons that take place throughout 1775 and 1776 deal with the strategic,
operational, and tactical decisions regarding the creation and implementation of the Continental
Army. After wrestling with the Congressional choice to create and fund a Continental Army and
Washington’s initial strategic decisions to capture Canada, cadets must tackle the operational
struggles that Philip Schuyler, Richard Montgomery and Benedict Arnold encountered while
they moved their forces towards Quebec. During this phase, students must deal with the
employment of Washington’s strategic orders while struggling with operational logistical
problems, especially the acquisition of artillery, gunpowder, and food. Further, cadets must pour
over maps to determine the most efficient and effective ways to capture Quebec, thus coercing
Canada to join the Patriot cause.
Once cadets address the strategic and operational challenges, the class will shift focus to
the tactical level, where the students must develop different ways to attack Quebec based on
intelligence, maps, and previous history (such as the British capture of Quebec in 1759). All
reading will be through primary sources, discounting any that were recorded in the past-tense. In
other words, cadets cannot use sources written in the future. They are limited to sources that
coincide with the date on the syllabus.
As 1775 turned into 1776, cadets must shift focus once again from Canada to the Middle

Colonies. They must recommend strategic and operational plans as the British concentrate their
forces in New York. Failure is part of growth, and cadets should assess the American failures
during the New York Campaign that led to their retreat into New Jersey. In doing so, they will
understand the implications that led to the Trenton and Princeton campaigns and their
effectiveness across the levels of war.
The block concludes with cadets tactically focused on Trenton as they decipher maps and
create courses of action to defeat the Hessian forces during the Christmas campaign. Thus,
throughout the block, cadets will prepare for strategic survival, operational movements, and
tactical outcomes to alter the course of the Revolutionary War.
In short, this block is designed to force cadets to act as military planners as they develop
specific courses of action, based on primary sources, and apply them to historical scenarios in
1775 and 1776.

OBJECTIVES:
• Understand the political and military difficulties inherent in the early stages of the
Revolutionary War; namely, the initial dichotomy of wanting to remain with Britain without
giving up individual liberty.
• Comprehend the importance of Canada, and particularly Quebec, to the Patriot cause.
• Determine appropriate actions and military responses during the New York Campaign.
• Develop the ability to cleanly transition between the three levels of war and recognize how
each level is applied to the overall goal of winning the war.
• Synthesize primary sources to create a cohesive plan at each level of war. Communicate each
plan effectively without projecting twenty-first-century ideals onto eighteenth-century
militaries.
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TIMELINE:
Lesson 6 - 10 May 1775 – It Begins
Lesson 7 - 5 July 1775 – Washington arrives in Cambridge
Lesson 8 - 12 November 1775 – Montgomery’s Campaign
Lesson 9 - 18 December 1775 – Preparation for Quebec
Lesson 10 - 30 December 1775 – Assault on Quebec
Lesson 11 - 18 March 1776 – British evacuate Boston… a victory?
Lesson 12 - 25 August 1776 – Independence! Strategic reassessment?
Lesson 13 - 30 October 1776 – The New York Campaign
Lesson 14 - 19 November 1776 – Forts Fall
Lesson 15 - 24 December 1776 – Trenton and Princeton

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW:
The course begins with the opening sessions of the Second Continental Congress on May
10, 1775. The Shot Heard ‘Round the World occurred barely a month earlier, and Congress
found a colonial populace woefully ill-prepared to face the British military in traditional warfare.
While the Minutemen and colonial militia performed admirably during the latter stages of the
Lexington and Concord affair, as well as the Battle of Bunker/Breed’s Hill, the fact remains that
there was no formal American army. Without an army, Congress could not adequately pursue
negotiation. Thus, once hostilities commenced, the Second Continental Congress immediately
gathered with the intention of determining military options against Great Britain.122 It quickly
became apparent that the united colonies needed a Continental Army commanded by a single
122

Ron Chernow, Washington: A Life (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2010): 184.

81

individual who had a strategic grasp of military matters. George Washington fit the bill. During
this opening lesson, cadets will examine the questions and problems posed to Congress, namely,
“whether America could better protect its liberties inside or outside of the British empire.”123
While the direct application of the problem is short lived — the next lesson introduces George
Washington as the new Commander-in-Chief — the strategic questions about independence
reverberated until July 4, 1776, another five lessons away.
The Canadian expedition, initially commanded by Philip Schuyler, began exceedingly
well as Fort Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and Montreal fell into the American hands without major
bloodshed. Unfortunately, the Quebec campaign, now led by Richard Montgomery because of
Schuyler’s worsening illness, failed in spectacular fashion. At its end, Montgomery lay dead,
Benedict Arnold severely wounded, and many expert riflemen captured, including their Captain,
Daniel Morgan.124
As 1775 turned into 1776, and as news reached General Washington of the failed
Canadian expedition, the cadets must turn their attention to the survival of the American army.
Though the Continental Army existed, it had to prove itself against the Redcoats. George
Washington discussed the importance of New York City in his correspondences and decided to
engage British General Sir William Howe in a struggle for New York.125 Cadets must debate the
New York campaign on all three levels of war and argue for specific courses of action. As they
read the primary sources, most cadets will begin to sense the tensions between commanders,
between Congress, and between the Patriot and Loyalists members of the population at large.
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Eventually, the existence of American independence itself will seem bleak, as it did for the
American soldiers retreating from continuous defeats in New York. The block will culminate
with the planning of the Trenton and Princeton campaign. At this point in the war, many
historians argue that the existence of the Army itself was at stake. If the Continental Army was
going to survive into 1777, strategic adjustments had to be instituted.

ISSUES:
• How did the Continental Congress and their Commander-in-Chief create and fund a
Continental Army able to effectively engage with the British military?
• Would a standing army or a militia be more effective against the Redcoats?
• Should the Patriots wage traditional European warfare or conduct guerrilla/insurgency
operations?
• What would be the best way to bring the British to the bargaining table?
• Was there a bargaining chip available… something that the King/Parliament wants?
• Was the Continental Army ready to engage the British in open combat?

SOURCES:
This class relies almost exclusively on primary sources, mainly correspondences between
commanders during the Revolutionary War. While there are several secondary sources, they are
used sparingly and only to provide relevant background information. During class, students will
experience “information overload” as they attempt to read through a large amount of
correspondence in a short period of time while deciding on what to incorporate into their daily
briefing. While overwhelming, this is by design. As future officers, cadets must learn what
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information is important, and what can wait.
Most of the correspondences are from the Papers of George Washington, all digitally
accessible online. Throughout this instructor’s guide, there will not be a list of specific letters;
rather, the instructor should visit https://founders.archives.gov and limit the search between the
corresponding dates in the syllabus. Students are not expected to read personal letters between
family or diary entries, as they would not be provided to a military staff. Important documents
are highlighted in each lesson guide. Otherwise, the instructor should provide a large amount of
digital or printed source material during each class.
Maps are also primary source material, and most are found on the Library of Congress’s
website (www.loc.gov). On rare occasions, a map may be used that is printed after an event took
place, but those occasions are also listed in the specific lesson guide. Once a map has been used
in class, it is available on all subsequent lessons. Thus, the collection is cumulative throughout
the semester.
Finally, with the exception of the three short research papers, all homework reading will
include primary source material. The goal is to use information that was widely published during
the American Revolution so that the students understand what the public read to inform their
thoughts. In that vein, Thomas Paine’s work features prominently throughout the semester.

BLOCK ASSIGNMENT:
Strategic Analysis Paper - Due lesson 10
• 1000 words or less
• Must have a historical argument, a solid thesis, and present researched evidence supporting
your position about the strategic level of war.
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• Must use scholarly secondary sources. I will only accept sources written by approved authors.
The following list are authors that are automatically approved, check with me if you have
an author that is not on this list. Any author mentioned in Chapter II is also acceptable.126
◦

Don Higginbotham, Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, Robert Middlekauff, Wayne Lee,
Eric Foner, Merrill Jensen, Joseph Ellis, T.H. Breen, John Ferling, David McCullough,
David Hackett Fischer

• Do not forget to think about any economic, social, cultural, diplomatic, or military issues.
• Answer the following questions: What was the strategy, and what were its challenges? How
effective was the American (or British) strategy to this point in the war? Why did the
Commander believe it was the correct strategy to win the war?

FINAL THOUGHTS:
•

Class time is extremely limited; therefore, cadets must be expedient with how they read
through the various correspondences. During this first block, the instructor should advise the
students on the best methods to quickly consume material.
◦

Group work is the easiest. If the students are split into three groups, divide the
correspondences three ways (or more).

◦

Allow students to write on the letters, dissecting the important issues from the mundane.

◦

Ensure they remain focused on the task: developing Courses of Actions relevant to the
situation of the day and the applicable level of war. Extraneous information can be
quickly set aside.

126

Note to Instructors: this list is not all inclusive but is designed to introduce students to many of the most
prominent American Revolution scholars and to prevent the wide array of internet-based, non-academic websites
from creeping into the student’s research.
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•

There are seven unassigned minutes built into each lesson; use that time to ensure cadets
understand the political, military, social, and economic situations in the eighteenth-century
that may not be covered in the various correspondences. A short mini-lecture is one of
several techniques suitable to fill the extra seven minutes.

•

For an excellent description of the various American strategies, see David Hackett Fischer’s
Washington’s Crossing, pages 79-80.

•

The class website will contain most of the essential documents throughout the semester. Visit
http://menath2001.wixsite.com/leadershiptriad for more information as the information
contained therein is updated frequently.

•

One final reminder: the individual lesson plans are single-spaced by design so that they can
be printed off on one front and back sheet of paper for in-class use.
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Lesson 6: Strategic Level - It Begins
Purpose of the lesson:
This lesson begins on the same historical date that the Second Continental Congress met to
determine their response to the Battles of Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill. Violence had
commenced, but Independence was not yet a foregone conclusion. Most delegates, as well as
citizens, still desired a peaceful reunification with England; however, they would not accept
anything less than their own representation and liberty. The perceived tyranny had to be
addressed before any de-escalation could commence.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
• Provide Primary Sources, cadets determine 3 COA’s based on strategic situation with the help
of correspondences & maps
• Preferably, cadets will get divided into 3 groups. If they do, they can decide how to split the
work so that they can develop 3 separate COAs. They will still need to coordinate
between groups between so as not to duplicate effort.
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• Each group has five minutes to present their Course of Action, argue for its effectiveness, and
answer questions about its feasibility.
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as John Hancock, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC situation — how these plans will achieve the
Congressional/Political goal of a peace with England (NOT Independence, yet).
Reading/Homework Due:
• Patrick Henry’s “Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death” speech to Congress
• "Letters of a Westchester Farmer," By the Reverend Samuel Seabury
Both sources detail the arguments for or against the actions of the Continental Congress in
resisting the King, especially to the point of violence. These two primary sources present a clear
delineation at the emotions that both Patriots and Loyalists felt as the situational-waters reached
a boiling point.
Significance of the Date:
• 10 May 1775 was the date that the Second Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia.
While the delegates quickly agreed that they needed to raise a military force, they did not
know how to go about doing so, or even the ramifications of such actions if the King
agreed to relax control over the colonies. No one yet spoke of Independence. First, they
needed to appoint a Commander.
• George Washington, Horatio Gates, Charles Lee, John Hancock, and (allegedly) Richard
Montgomery were considered for Commander-in-Chief, although Artemas Ward was
commanding the militia surrounding Boston.
• Ethan Allen, his Green Mountain Boys, and Benedict Arnold captured Fort Ticonderoga the
night of 9-10 May, gaining military stores including gunpowder and artillery. Though
Congress did not know about it until 18 May, it is still applicable to this lesson as the
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next date has other pressing matters.
SITREP Student:
Cadet X - If less than 15 students enrolled, this lesson can be a demo SITREP by the instructor.
If not, the demo should occur on lesson 5, and this will be the first cadet led briefing.
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Since no army existed yet, the focus should be on the New England colonial militias and the
British troops. Gunpowder stores, ammo, artillery, and food should be briefed (if able), as
well as the morale of both the militia and the civilians in and around Boston
(Higginbotham says 20,000 militia around Boston) 127. Congress will not authorize
anything military related (including gunpowder), until June.128
• British troops and their actions should be discussed, but the Battle of Bunker Hill will not
occur until June 17th, nor will Clinton, Howe, and Burgoyne have arrived.
SITREP Questions (if not addressed):
• Morale of the militia, civilians
• Command structure, and which colonial units are involved
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Correspondences: John Adams diary, “To Mass Bay Co,” Ethan Allen takes Ticonderoga
Note: John Adams diary relates his public experience in Congress and is thus usable in class.
• Newspapers: Essex Gazette, Apr and May 1775 accounts of Lexington and Concord
• Maps: America/Colonial area maps, pre-May 1775
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Determine what actions the Second Continental Congress should take in light of Lexington
and Concord, the Intolerable Acts, and the gathering militia around Boston.
• Give actionable ideas that allow for reconciliation without sacrificing liberty.
• Address military situation, including who controls colonial militias. Are there thirteen militias,
or one?
• Historical COA: Raise/fund an army of 15,000 troops, appoint George Washington
Commander-in-Chief
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
The initial response to the Shot Heard ‘Round the World was divided. No one yet spoke
of Independence, but few were willing to concede their perceived liberties to the British. John
Dickinson advocated for reconciliation, whereas John Adams was vocal for independence. While
127
Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice,
1763-1789, Collector’s Edition. (Norwalk, Connecticut: Easton Press, 1971): 65.
128
Ron Chernow, Washington: A Life (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2010): 181-194.
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America had only seen violence at Lexington and Concord so far, British Generals Robert Howe,
John Burgoyne, and Henry Clinton were on their way to Boston to assist General Thomas Gage.
The courses of action that Congress decided upon, coupled with the British response, opened the
door to further hostilities.
Again, independence was not yet at the forefront of colonial minds.
Homework:
• Oliver L. Spaulding, “The Military Studies of George Washington,” The American Historical
Review 29, no. 4 (July 1924): 675–680.
• "A Declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North-America, now met
in Congress at Philadelphia, setting forth the causes and necessity of their taking up
Arms.” 5 July, 1775.
Notes:
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Lesson 7: Strategic Level - Washington Arrives in Cambridge
Purpose of the lesson:
This lesson is strategic in nature, highlighting the immediate complexities and problems that
Washington faced when he arrived to take command of the Continental Army outside of Boston
in mid-1775. The students should come to grips with the fact that the separate colonies had to
create a unified military force able to stand up to the Redcoats. Additionally, there was the
diplomatic problem of trying to achieve peace and reunification without sacrificing liberty.
Structure of the class:
(12-15 minutes) SITREP
(15 minutes) PLANNING STAGE
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC situation — how these plans will achieve the
Congressional/Political goal of a peace with England (NOT Independence, yet).
Reading/Homework Due:
• Oliver L. Spaulding, “The Military Studies of George Washington,” The American Historical
Review 29, no. 4 (July 1924): 675–680.
• "A Declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North-America, now met
in Congress at Philadelphia, setting forth the causes and necessity of their taking up
Arms.” 5 July, 1775.
The first reading highlights the books that Washington studied as he prepared to lead the
Continental Army. Cadets are encouraged to find and skim the same works to see the military
studies in the late-eighteenth century.
The second reading lists the colonial grievances for creating a Continental Army, perceived as an
illegal and rebellious action by the King.
Significance of the Date:
5 July 1775 — Between May 10th and July 5th, the Second Continental Congress had worked at
a furious pace to establish the conditions to enable peace. At the same time, they authorized the
creation and funding of a united Continental Army led by George Washington, who did not feel
up to the task. The Olive Branch Petition was released on the 5th, giving the King one more
chance to work towards peace… he did not read it.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
Strategic situation around Boston, specifically the status of the Continental Army and the
location of the British. As a reminder, cadets should report on troop strength, troop locations,
troop morale, supply levels (including food, gunpowder, and ammunition), weather, enemy
locations, enemy strength, potential enemy movements, civilian morale (including Patriot or
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Loyalist sentiments), diplomatic affairs, prisoner status/exchanges, financial status and
geography. Also, Indian affairs should begin to be highlighted in the SITREP.
SITREP Questions:
Ensure cadets discuss the initial status of the army, especially troop strength, enemy location
(Boston and Bunker Hill), and the need for gunpowder. If they don’t, query them.
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Washington’s correspondences between 10 May and 5 July 1775, excluding personal
correspondence.
Note General Orders, 4 July 1775
• Olive Branch Petition
• All maps pre-July 1775. Principally, overview maps of the British Colonies and close-up maps
of Boston.
Staff Briefing & Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA – Canadian expedition
• Back-up COA • Back-up COA Final Thoughts:
The opening strategic stages developed around Boston and dealt with how to convince the King
to address colonial grievances. The Americans did not yet desire full independence but wanted to
prove the seriousness of their grievances and their willingness to use force.
Homework:
• Dunmore’s Proclamation
• Colonial Response in the Virginia Gazette
Notes:
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Lesson 8: Operational Level - Montgomery’s campaign
Purpose of the lesson:
Lesson 8 is the first transition to the Operational level. General Washington had decided to take
Quebec to use as a bargaining chip and as a strategic geographic location since it controlled the
St. Lawrence River (which led to Lake Champlain and the Hudson River). Thus, in this lesson,
the focus is on moving the Northern Army into position so that it could achieve the strategic
goals of taking Canada. The focus should be on movement, logistics, and planning.
This is also the first lesson that introduces a massive amount of correspondence and in-class
reading. While all the information is important to the overall war, cadets must develop the ability
to sift the campaign-crucial information from that which can either wait for another day, or that
which is important to another level of war. For instance, there is a lot of strategic-level
correspondence present in this lesson… only the operational information is crucial to the
Commander.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as Philip Schuyler, should ensure that each COA
addresses the OPERATIONAL situation — how these plans will achieve the conquest
and pacification of Canada, and their willingness to join the Patriot cause against the
British.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Dunmore’s Proclamation
• Response to Dunmore’s Proclamation in the Virginia Gazette
Significance of the Date:
12 November 1775 - Numerous critical events occurred between 5 July 1775 (lesson 7) and 12
November. Chief among them were Dunmore’s Proclamation, the treason of Dr. Benjamin
Church, the rejection of the Olive Branch Petition, attempted alliances with the Oneida Indians,
the creation of a Naval Force, and the creation of the Continental Marines. Montreal was
captured on 13 November, making the 12th an important planning and preparation day for the
Northern Army. Despite a large amount of correspondences, students must focus on the task at
hand, the capture of Montreal.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Troop strength, morale, supply of Schuyler’s forces
• Civilian reaction to Dunmore’s Proclamation
• Indian affairs in the Northern theater (est July 12, 1775)
• Weather
• Naval force/affairs (Washington established a Naval & Marines force in Aug, 1775)
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SITREP Questions:
Ensure to focus on Operational-level questions while acting as Philip Schuyler. This lesson has a
dearth of strategic-level correspondences designed to overwhelm the cadets with information.
They must remain focused on the operational and leave the strategic to Washington.
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Letters to/from Philip Schuyler, Richard Montgomery, Benedict Arnold
• General Orders from Washington and Congress
• Maps of Montreal, New England, Ft. Ticonderoga, Lake Champlain/St. Lawrence, Quebec,
area maps pre-Nov 1775.
• Strategic-level information about the Oneidas, Falmouth, Benjamin Church, etc.
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Ticonderoga, Montreal captured; Arnold meets up with Montgomery needing
supplies
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
The students may not have been prepared for the COA briefings with the amount of information
they had to decipher during the planning stage. The lesson was designed with that in mind. The
feeling of being overwhelmed with information, much of it unimportant to the immediate task, is
as common in the modern military as it was in the eighteenth century. As a debrief, the instructor
should point this out and link the study of history to modern-day life.
Homework:
• John W. Wright, “The Rifle in the American Revolution,” The American Historical Review 29,
no. 2 (1924): 293–299.
• Study/research for the Strategic Analysis Paper
** Note: John Wright’s article is not a primary source but gives an excellent account of
weaponry during the American Revolution. It is essential to keep cadets from guessing
about common weaponry in the late eighteenth-century.
Notes:
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Lesson 9: Operational/Tactical Level - Preparation for Quebec
Purpose of the lesson:
Lesson 9 begins the transition between the Operational level and the Tactical level. After the
previous lesson, students should start to feel the oppression of time during the planning stage and
the need to come to class with as much SITREP information as possible. This lesson builds on
those emotions. Once again, a massive amount of correspondences are provided, not all of which
are important to the Operational or Tactical level. Cadets must develop discernment.
During this lesson, cadets will prepare for the assault on Quebec after having joined with
Benedict Arnold’s ill-equipped forces and determine how to organize the Army for the assault.
While the focus should be logistical in nature, students can begin to form a tactical plan
regarding the assault itself.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as Richard Montgomery (who replaced the ill
Schuyler), should ensure that each COA addresses the OPERATIONAL or initial
TACTICAL situation — how they can attack and conquer Quebec.
Reading/Homework Due:
• John W. Wright, “The Rifle in the American Revolution,” The American Historical Review 29,
no. 2 (1924): 293–299.
Significance of the Date:
18 December 1775: Arnold’s forces arrived on Nov 14th, half-starved and half-clothed, but in
good spirits and ready to fight. They joined Montgomery’s force on 2 December. On the 5th,
Henry Knox began to transport the much-needed artillery from Ft. Ticonderoga to the
Continental Army at Cambridge; something many thought too difficult a task to accomplish. On
the 18th, General Nathanael Greene received a report that Quebec had fallen to Montgomery and
Arnold.
The 18th was chosen to give time between Nov 12 (lesson 8) and 18 Dec in order to build
correspondences and intel for the cadets to sift through during class. Information overload is a
key part of military planning.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• New troop strength after the success at Montreal and the addition of Arnold’s forces.
• Artillery and gunpowder
• Clothing, food, shelter (it is December in Canada)
• Weather (Montgomery wants the cover of a snowstorm to assault Quebec)
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SITREP Questions:
Focus on operational/tactical questions:
• How many troops do the British have in Quebec?
• Are the people friendly to Americans?
• What is their supply situation? Can a siege work?
• What is the status of our soldiers?
• Is there illness in camp?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Map of Quebec, St. Lawrence, Northern Provinces
• Correspondences between Washington and Schuyler
• Correspondences between Washington and Arnold
• Montreal’s Terms of Surrender
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: 2-prong assault with a third diversionary force. Montgomery leads one,
Arnold leads the other. They are to meet at the gates to the inner city.
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
This lesson is all about preparation for Quebec and information overload. Cadets must learn to
read through material quickly, delegate responsibilities, and prepare for the COA briefings. If
they are not ready or ill-prepared for the briefings, question them thoroughly and aggressively as
any field commander would do. Ensure they understand the difficulties present in this historical
situation, and how that still translates to modern military endeavors.
Homework:
• No class reading.
• The Strategic Analysis paper is due next lesson.
Notes:
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Lesson 10: Tactical Level - Assault on Quebec
Purpose of the lesson:
This lesson is all about the tactical intricacies involved in the assault on Quebec. It must remain
at the tactical level, eschewing any thought of the strategic or operational levels of war. In that
vein, applicable correspondences will be minimal, and the map of Quebec is extremely
important. Further, personnel, routes, gunpowder, the division of troops, communication, and the
timetable for the attack are paramount. It is imperative that the cadets remain entrenched in
battle-specifics during this lesson.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as Daniel Morgan, should ensure that each COA
addresses the Tactical situation — how these plans will take Quebec with minimal loss
of life.
Reading/Homework Due:
The Strategic Level analysis paper is due by the beginning of class.
Significance of the Date:
30 December 1775 - The assault began on the night of the 30th under cover of a severe
snowstorm. It had originally been planned for the 27th, but as they moved into position, the
flurries passed, the moon emerged, and the attack was called off. Soon after, a deserter took the
plan to Quebec, and it had to be revised. The weather on the 30th enabled the small American
force to launch their attack.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Men, gunpowder, ammo, weather
• Intelligence, morale
SITREP Questions:
• In addition to questions about the troops, ask about how the deserters changed the outlook for
the assault. What were the men saying? Should the assault be called off?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Map of Quebec
• Map of the St. Lawrence River
• Correspondences between Washington and Schuyler
• Correspondences between Washington and Arnold
• Correspondence between Washington and Morgan
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Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: 2-prong assault + diversionary assault
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
Again, this lesson should be steeped in specifics regarding the battlefield assault. The COAs
should be extremely detailed as if the attack were about to take place. Each member must know
all aspects of the plan and be prepared to talk through them. Play the game!
Homework:
George Morison, “An Account of the Assault on Quebec, 1775,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of
History and Biography 14, no. 4 (1891): 434–439.
Notes:
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Lesson 11: Strategic Level – British evacuate Boston… a victory?
Purpose of the lesson:
Lesson 11 brings the class back to the middle colonies to adjust the strategy after the defeat in
Quebec. Though Benedict Arnold was still recovering outside of the northern city, his forces
were ravaged with disease and injury. Canada was lost.
On the other hand, as early as January, Washington had received intel that suggested that the
British were going to evacuate Boston in favor of New York, a geographically vital location for
the British navy. The Continental Army captured Dorchester Heights on March 4, the Redcoats
left on March 17. In those terms, this lesson revolves around strategic re-assessment. Cadets
should focus on the impact of losing in Canada, the political and social ramifications of
“liberating” Boston, and the implications of a British attack on New York City.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the Strategic situation — assessment of a re-focused strategy without Canada
and the protection of the Middle Colonies.
Reading/Homework Due:
• George Morison, “An Account of the Assault on Quebec, 1775,” The Pennsylvania Magazine
of History and Biography 14, no. 4 (1891): 434–439.
• Thomas Paine, Common Sense (New York: Signet Classic, 2003). **This is split across three
lessons. Students do not have to finish the work until lesson 13**
Significance of the Date:
18 March 1776 - The Redcoats evacuated Boston on March 17th, leaving the 18th for reevaluation and re-assessment of the strategic situation. It was widely accepted that the British
would move on New York, but the Southern colonies were continually threatened, and Canada
remained a geographic threat. The shock from losing Quebec reverberated throughout various
correspondences between January and March, leaving options wide open as to how to handle the
political, economic, military, and social aspects of the war in 1776.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Troop strengths and locations
• Military and Civilian Morale
• British positions and naval movements
• Alliances (Indian, French)
SITREP Questions:
• Status of Arnold’s forces still outside Quebec
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Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Washington to/from Congress, Committees of Safety, Provincial Congresses
See www.founders.archives.gov or http://menath2001.wixsite.com/leadershiptriad
• America area maps, New York, New York City, Southern Colony harbor maps
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Build defensive measures in New York
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
Strategic re-assessment was the primary goal of this lesson, thus, the COA options should be
much broader than the normally would be for an operational or tactical lesson. Further, since the
focus had been on Canada and Boston, a new strategy could encompass a number of
possibilities. Students should keep in mind relevant intelligence, but otherwise must highlight the
economic, political, diplomatic, social, informational, and military aspects of strategy. In short,
this lesson is about realistic brainstorming.
Homework:
• Declaration of Independence, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript
• Thomas Paine, Common Sense
Notes:
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Lesson 12: Strategic Level – Independence! Strategic Reassessment?
Purpose of the lesson:
The Declaration of Independence changed the strategic situation for America. While strategic in
nature, this lesson also deals with the coming attack on New York and the operational
movements necessary to prepare to defend the city and the state. Focus should be on the
Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, and Socio-political elements of the war on the
eve of the New York campaign.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the Strategic situation — how these plans will enable an overall victory and
secure American independence.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Thomas Paine, Common Sense
• Declaration of Independence
Significance of the Date:
25 August 1776 - The first battle in the ill-fated New York campaign — the Battle of Long
Island — occurred on 27 August and began a string of American tactical defeats. The 25th gives
students the ability to assess the strategic strengths and weaknesses before diving into the
operational and tactical levels of war that took place in the latter months of 1776.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Troop strength, training, morale
• Logistics: ammo, gunpowder, artillery, supplies
• Broad defensive positions around New York
• Diplomatic alliances
• Civilian morale and sentiment
SITREP Questions:
• Troop strength on paper vs ready to fight
• Financial situation
• British troop strength
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Maps of New York
• American overview maps
• Letters between Washington and Greene, Hancock, and Committees
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Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Engage the British at Long Island, defend via Fort Lee and Fort Washington
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
This lesson is a good chance to revisit the various types of strategy propagated by different
commanders and elucidated by David Hackett Fischer in Washington’s Crossing on pages 7980.129 Did Washington favor a War of Posts, a Fabian Strategy, a Guerrilla War, an offensivedefensive, or traditional European battle? What about the socio-political situation? Does/did that
affect military strategic decision-making? These are great questions to ask during the COA
briefings so that cadets understand exactly what the Continental Army was attempting to do
during the New York Campaign.
Homework:
• Finish Common Sense
Notes:

129

David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006): 79-80.
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Lesson 13: Operational Level - The New York Campaign
Purpose of the lesson:
The New York campaign brings to light numerous questions about the performance of both
George Washington as a Commander and the performance of the Continental Army. This lesson
aims to introduce various doubts into the planning process. Although the focus is operational,
questions about both the strategic and tactical situations should be brought to light and
addressed. For instance, as a strategic commander, should Washington have been engaged at the
operational and tactical levels of war? Knowing the strength of the British troops and the
strength of his own (not to mention the training), did Washington continue to make sound
military decisions in his maneuvers?
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the Operational situation — how these plans will enable the Army to defeat
the British in the Middle Colonies.
Reading/Homework Due:
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense
Significance of the Date:
30 October 1776 - By this point, the Continental Army lost at Long Island, Harlem Heights, and
Kips Bay, forcing Washington to abandon Manhattan. He lost again at White Plains on the 28th
of October. His numbers were dwindling, but he still had nearly 6,000 troops manning the
defenses at Forts Lee and Washington that overlooked the Hudson River. While the campaign
had proved unfortunate so far, it was not over yet.
Further, Benedict Arnold fought the Battle of Valcour Island on October 11th with a ragtag fleet
on Lake Champlain. His actions delayed another British advance from Canada until 1777.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Troop numbers and locations
• British troop numbers and locations
• Logistics
• Morale
• The French
SITREP Questions:
• This is one of the few rare occasions where the instructor, acting as Washington, could ask
about the planning process. Through the sting of defeats, questions about strategy,
maneuver, or reconciliation with the British could be brought to light. Further, in
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September, seven of Washington’s generals signed a petition urging him to abandon New
York. He called a Council of War in October and determined to leave Manhattan. While
the questions do not have concrete answers, a review of the entire process is applicable in
light of the string of defeats. The instructor should not address these questions directly to
the Cadet briefing the SITREP but should open them to the floor.
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Maps of the Middle Colonies
• Map of New York
• Allow tactical maps of the New York campaign (even though they would not have been
produced so quickly afterwards)
• Map of Valcour Island/Arnold’s retreat from Quebec
• Nathanael Greene’s disagreement with Washington and subsequent petition
• Washington’s correspondence with Congress, with Greene, with Lee, with Hancock
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Defend Forts Lee and Washington to control the Hudson, keep Howe on
Manhattan
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
This lesson forces more strategic and operational reassessment, especially after a series of
defeats in the face of the British’s enormous military strength. While operational in nature,
students can (and should) look to other strategic methods that they can recommended to their
commander. Further French aid should be discussed in addition to diplomatic affairs with the
British.
Homework:
• Joseph A. Waddell and Charles Porterfield, “Diary of a Prisoner of War at Quebec, 1776,” The
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 9, no. 2 (1901): 144–152.
The POWs had been released and were rejoining their peers at this point in the war.
Notes:
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Lesson 14: Operational Level - Forts Fall
Purpose of the lesson:
Lesson 14 completes the disaster in New York as Washington continued to get routed, and Forts
Independence, Lee, and Washington fell to the British. The British controlled all of Manhattan,
and the Continental Army was severely undermanned.
The purpose of this lesson is to ascertain methods to maneuver the Army away from pitched
battle in order to protect them and thereby continue the war. Should the instructor desire to
remain in character as Nathanael Greene, he could focus the lesson on answering how and why
he let the British commanders out-maneuver him and capture Fort Washington. In any case, the
students should focus their efforts on moving the troops out of immediate danger, retain
whatever supplies are available, and prepare for strategic guidance.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as Nathanael Greene, should ensure that each COA
addresses the Operational situation — how these plans will secure the remaining army.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Joseph A. Waddell and Charles Porterfield, “Diary of a Prisoner of War at Quebec, 1776,” The
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 9, no. 2 (1901): 144–152.
Significance of the Date:
19 November 1776 - Howe captured Fort Washington on 16 Nov, plundered it on the 17th, and
renamed it on the 18th. Hessians captured Fort Lee on the 18th. The British controlled all of
Manhattan Island by the 19th. Greene takes much of the blame, especially for the surrender of
the 2,800 troops at Ft. Washington, not to mention the much-needed supplies.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Troops strength, and troop losses (specifically at Fort Washington)
• Logistics, and what was lost
• Intel reports
• Anticipated reinforcement numbers (Congress reminded several States to pony up on 19 Nov)
• Civilian and military morale
SITREP Questions:
• “How did this happen?” - Greene
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• To GW (PNG vol 1, 328): Fort Independence fell 31 Oct, Lee still stands. Also see the
logistics letter on 5 Nov (333).
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• The Papers of Nathanael Greene (PNG) vol 1 has an excellent series of letters regarding
logistics and the defense of Fort Lee/Washington. It culminates with the loss of Fort
Washington and the surrender of 2,800 Americans (339-360).
• Of note is Washington’s letter on 8 Nov recommending Greene evacuate Ft. Washington…
Greene does not leave.
• Map of New York
• Tactical map of the NY Campaign (despite being created later)
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Run away
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
• What to do with the remaining forces was the focus of this lesson. Greene knew he had
screwed up, and now had to determine how to defeat a much more entrenched British
army. Though this was another Operational lesson, students could bridge to the Strategic
after developing COAs that secure their forces. This is widely regarded as the low point
for the Americans in the Revolutionary War. Ensure the cadets firmly grasp the dire
situation in the last quarter of 1776.
Homework:
• Thomas Paine, The Crisis I
Notes:
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Lesson 15: Tactical Level - Trenton and Princeton
Purpose of the lesson:
Understanding the dire straits of the American Army at the end of 1776 and the desperate need
for a victory is the primary goal of this lesson. The status of the troops, the financial situation,
and the social outlook on the war was poor; there was, however, reason for hope. Reinforcements
were arriving, many of the soldiers with expiring enlistments would stay if they were paid, and
Thomas Paine’s writings (particularly The Crisis) prompted popular social examination.
The lesson itself should deal primarily with the battlefield attack on Trenton. Much of the
correspondence should be focused on larger, strategic factors, but cadets should wade through
that material and highlight only the tactical details necessary for a successful course of action
against the Hessians. While it is tactical in nature, the students must focus on the operational
aspects of moving the men and equipment across the Delaware River and into position for the
surprise attack.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the Tactical situation — how these plans will take Trenton with minimal loss
of life.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Thomas Paine, The Crisis I
Significance of the Date:
24 December 1776 - Christmas eve was the final planning day for Washington and his top
commanders as they prepared for the assault on the Hessian force at Trenton. Nathanael Greene,
John Sullivan, Henry Knox, and James Ewing made up the primary commanders, and each
played their part flawlessly.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Weather
• Troop strength
• Enemy troop strength
• Social and economic outlook
• Logistic movements
• Henry Knox’s artillery numbers
• Intel on the Hessian units stationed in Trenton
• Intel on Johann Rall

106

SITREP Questions:
• Weather conditions
• Hessian culture, specifically around Christmas
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Congressional correspondences, specifically regarding troops and supplies
The Northern Army under Schuyler needed troops and supplies as badly as did
Washington
• Correspondences dealing with the state of the Army (see Johnathon Trumbull, 16 Dec)
• Map of Trenton
• Map of Princeton
• Map of the Delaware River
• New Jersey area maps
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Attack and capture Trenton
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
One could question why George Washington has been a commander at each level of war instead
of remaining at the Strategic level, and the cadets could debate the benefits and pitfalls of such a
position.
This is the first lesson where culture is specifically highlighted as it relates to the Hessian unit.
While it is somewhat downplayed in the eighteenth-century because traditional European
warfare crossed cultural dichotomies, it is still important to understand if there are differences
before going into battle. If nothing else, it is a good exercise to force students to examine cultural
military differences.
Finally, ensure cadets completely understand the tactical COA of the assault. One could go so far
as to assign students as different sub-commanders and have them walk through the attack on the
Trenton map. While Princeton is over a week away, the instructor could also enable the students
to determine a COA based on the notion that Cornwallis could lead a force from Princeton into
Trenton to try and recapture the town. In that case, Washington would need a plan at the ready
— the Princeton assault.
Homework:
Thomas Paine, The Crisis II - III
Notes:
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CHAPTER VII
VII. BLOCK GUIDE: Part II — Operational Assessment, 1777-1778
PURPOSE:
Block I introduced students to the fast-paced planning tempo of the Revolutionary War
and the intricacies of social, political, diplomatic, economic, and military correspondence. Cadets
experienced the planning process at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Further,
they wrestled with time — or the lack thereof — to accomplish all of their daily tasks. Through
practice, students are becoming adept and sifting through large amounts of information to pick
out the important. Their communication skills are improving and will continue to improve in
Block II. Finally, through primary sources, cadets are learning the importance of cultural
differences, media, the interaction of the national instruments of power, and the tactics and
techniques of eighteenth-century warfare. In short, they are already meeting the institutional and
departmental outcomes in an active learning, flipped classroom environment through the
gamification of the Revolutionary War.
Block II continues along the same lines. Students will maintain their focus on primary
sources, continue to develop and recommend three courses of action (COAs) per lesson, and
differentiate between the three levels of war. The main difference with Block II is that the
emphasis will shift slightly from the strategic to the operational, as 1777 and 1778 had several
major campaigns that changed the course of the war, especially the Saratoga and Philadelphia
Campaigns. Thus, assessing the operational ability of the Continental Army through primary

sources and its impact on the strategic and tactical situations is the main purpose of this block.

GOALS and OBJECTIVES:
• Highlight the evolution, survival and operational ability of an American force that can achieve
independence.
• Understand the difficulties inherent in moving Armies through a divided America at war.
• Comprehend the operational level of war in practice.
• Grasp the strategic and operational importance of the Saratoga and Philadelphia Campaigns, as
well as the tactical implications of the military training at Valley Forge.

TIMELINE:
Lesson 16 - 30 May 1777 - Saving an Army
Lesson 17 - 10 September 1777 - Protecting Philadelphia
Lesson 18 - 18 September 1777 - Saratoga I, Freeman’s Farm
Lesson 19 - 4 October 1777 - Germantown: victory or defeat?
Lesson 20 - 7 October 1777 - Saratoga II, Bemis Heights
Lesson 21 - 6 February 1778 - Winter Training
Lesson 22 - 30 May 1778 – State of the Army / DIME
Lesson 23 - 19 June 1778 - Watching the British
Lesson 24 - 28 June 1778 – Monmouth Courthouse
Lesson 25 – Post-28 June 1778 – Tactical aftermath – Strategic results?
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW:
After the near-disastrous events in 1776, the Continental Army entered 1777 with
renewed hope. The Trenton and Princeton campaign went exceedingly well for such a small,
dilapidated force, and the public reaction from Thomas Paine's The Crisis I spurred a sense of
patriotism and urgency for the American cause. At the same time, during the early months of
1777, the Continental Army disintegrated to barely 2,500 troops — not nearly enough to
confront the British forces in occupied New York.130 In the meantime, General Johnny Burgoyne
put forth a plan for another Canadian invasion, this time from Quebec down the Hudson River.
General Howe, already outnumbering Washington’s soldiers, requested 20,000 additional troops
so that he could conquer Philadelphia, hold New York, and aid Burgoyne.131 He did not receive
reinforcements, but his force still more than tripled the Continental Army.
George Washington spent the first half of 1777 trying to determine Howe’s intentions.
Though he refused to let Howe draw him into open-field battle, he nevertheless engaged the
British at the Brandywine River outside of Philadelphia. Unfortunately, George Washington was
decisively out-generaled. Howe routed the Continental Army in early September and captured
Philadelphia.
In the Northern States, the Continental Army of the North, under the command of
General Horatio Gates, bogged down Burgoyne’s Redcoats short of Albany. The Patriots scored
two major tactical victories on 19 September and 7 October at Freeman’s Farm and Bemis
Heights, respectively.132 The surrender of an entire British Army bolstered not only the
Americans, but rallied British enemies around the world, leading Saratoga to become known as
130

Ron Chernow, Washington: A Life (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2010): 294.
Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice,
1763-1789, Collector’s Edition. (Norwalk, Connecticut: Easton Press, 1971): 178.
132
W. J Wood, Battles of the Revolutionary War, 1775-1781 (Cambridge: Da Capo Press; Oxford Publicity
Partnership, 2003): 132-171.
131
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one of the most decisive battles of world history.
Building on the tactical, operational, and strategic success of Saratoga, the Continental
Army spent the winter of 1777-1778 under the watchful training-eye of a Prussian, Baron von
Steuben. Despite the harshness of the winter and the constant lack of food, von Steuben reshaped
the now-veteran Continental Army into one that could match an eighteenth-century traditional
European force.133 They got their chance to prove it on a large scale in June as the British left
Philadelphia and headed back to New York. The resultant campaign culminated in the tactically
indecisive but strategically important Battle of Monmouth Courthouse. With that, the major
campaigns in the Middle and Northern states came to an end. The British shifted their strategic
aim to the Southern states, which is the focus of Block III.

ISSUES:
• How did the Declaration of Independence alter the strategic landscape for George Washington
and his commanders?
• Did the victory of the Saratoga campaign result from a superior American military prowess or
was it a blundered British expedition?
• Why was Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga so strategically important for the American cause?
• What was the impact of the Valley Forge winter of 1777-1778, and how was that important to
the American strategy?
• What defined victory during the Philadelphia campaign in both 1777 and 1778? Is there a
difference between a tactical and a strategic victory? Can you have a tactical victory but a
strategic failure, and vice versa?
133
Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763 - 1789, Rev. and expanded
ed., The Oxford History of the United States C. Vann Woodward, general ed.; Vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,
2007): 424-425.
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BLOCK ASSIGNMENT:
Operational Analysis Paper - Due lesson 21
• 1000 words or less
• Must have a historical argument, a solid thesis, and present researched evidence supporting
your position about the operational level of war.
• Must use scholarly secondary sources. I will only accept sources by approved authors. The
following list are authors that are automatically approved, check with me if you have a
scholar that is not on this list. Any author mentioned in Chapter II is also acceptable.
◦

Don Higginbotham, Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, W. J. Wood, Robert Middlekauff,
Wayne Lee, Eric Foner, Merrill Jensen, Joseph Ellis, T.H. Breen, John Ferling, David
McCullough, or Benson Bobrick.134

• Do not forget to think about any economic, social, cultural, diplomatic, or military issues.
• be sure to answer the following questions: How effective were the American (or British)
operational methods to this point in the war? Did they support the strategy, and what
were their challenges?

FINAL NOTES:
This block contains several lessons that deviate from how most of class operates. One
includes a role-playing tactical exercise, and another focuses on strategic-level analysis with no
COA briefings. All of the differences are listed in the lesson notes, so be sure to read them prior
to each class period.

134

Note to Instructors: this list is not all inclusive but is designed to introduce students to many of the most
prominent American Revolution scholars and to prevent the wide array of internet-based, non-academic websites
from creeping into the student’s research.
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Lesson 16: Strategic Level - Saving an Army
Purpose of the lesson:
After the previous few fast-paced lessons, this one is somewhat of a “breather.” While it still
follows the same format, the goal is to provide an overview of where the Continental Army
began and how it evolved up until this point in the war. In short, this lesson should be a minireview. As such, the COA briefings will be shortened to a single, five-minute briefing by the
instructor acting as George Washington.
While the student-led SITREP and the numerous in-class correspondences will remain, the
lesson will include some discussion on the state of the Continental Army and the use of the four
Instruments of Power (IOP) during the war (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic — or
DIME). Further, this lesson provides an excellent opportunity to discuss illness, especially
smallpox.
This course also provides the opportunity for self-assessment, and we will discuss if the course
needs adjustment as we move into Block II. Further, this lesson provides the opportunity for
honest feedback and criticism of the overall course methodology, specifically, if the primary
source-driven gamification of the Revolutionary War is conducive to the increase of critical
thinking and overall metacognition. While the feedback cannot create drastic change during the
semester, the feedback can (and should) alter Block II. For instance, we can reduce the workload
if there is far too much in-class correspondence to read or if three COA briefings every day are
inappropriate. Nonetheless, this lesson offers the opportunity for self and course assessment.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(30 Min) COA PLANNING & DISCUSSION
• Provide Primary Sources, correspondences & maps
• Preferably, cadets will get divided into groups to read through the primary sources.
(5 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should address the
STRATEGIC situation — how his plans will achieve the Congressional/Political goal of
an Independence United States without British interference.
Reading/Homework Due:
Thomas Paine’s The Crisis II
Significance of the Date:
30 May 1777 - Washington began the campaign season on May 28th when he led the Continental
Army to Middlebrook Valley. His intent was to watch General Howe and to remain in a
maneuverable position until the time was right.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Status of the Army
• Numbers, logistics, morale
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• Position of the enemy
• Civilian sentiment
• Sickness
SITREP Questions:
• Remain focused on the strategic situation
• Ask about diplomatic efforts, especially between the French and Indians
• Discuss financial efforts… Washington’s biggest struggle
• Question the health of the troops, especially regarding smallpox and its vaccination
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Colonial Area maps
• Winter Correspondences
• Washington to Gates, 28 Jan
• Washington to Maxwell, 17 April
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Gather troops and supplies, monitor Howe, protect Philadelphia.
Final Thoughts:
• Once again, ensure that this lesson still follows the format as the SITREP is important and the
primary sources instrumental to H999. At the same time, this lesson must include some
informal course assessment.
• The next SITREP is difficult due to the large amount of information across two theaters of
war, consider discussing the expectations with the student at the end of this lesson.
Homework:
Thomas Paine’s The Crisis III
Notes:
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Lesson 17: Strategic/Operational Level - Protecting Philadelphia
Purpose of the lesson:
Lesson 16 was dedicated to a strategic assessment of the course up to this point and acted as a
“breather.” This lesson immediately jumps back into the fray — just like the Revolutionary War
in mid-1777. The British embarked on several major operational preparatory moves during June,
July, and August as they pursued two distinct strategies.
While both Howe’s Philadelphia campaign and Burgoyne’s Hudson River campaign were
strategically significant, the focus of this lesson will be on the former rather than the latter. At
the same time, students must understand Burgoyne’s advance from Quebec in the context of the
specific time and date within 1777. In other words, the purpose of this lesson is to force the
cadets to realize that multiple strategic events occurred simultaneously, all of which required
attention.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
• Provide Primary Sources, cadets determine 3 COA’s based on strategic situation with the help
of correspondences & maps
• Preferably, cadets will get divided into 3 groups. If they do, they can decide how to split the
work so that they can develop 3 separate COAs. They will still need to coordinate
between groups between so as not to duplicate effort.
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• Each group has five minutes to present their Course of Action, argue for its effectiveness, and
answer questions about its feasibility.
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC and OPERATIONAL situation — how these plans will
defeat the British so that the Political and Diplomatic realm can finalize peace.
Reading/Homework Due:
Thomas Paine’s The Crisis III
Significance of the Date:
10 September 1777 - The Continentals and the British would engage at the Battle of Brandywine
on the 11th, so the day prior was an important planning day. Washington understood the strategic
importance of protecting Philadelphia and the socio-political impact it brought, but also
disregarded the traditional European notion that the capture of a specific city could end the war.
At the same time, he knew that Burgoyne was advancing from Canada. Fort Ticonderoga had
fallen without a shot fired, Fort Stanwix was under siege, and the Redcoats had recruited a large
number of Canadian and Indian allies. There were American successes. Through cunning and
deception, Benedict Arnold had eliminated British Lt Col Barry St. Leger’s force and broken the
siege of Ft. Stanwix. Further, American General John Stark captured nearly 1,000 of Burgoyne’s
troops as they foraged for food.
Nonetheless, both campaigns had significant strategic implications, and both required an
operational American response.
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SITREP Student: Cadet X — This student has a difficult task with the amount of information
required over two geographic areas.
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Position and size of Howe’s force
• Position and size of Burgoyne’s force
• Size and strength of Washington’s force
• Size and strength of Gates's force
• Civilian sentiment around the Middle States
• Status of Indian allies and enemies, specifically the Oneida (friend) and Seneca (foe)
SITREP Questions:
• Status of Congress - are they safe?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Overview map
• Northern theater map
• Middle theater map
• Philadelphia and surrounding area map
• Washington to Congress, and Washington to Schuyler, 20 June
Courses of Action (COAs):
1. Historical COA: Engage at the Battle of Brandywine
2. Backup 1:
3. Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
Warfare is not linear. Military personnel often describe their time as long stretches of boredom
or monotony followed by periods of adrenaline and terror. When things happen, they seem to
happen all at once. In the classroom, these past two lessons attempt to recreate that same
phenomenon. Lesson 16 was slow, whereas a myriad of events took place between lessons that
demand attention. Therefore, this lesson was designed to be another busy class period. To finish
the class, the instructor should remind the students that sometimes warfare is like that — busy.
Homework:
• Travels through the interior parts of America, by Thomas Anburey, lieutenant in the army of
General Burgoyne. Read pages 164-199 (letters XXX - XXXVII).
• NOTE: This reading slightly breaks the rules of the course in that it would not have been
available to Americans at the time it was written. It is, however, a primary source that
provides an abundance of information about Burgoyne’s campaign from a British
soldiers’ perspective, including Ticonderoga, Jane McCrea, and Saratoga.
• NOTE: While cadets are only required to read Anburey’s letters XXX through XXXVII, his
entire collection would provide them a wealth of information that could aid them greatly
during their SITREPs and COA briefings. It would be worth it to mention that to the
class.
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Lesson 18: Operational Level – Saratoga I, Freeman’s Farm
Purpose of the lesson:
This lesson highlights the Saratoga campaign up until the Battle of Freeman’s Farm. The
purpose is to comprehend the relative lack of immediate intelligence and correspondence while
trusting that those in the area have control over the situation. Though this lesson historically
takes place less than two weeks from the previous lesson, the correspondences, maps, and intel
should follow from early in the Saratoga campaign.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as Horatio Gates, should ensure that each COA
addresses the OPERATIONAL situation — how these plans will maneuver the Army to
enable a successful tactical situation.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Travels through the interior parts of America, by Thomas Anburey, lieutenant in the army of
General Burgoyne, pages 164-199 (letters XXX - XXXVII).
Significance of the Date:
• 18 September 1777 - The Battle of Freeman’s Farm occurred on the 19th, so this is the last
chance to ensure the Northern Army is in a favorable position to engage, which is the
goal of the operational level.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Troop numbers, strength, supplies on both sides
• Location
• Status of Indian allies
• Recap of Burgoyne’s route
• Logistics
• Guns, ammo, artillery
SITREP Questions:
• Status of militia
• Communication lines, especially for Burgoyne
• Movement from Howe or Clinton
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Overview map
• Northern Theater Map
• Tactical level map of Saratoga
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•
•
•
•

To Washington from Gates, 22 Aug
To Washington from Gates, 28 Aug
From Hamilton to Gates, 29 Aug
From Washington to Gates, 1 Sept

Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Engage at Freeman’s Farm and again at Bemis Heights
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
Correspondence to the Northern Theater was comparatively light during the summer of 1777,
especially for such a strategically important engagement. After the previous lesson, students may
have difficulty finding the relevant information necessary to develop three COAs; therefore, the
instructor may need to assist, perhaps even to the point of “breaking character” and giving a
mini-lecture on the Burgoyne’s plan.
Homework:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis IV
Notes:
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Lesson 19: Tactical Level – Germantown, victory or defeat?
Purpose of the lesson:
This tactically-focused lesson has a two-fold purpose: first, it uses Washington’s General Order
from 3 October that praised the Army's fighting spirit and stoked their competitive nature to do
better than their Northern compatriots that had recently bested the Redcoats at Freeman’s Farm.
In doing so, Washington highlighted the soldier’s warrior ethos, and elucidating that point in
class illuminates the USAFA outcome of the same name.
Second, this lesson extolls the necessity of detail. With the extra few minutes afforded during
each class period (only 45 of the 53 minutes are utilized), the instructor, acting as George
Washington, will reveal his “General Orders for Attacking Germantown” to the class. His
detailed order will then be compared to the COA briefings, allowing the students to engage in
informal and unspoken self-assessment as they see how they should prepare tactical-level
COAs.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the TACTICAL situation — how these plans will defeat the British force and
defend Philadelphia.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis IV
Significance of the Date:
• 3 October 1777: The attack on the British forces in Germantown occurred pre-dawn on 4
October. Washington moved his army the evening of the 3rd, and issued orders that same
afternoon.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• British troops numbers and locations (Germantown: if Cadet X does not brief this accurately,
the instructor should turn the briefing into a more antagonistic meeting in the same way
as would happen in the modern military)
• Tactical level details: food, armament, gunpowder
• Morale
• Intel
• Geography
• Weather
SITREP Questions:
• British defenses
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Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Middle colonies map
• Germantown map
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: See “General Orders for Attacking Germantown, 3 Oct 1777"
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
Creating a plan with an eye for detail is the main focus of this lesson. Because the tactical plans
have not generally been reviewed after the COA brief, this is a rare occasion to examine
Washington’s order after the COA briefings. Thus, cadets should see how they need to brief the
tactical level in the future (assuming they have not already risen to the task).
Robert Middlekauff's The Glorious Cause has a good overview of the Battle of Germantown
beginning on page 399, as does Ron Chernow’s Washington on page 307.
Homework:
• Research for Operational Analysis Paper
Notes:
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Lesson 20: Tactical Level – Saratoga II, Bemis Heights
Purpose of the lesson:
This lesson is again tactical in nature, and the in-class readings highlight the results from
the Battle of Freeman’s Farm. The beginning of the Battle of Bemis Heights was not a planned
assault and started after American troops discovered a British reconnaissance party advancing
towards their lines. Thus, the focus of this lesson is still tactical in nature, but without the
knowledge of an impending assault.
While not necessary, if the instructor desires higher gamification during the lesson,
he/she may create a situation incorporating real-time information while cadets plan for their
normal COAs. In other words, the class could remain structured as if they are planning COAs for
the next day. Abruptly, the instructor/commander could announce that the battle is beginning
now, and the cadets must react by pouring over the tactical map. They must decide where to send
the troops and wait for further intel while developing alternative plans and scenarios.
During this exercise, the instructor must ensure that the British movements are accurately
depicted so that the lesson does not devolve into an ahistorical “what-if” game. If the cadets send
troops to the wrong locations, the instructor could have the British troops advance on the
American camp, growing more frantic as they approach until the exercise needs to stop or the
cadets send troops to the correct location.
Again, this is not required, but could be a good tactical exercise.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as Benedict Arnold or Daniel Morgan, should ensure
that each COA addresses the TACTICAL situation — how these plans will defeat the
British so that the Political and Diplomatic realm can finalize peace.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Research for Operational Analysis Paper
Significance of the Date:
• 7 October 1777: The Battle of Bemis Heights occurred on this day.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Troop numbers and locations (friend and foe)
• Supply amounts (friend and foe)
• Weather
• Geography
• Reinforcement possibilities for both sides
SITREP Questions:
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• weapon reserves
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Overview map
• Saratoga map
• Freeman’s Farm map
• Bemis Height’s map
• Correspondences between Gates, Washington, and Arnold
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Bemis Heights
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
The exercise could be an excellent way to break up the regular flow of the class. While it would
not require much extra preparation, the instructor would need to know the exact locations of
British troops as well as have a good map of the area. Otherwise, it would be interesting to try,
especially as lesson 20 is half-way through the semester; a time when many students are growing
weary.
Homework:
• Write Operational Level Analysis Paper
Notes:
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Lesson 21: Strategic Level – Winter Training
Purpose of the lesson:
Lesson 21 is the first lesson that takes place in 1778. It refocuses on the Strategic level of
war after the Saratoga victories and the loss of Philadelphia. Though Philadelphia was a hard
loss, the strategic situation changed when the French formally entered into the war against the
British. Further, the arrival of the Prussian Baron von Steuben allowed an experienced European
officer to train the Continental Army, most of whom were veterans of Germantown. Further, the
drill allowed the troops to engage in some activity during a brutally cold and undersupplied
winter. With those new significant events unfolding, the cadets must focus on how they should
reshape the overall American strategy to take advantage of the new training and alliances.
Conversely, the Conway Cabal illuminated a growing political weariness with George
Washington, including an effort to replace him with Horatio Gates. Military infighting among
commanders was common, but reaching into the high levels of the political realm was less-so,
especially when Thomas Conway was appointed as the first Inspector General. Such events often
become major distractions from other, strategically critical decisions that could alter the course
of the war.
The other major development that this lesson should address is Washington’s order to
allow African-Americans into the Continental Army ranks. Any slaves that enlisted were
promised their freedom after the war. This followed the New Jersey Militia Act of 1777 that
allowed free blacks to join, but not slaves. At the same time, the Continental Army leadership
still needed to decide how to use the troops in a racially-divided culture.
The purpose of this lesson is to highlight all three of these major issues. Thus, each of the
three COAs should focus on one of these issues instead of having two backup COAs.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC situations.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Operational Analysis Paper due
Significance of the Date:
• 6 February 1778 - The Franco-American treaty of Amity and Commerce is signed in Paris.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Number of troops
• Supplies, especially food and clothing
• Number of deserters
• Political and civilian sentiment
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• Illness
SITREP Questions:
• Success of smallpox vaccinations
• Should we confiscate civilian property (food and clothing) to supply the troops, as Congress
suggested?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Overview map
• Washington to Thomas Conway, 5 Nov 1777
• Washington to Lafayette, 31 Dec 1777
• Washington to Nicholas Cooke, 2 Jan 1778
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Drill and Training COA:
• International Alliance COA:
• African-American Troops COA:
Final Thoughts:
With the numerous strategic-level issues that took place during the winter of 1777-1778, the
cadets have the chance to tackle at least three of them during the COA briefings. While this may
present the situation where they might need to take to the internet in an effort to find more
sources than are available in class, as long as they remain primary sources on or before 6
February 1778, the instructor should allow them. Also, the three separate COAs break up the
standard lesson during the middle of the semester.
Homework:
• Scan Baron von Steuben’s drill manual
Notes:
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Lesson 22: Strategic Level - State of the Army/DIME
Purpose of the lesson:
Like the previous lesson, this class stays at the strategic level, primarily examining the
Instruments of Power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic - or DIME) and the state
of the Army at the beginning of the campaign season of 1778. General Henry Clinton replaced
General Howe and began to move the British Regulars back towards New York in late May/early
June. George Washington was spoiling for a fight now that his Continental Army had undergone
European-style training.
Thus, the purpose of this lesson is to determine how and when Washington should
strike… if he should maintain his Strategic Defensive or challenge Clinton in open combat.
Further, it seeks to examine the fruition of the Franco-American alliance and the impact of the
order to allow African-Americans to serve in the Continental Army. Finally, cadets should
mention any economic or financial impacts that are influencing the conduct of the Revolutionary
War.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC situation — how these plans will defeat the British so that
the Political and Diplomatic realm can finalize peace.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Baron von Steuben’s Drill Manual
Significance of the Date:
• 30 May 1778 - While the 30th itself does not contain a significant historical event, the end of
May/beginning of June mark the start of the campaign season as Clinton began to move
the British forces. Thus, the end of May is an appropriate time to assess the Strategiclevel state of the Army before moving to the operational level.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Franco-American alliance
• Drill and Training outcomes
• Economics/Finance
• Troops strength and supply
• Location of British Army
SITREP Questions:
• Civilian sentiment
• Weapon logistics
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Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Overview map
• Middle colonies map
• Philadelphia/New Jersey/New York area maps
• Correspondences between Washington and Congress
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Chase Clinton
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
This lesson builds on the previous lesson, further examining the fruition of the strategic-level
issues that were brought to light throughout the winter of 1777/1778. In that vein, students need
to try to find any impacts that those decisions had as the Continental Army heads into the
campaign season of 1778.
Homework:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis V
Notes:
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Lesson 23: Operational Level - Watching the British
Purpose of the lesson:
Accurate intelligence in the eighteenth century was notoriously difficult to ascertain. In
mid-June, the Continental Army departed Valley Forge only to discover that the British had
recently abandoned Philadelphia. General Washington maneuvered his army in an attempt to
catch Henry Clinton before he could reach the relative safety of New York City.
The purpose of this lesson is to attempt to find and intercept the enemy while still dealing
with the logistical problems inherent at the operational level of war.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the OPERATIONAL situation.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis V
Significance of the Date:
• 19 June 1778 - Washington deploys six brigades to catch General Henry Clinton on his march
to New York, officially departing Valley Forge and beginning the campaign that will
culminate at Monmouth Courthouse.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Intel, specifically on the location of the British army
• Location of the various parts of the Continental Army
• Logistics and supply issues
• Geography
• Weather (heat becomes a major influence during the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse)
• Civilian sentiment
SITREP Questions:
• Do we have reinforcements, specifically Benedict Arnold?
• What news from our Indian allies?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Overview map
• Middle states map
• Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York area maps
• From Washington to Dickinson, 5-7 June
• To Washington from Paine, 5 June
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Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Catch up to the British at Monmouth Courthouse
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
Once again, this lesson deals with moving an army towards the enemy with the goal of a
decisive tactical engagement. In this case, the location is not a fixed target, which complicates
the planning process. Further, the intelligence and prospects of the enemy army was often
conflicting, leading to miscalculation and poor recommendations. The two listed
correspondences detail that exact situation.
The next lesson is different and requires preparation. It will be a role-playing recreation
of the Battle of Monmouth, complete with each cadet acting as a different commander. At the
end of this lesson, assign either one or two cadets the following roles: George Washington,
Charles Lee, Anthony Wayne, Nathanael Greene, Marquee de Lafayette, Lord Stirling, Henry
Clinton, Lord Cornwallis, and perhaps Molly Pitcher, who entered fame with her actions at
Monmouth. The cadets must research and understand their role in the battle and be prepared to
walk through, on a map, exactly what occurred and why.
Whomever is assigned to give the SITREP is exempt from taking a role in the exercise.
Homework:
• Research your role in Monmouth Courthouse
Notes:
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Lesson 24: Tactical Level - Monmouth Courthouse
Purpose of the lesson:
The Battle of Monmouth Courthouse was Washington’s chance to show off his retrained
Continental Army. While the Army did exceptionally well compared to previous engagements,
the battle itself ended in a stalemate. At the same time, the battle brought to light the tactical
failings of Charles Lee, who disobeyed orders and was eventually court-martialed as a result.
The purpose of this lesson is to plan the assault on Clinton’s forces and walk through the
battle. The SITREP will still occur, but the class exercise will replace the COAs.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(30 Min) Battle Exercise: use the Monmouth Courthouse Battle Map
• The exercise will begin with Lee’s force catching up to and engaging the British. The
student’s that are role playing Lee, Clinton, and Cornwallis will talk through the action
leading to Lee’s retreat. Each subsequent event will feature the character engaged in the
specific part of the battle, taking turns discussing where they were, what they were doing, and
their decisions.
• An excellent animated review of Monmouth Courthouse that details the specific movements
can be found at http://www.revolutionarywaranimated.com/Monmouth.html
The instructor can watch the video prior to class as the exercise should mirror the animation.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Students should be prepared to role-play their part in the Battle.
Significance of the Date:
• 28 June 1778 - The Battle of Monmouth Courthouse
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Overview map
• Monmouth map
• Correspondences applicable to the specific student
Results of Action:
• Tactical draw
• British retreat to Sandy Hook, where the Navy takes them to NYC
Final Thoughts:
The Monmouth Courthouse battlefield role-playing exercise is another method designed to
introduce the students to tactical-level activity. In the lesson, each student should be the expert
on their historical character, understanding both the timing of the battle, the applicable decisions,
and the ramifications. While it will be research intensive prior to class, their connection to each
character should have long-term implications as the students will better understand the
motivations and thought-processes of the different individuals.
It also acts as another method to increase student interaction and metacognition.
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Homework:
• Joseph Plumb Martin’s A Narrative of a Revolutionary Soldier, Chapter IV: The Campaign of
1778
Notes:
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Lesson 25: Tactical Aftermath - Strategic Results?
Purpose of the lesson:
The Battle of Monmouth Courthouse was the last significant engagement in the Middle
or Northern states as the British would shift their focus to the South. Further, the battle itself
opened several interesting areas of exploration, including Charles Lee’s demise as a commander
and the Continental Army’s ability to engage the Redcoats on equal footing thanks to their
Valley Forge training. It also highlighted the culmination of the operational campaign and leads
to a discussion of the eighteenth-century definition of “victory.” The Americans claimed victory
because Clinton continued towards New York rather than holding the ground, but that was his
intention from the start. At the same time, the Continentals proved their mettle against the
Redcoats in traditional battle – a clear psychological victory.
The ultimate purpose of Lesson 25 is to examine the ramifications of the Battle of
Monmouth Courthouse and decide upon further strategic courses of action.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC situation — how these plans will defeat the British so that
the Political and Diplomatic realm can finalize peace.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Joseph Plumb Martin’s A Narrative of a Revolutionary Soldier, Chapter IV: The Campaign of
1778
Significance of the Date:
• Post 28 June 1778 - The Battle of Monmouth Courthouse occurred on this date.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Post-battle status of forces… losses on both sides
• Movement of British forces
• Ability of the Army to continue pursuit
SITREP Questions:
• Morale?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
1. Overview map
2. Area maps
3. Correspondence between Washington and Lee
4. Political correspondence
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Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA:
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
The strategic ramifications of Monmouth Courthouse were monumental as the strategic
trajectory of the Revolutionary War shifted after the battle. Both the American and British
leadership engaged in dialogue within their own political and military ranks about a revamped
strategy. That strategy would play out in late 1779 and 1780. Thus, an examination of why
Monmouth Courthouse led to those changes is necessary in the classroom, and a fitting
culmination to Block II.
Homework:
• Philipsburg Proclamation
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis VI
Notes:
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CHAPTER VIII
VIII. BLOCK GUIDE: Part III -- Tactical Triumph, 1779-1783
PURPOSE:
The final block highlights the evolution of tactical doctrine as the British and American
strategies shifted to the Southern theater. After a somewhat successful tactical engagement at
Monmouth Courthouse, the Continental Army felt confident in their ability to fight the Redcoats
in traditional European-style combat. Unfortunately, that confidence would disappear at Camden
as Horatio Gates would lose nearly all of the Southern Army. Further, the Revolutionary
commanders slowly realized that their victories were more-often through non-traditional means,
as the battles at Stony Point and Paulus Hook illustrated. Thus, the purpose of this block is to
understand the tactical shift based on the strategic-level evolution. In the end, students should
realize the combined nature of all three levels of war, the need for strategic reassessment, and the
implementation of all instruments of national power.
Additionally, this block sees a larger concentration of combining the levels of war.
Students should have a strong handle on the three levels, and thus this block begins to introduce
a larger concentration of “grey areas” between the three levels. They are expected to differentiate
between them in the SITREP and COA briefings, but the lessons will not be strictly delineated.

GOALS and OBJECTIVES:
• Understand how tactical engagements evolved in the Southern Theater.

• Comprehend the British strategic situation, their reasons for moving to the Southern Theater,
and their operational expectations in the south.
• Explain how the Americans were able to take advantage of the Redcoat’s weaknesses across
the three levels of war.
• Assess the American victory and detail the major factors involved in the British willingness to
surrender.

TIMELINE:
Lesson 26 - 22 June 1779 – State of Affairs
Lesson 27 - 20 August 1779 - Stony Point and Paulus Hook
Lesson 28 - 18 October 1779 - Recapture Savannah?
Lesson 29 - 30 May 1780 - The Winter
Lesson 30 - 11 July 1780 - The South
Lesson 31 – 7 October 1780 – King’s Mountain
Lesson 32 – 2 December 1780 – Greene in the South
Lesson 33 - 16 January 1781 - Cowpens
Lesson 34 - 1 March 1781 - The Race to the Dan
Lesson 35 - 15 March 1781 - Guilford Courthouse
Lesson 36 - 1 September 1781 - The Plan
Lesson 37 - 28 September 1781 - Yorktown
Lesson 38 – October 1781- November 1783 - Is It Over?
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW:
War-weariness had set in by the fifth year of the American Revolution. George
Washington and his Continental Army were in a constant fight not only against the British, but
against the resistance of the American states to provide for a unified military force. The new
alliance with the French allowed the troops to more easily endure the 1778-1779 winter thanks to
additional provisions while the continued drill and training that Baron von Steuben led added to
the American tactical proficiency. Unfortunately, the financial situation was bleak. The Army
troop numbers remained smaller than Washington wished. Without a strong American currency
or the willingness of the population to provide for the Military, the war could not endure for
much longer.135
To make matters worse, the winter of 1779-1780 was horrendous. The cold and snow
broke records, and when the dwindling food supply gave out, it led to one of the few American
mutinies during the war. The troops endured much, but after months of near-starvation in frigid
temperatures, they refused to obey their superiors until they received even minor provisions.136
At the same time, there were reasons for hope. The French officially allied with the
United States, sending much needed supplies and providing their navy to challenge the British at
sea. Further, their entrance into the war forced the British to change their strategy as France and
Spain challenged the British worldwide colonial empire. Britain simply did not have the
resources to defend against an international coalition attacking worldwide holdings while
attempting to suppress the American rebellion. A southern thrust allowed them to shift Redcoats
between the American states and the West Indies quickly.
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After the loss of Stony Point to the Patriots, the British leadership convinced themselves
that the American South contained a large Loyalist population willing to actively participate for
the Crown if they received a small amount of Redcoat support. The relatively quick capture of
Savannah and Charleston bolstered their belief, and the defeat of the Continental Southern Army
under Horatio Gates at Camden solidified the notion that their new strategy worked. The
American situation once again seemed bleak in the summer of 1780.137
Nathanael Greene, the newly appointed commander of what was left of the Southern
Army, shifted the Southern strategy away from the traditional European climactic battle. In its
place, Greene used an operational technique that lured Cornwallis’s Redcoats into the Carolina
interior and stretched the British supply lines to the breaking point. Simultaneously, Daniel
Morgan developed and implemented a tactical approach that combined the strengths of the
militia with the strengths of the regulars while playing on the British stereotypes of the “inept”
militiamen. The result was a truly decisive victory over the feared Lieutenant Colonel Banastre
Tarleton and his British Dragoons at Cowpens in January of 1781.138
Furious, General Cornwallis leapt into action. In his mind, the only necessary recourse
was the destruction, for the fourth time of the war, of the American Southern Army. The British
general resolved to chase down Nathanael Greene in the Carolina backcountry, an operational
maneuver that played into Greene's game plan. As Cornwallis plunged into the interior, his
forces grew weaker and his supply lines snapped. Greene stayed one step ahead, his forces
growing stronger thanks to an increasing number of militia who were arriving daily with their
knowledge of the terrain and ability to live off the land. Finally, a frustrated, hungry, and
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weakened British force found General Greene ready to fight at Guilford Courthouse. The
resultant Pyrrhic victory for Cornwallis cost him so much that he was forced to retreat to the
Atlantic coast to resupply. He set up his base of operations at Yorktown.139
George Washington saw his chance to pounce, and mustering all of his diplomatic,
political, and military clout, he convinced the French to help him trap Cornwallis. Finally, his
Strategic Defensive/Fabian strategy paid off, and the opportunity he so patiently waited for
presented itself. The siege lasted less than six weeks before Washington received the first formal
surrender of his career. With that, hostilities ceased.140
Unfortunately, the Continental Army would endure through two more long years of
service unsure of a lasting peace. Though there were no longer any British combat operations,
there was not yet a political treaty between the two nations officially ending the war and
recognizing the United States as an independent nation. Thus, until 1783, the Army was left in
limbo. Washington himself never fully believed that a lasting peace was forthcoming until he
was able to declare an end to hostilities and disband his Continental Army. He was afforded
that privilege on November 3, 1783.141 The war was officially over.

ISSUES:
• What did the South have that made the British shift their strategy away from the Middle or
Northern states?
• How important were outside-the-military factors in the South, such as politics, economics,
socio-cultural issues, or the “southern way of life” to inside-the-military factors between
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1779 and the end of the war?
• What was the prominent recurring objective during the last several years of the war, resources
or morale?
• Did the Articles of Confederation have an impact on military operations?
BLOCK ASSIGNMENT:
Tactical Analysis Paper - Due lesson 32
• 1000 words or less
• Must have a historical argument, a solid thesis, and present researched evidence supporting
your position about the tactical level of war.
• Must use scholarly secondary sources. I will only accept sources written by approved authors.
The following list are authors that are automatically approved, check with me if you have
an author that is not on this list. Any author mentioned in Chapter II is also acceptable.
◦

Don Higginbotham, Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, Robert Middlekauf, Wayne Lee,
Eric Foner, Merrill Jensen, Joseph Ellis, T.H. Breen, John Ferling, George Scheer,
Hugh Rankin, David McCullough, or Benson Bobrick.142

• Do not forget to think about any economic, social, cultural, diplomatic, or military issues.
• Be sure to answer the following questions:
◦

How effective were the American (or British) tactics by this point in the war? What
were they, and why did the Tactical Commanders believe that their tactics could
defeat the enemy?
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from creeping into the student’s research.
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Lesson 26: Strategic Level - State of Affairs
Purpose of the lesson:
The post-winter strategic assessment was not great (see Rebels and Redcoats, ch29). The
economic situation was dire, and states seemed unwilling to aid the Continental’s at the expense
of their own militia. While the winter between 1778-1779 was comparatively mild, and the
troops now had some additional clothing thanks to the French-American alliance, there was still
a growing rift between the regular troops and the militiamen.
Further, the British’s southern strategy met with success as Savannah fell in December of 1778,
and General Henry Clinton’s Redcoats captured Verplank’s and Stony Point in May of 1779,
severing a critical river crossing necessary for communication.
Thus, the main purpose of this lesson is to assess the state of affairs as the campaign season
opens in 1779.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
• Provide Primary Sources, cadets determine 3 COA’s based on strategic situation with the help
of correspondences & maps
• Preferably, cadets will get divided into 3 groups. If they do, they can decide how to split the
work so that they can develop 3 separate COAs. They will still need to coordinate
between groups between so as not to duplicate effort.
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• Each group has five minutes to present their Course of Action, argue for its effectiveness, and
answer questions about its feasibility.
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC situation — how these plans further the
Congressional/Political goal of a peace with England and an independent nation.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis VI
• A Tory View of Frontier Warfare, Summer 1778—Peter Oliver: from “The Origin & Progress
of the American Rebellion"
Significance of the Date:
• 22 June 1779: Spain declared war on Great Britain on the 21st, which added another
international strategic problem for the British. Further,
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Post-winter status of forces
• Number of troops fit for duty
• Alliance with France — number of French troops and supply
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•
•
•
•

International situation — status of Spain, Prussia, West Indies, etc.
Number and location of British troops
Financial status of the Army
Aspects of raising African-American regiments

SITREP Questions:
• Rift between Continental Army and state militia
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Nathanael Greene to James Varnum, Feb 9, 1779
• George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, Oct. 4, 1778
• Washington to Benjamin Harrison, Dec 18, 1778
• Washington to Henry Laurens, Mar 18 & 20, 1779
• Overview map
• Map of Savannah
• Map of the Southern Theater
• Map of Verplank and Stony Point area
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Re-capture Stony Point, re-capture Savannah
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
• Though this lesson should highlight the state of affairs for the Americans and the international
situation against the British, it should also develop several strategic-level COAs aimed at
a British defeat. At this point in the course, the levels of war may start to run together.
Ensure that they do not. Further, ensure that all elements of culture are addressed at the
strategic level since eighteenth-century socio-cultural issues played a large role in the
Continental Army’s overall strategy. One prominent example includes the continued
debate over the issue of allowing slaves or free blacks to serve. In short, keep the
strategic level wide.
• **the student assigned to give the next SITREP may need a “heads up” to focus on Stony
Point and Paulus Hook in addition to the regular SITREP briefing material.
Homework:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis VII
• Philipsburg Proclamation
Notes:
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Lesson 27: Strategic/Operational Level - Stony Point & Paulus Hook
Purpose of the lesson:
“Mad” Anthony Wayne captured Stony Point from the British in a nighttime raid on July 16, and
Henry “Light Horse” Lee took Paulus Hook in similar fashion on 19 August. While Washington
ordered both abandoned, they illuminated the evolution of operational maneuvers at this point in
the war (and also highlighted the importance of commanders with nicknames). In addition, these
two assaults further elucidate what “victory” means — is a strategic morale boost a better
“victory" than the traditional notion of holding territory? Nathanael Greene certainly thought so
based on his tactical actions throughout the war. The implications of such a definition was
crucial to Washington’s overall strategic vision and an important characteristic of the
Revolutionary War that students must understand. Thus, that is the purpose of this lesson.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
• Provide Primary Sources, cadets determine 3 COA’s based on strategic situation with the help
of correspondences & maps
• Preferably, cadets will get divided into 3 groups. If they do, they can decide how to split the
work so that they can develop 3 separate COAs. They will still need to coordinate
between groups between so as not to duplicate effort.
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• Each group has five minutes to present their Course of Action, argue for its effectiveness, and
answer questions about its feasibility.
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC/OPERATIONAL situation — how these plans will
maneuver the Army to achieve the strategic-level orders.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis VII
• A Tory View of Frontier Warfare, Summer 1778—Peter Oliver: from “The Origin & Progress
of the American Rebellion"
Significance of the Date:
• 20 August 1779: “Mad” Anthony Wayne captured Stony Point from the British in a nighttime
raid on July 16, and Henry “Light Horse” Lee took Paulus Hook in similar fashion on 19
August. While Washington ordered both abandoned, they illuminate the evolution of
operational and tactical maneuvers at this point in the war.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus: **the student may need a “heads up” to focus on Stony Point and
Paulus Hook
• Recount the operational events of Stony Point and Paulus Hook
• Discuss why both were quickly abandoned
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• Standard SITREP material (troops, locations, etc)
SITREP Questions:
• Civilian reaction to Philipsburg Proclamation
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• George Washington to Henry Lee, July 9, 1779
• Maps of Stony Point and Paulus Hook
• Maps of the Southern Theater
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Recapture Savannah
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
• The evolution of operational-level methods was the main purpose of this lesson, and the
implications for further combat endeavors should be highlighted throughout the class.
Cadets should debate the merits of using these non-conventional means on a recurring
basis throughout the class, and their COAs should reflect that change.
Homework:
• Banishing Tories: “A Whig”: To the Public; Pennsylvania Packet, Aug 5, 1779 (see The
American Revolution: Writings from the War of Independence pg 530-533)
Notes:

142

Lesson 28: Operational/Tactical Level - Recapture Savannah?
Purpose of the lesson:
Alliances can be tricky, especially when coordinating tactical assaults. The focus on this lesson is
the tactical attack on the British in Savannah and the attempt to liberate the city. George
Washington coordinated heavily with the Comte d’Estaing and his French fleet. Students should
plan the attack and present their COAs around the joint endeavor to recapture Savannah.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL situation of recapturing Savannah.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Banishing Tories: “A Whig”: To the Public; Pennsylvania Packet, Aug 5, 1779 (see The
American Revolution: Writings from the War of Independence pg 530-533)
Significance of the Date:
• 18 October 1779: George Washington and Comte d’Estaing launch a combined assault on the
now British-held city of Savannah on the 19th.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Alliance with the French
• Location of French fleet
• Number of ships and time necessary for their preparation/participation
• Standard tactical evaluation of American troops, logistics, terrain, weather, etc.
SITREP Questions:
• Where is the British fleet?
• Is the French fleet willing to engage the British navy for Savannah?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Washington to Congress, 4 Oct 1779
• Washington to Comte d’Estaing, 4 Oct 1779
• Map of Savannah
• Map of the Southern theater, including the West Indies
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: The attack failed
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
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Final Thoughts:
• Though the recapture of Savannah fails, students should highlight the nature of international
cooperation at the operational/tactical level.
Homework:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis VIII
Notes:
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Lesson 29: Strategic Level - The Winter
Purpose of the lesson:
The 1779-1780 winter was the harshest of the American Revolution. Temperatures were at
extreme lows while the snow was at record highs around the Continental Army’s encampment at
Morristown. Food became scarcer for the troops than at any other point in the war, and locals
were unwilling to part with their stores. Even if they did, transportation was near impossible in
such conditions. Strategically, Washington had his hands full trying to keep his army together.
The British, on the other hand, were preparing for a large summer campaign in the south, and
Washington’s spies relied the rumors back to him. General Henry Clinton was moving large
numbers of Redcoats, leaving New York lightly defended. Their capture of Charleston was the
biggest loss of American forces of the war. Further, British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton
gave no quarter to the Patriots trying to surrender at Waxhaw’s, South Carolina. The ensuing cry
of “Tarleton’s Quarter” became synonymous with how the Redcoats treated prisoners or those
who surrendered.
At the same time, the diplomatic situation was improving as both France and Spain declared war
on Britain, and John Adams was hopeful that international trade with some neutral nations would
increase. Nonetheless, this was America’s war to fight, and Washington needed to develop a
post-winter strategic assessment that would allow the Patriots to force the British to the
bargaining table. Thus, that is the purpose of this lesson.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC situation.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis VIII
Significance of the Date:
• 30 May 1780: The “massacre” at Waxhaw’s occurred on 29 May. While the event itself was a
tremendous loss, it gave the Continentals a propaganda victory in the rallying cry of
“Tarleton’s Quarter.”
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Status of the troops
• Winter Mutinies
• Location of the British
• Weather
• Alliances
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SITREP Questions:
• Civilian sentiment
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Washington to Schuyler, 30 Jan 1780
• Washington to Fielding Lewis, 5 May 1780
• Washington to Steuben, 2 April 1780
• Greene to Moore Freeman, 4 Jan 1780
• Greene to Christopher Greene, 10 Feb 1780
• Greene to Griffin Greene, 25 April 1780
• Overview Map
• Southern Theater Map
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Recommend Greene take the Southern command, get Gates instead.
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
• As in the previous post-winter lessons, this one is all about the strategic assessment and the
plan for 1780. The French and Spanish add a new dimension to the overall war, as does
the shift to the Southern theater. Ensure the students are seeing the “big picture."
Homework:
• Henry Clinton’s Proclamations
Notes:
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Lesson 30: Strategic Level - The South
Purpose of the lesson:
Similar to the previous lesson, this strategic-level class focuses on the specifics of the Southern
theater and how best to defeat a British army that has met with success. The fall of Savannah and
Charleston dealt a severe blow to the Patriots, and the French Navy has not challenged the
British as Washington hoped. Further, in appointing Horatio Gates as Commander of the
Southern Theater over the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation of Nathanael Greene,
Congress displayed a lack of trust in Washington.
This lesson aims to highlight the numerous strategic problems with the Southern Theater during
1780.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC situation.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Henry Clinton’s Proclamations
Significance of the Date:
• 11 July 1780: Clinton issued his proclamations on 3 June, demanding that Americans sign an
oath of allegiance to the King or be considered traitors. His actions forced fence-sitters to
choose a side. Also, on 11 July, the French naval squadron finally arrived at Newport,
RI.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Troop levels, locations, logistics
• French troops and ships
• British troop locations
• British naval locations
SITREP Questions:
• How did Clinton’s proclamations affect the southern morale?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Washington to Congress, 2 April 1780
• Washington General Orders, 6 April 1780
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Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Gates loses at Camden
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
• Ensure the students focus on the Southern theater and how it differentiates from the Northern
and Middle theaters. The point of this lesson was to get them to understand the British
perspective in moving south and attempt to find ways to staunch their success.
Homework:
• News of Benedict Arnold’s betrayal
• Benedict Arnold to the Inhabitants of America
• Patrick Ferguson’s message
Notes:
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Lesson 31: Tactical Level - King’s Mountain
Purpose of the lesson:
The Battle of King’s Mountain breaks traditional military planning and hierarchy in that it was
purely a militia-driven fight. While the overall plan was discussed and agreed upon prior to the
battle, once it started there was no single commander in charge of the plan. Each militia unit was
on its own. To that end, this lesson will echo the sentiments and split the class into several
groups. Each group will act as a separate militia unit, elect a captain, and allow those captains to
confer with each other and develop the COAs. At the end of the lesson, they must agree on the
three COAs, but they do not have to brief them to any single person (such as the instructor).
Instead, all cadets in the room must understand the plan.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(25 Min) COA PLANNING: The cadets are on their own here… they must elect several leaders
to confer and decide on COAs. They just all have to know what it is.
(5 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor will not participate in the process during this lesson. Instead,
the cadets selected as Militia Commanders should ensure that each COA addresses the
TACTICAL situation.
• Only 5 minutes is necessary to ensure that all students know the plan. Pick one or two at
random to relay the COAs, and that will suffice.
Reading/Homework Due:
• News of Benedict Arnold’s treason
• Benedict Arnold to the Inhabitants of America
• Patrick Ferguson’s message
Significance of the Date:
• 7 October 1780: This is the date of the Battle of King’s Mountain.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Militia units — number and locations
• Ferguson’s location and number of troops
• Geography
SITREP Questions:
• Who is in charge?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Ferguson’s message to Isaac Shelby
• Map of King’s Mountain
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Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Rifleman-style attack shooting up the hill — annihilation of Ferguson’s corps
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
• In keeping with the militiamen style of the lesson, the instructor should play an extremely
minor role in this class period. Because King’s Mountain had no overall commander, the
class should do the same. They must still get coordinated enough to carry out a feasible
assault.
Homework:
• Isaac Shelby, “King’s Mountain: Letters of Colonel Isaac Shelby,” ed. J. G. de Roulhac
Hamilton, The Journal of Southern History 4, no. 3 (1938): 367–377.
• Royal Gazette: “Strayed… a whole Army."
Notes:
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Lesson 32: Operational Level - Greene in the South
Purpose of the lesson:
Tasked with carrying out Washington’s strategic plan, Nathanael Greene had little to work with
when he took command of the Southern Army at the end of 1780. Thus, the purpose of this
lesson is to highlight and figure out how to operationally field an Army to challenge the British
in the South.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as Nathanael Greene, should ensure that each COA
addresses the OPERATIONAL situation.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Isaac Shelby, “King’s Mountain: Letters of Colonel Isaac Shelby,” ed. J. G. de Roulhac
Hamilton, The Journal of Southern History 4, no. 3 (1938): 367–377.
• Royal Gazette: “Strayed… a whole Army."
Significance of the Date:
• 2 December 1780: The Battle of Camden occurred on 16 Aug, ending in the defeat and
dispersal of the Southern Army. Congress allowed Washington to select the new
Commander of the Southern Army; Nathanael Greene was his top choice, who took
command on 2 December.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Status of Southern Forces
• Recap of Southern battles
• Standard SITREP information
SITREP Questions:
• How many guerrilla fighters occupy the area?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Washington to Thomas Jefferson, 21 Sep 1780
• Washington to Thomas Jefferson, 10 Oct 1780
• Washington to Abner Nash, 6 Nov 1780
• Washington Circular to State Governments, 18 Oct 1780
• Overview map of the Southern Theater
• Greene’s appointment
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Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Greene dispatches BGen Morgan with a “flying army."
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
• While this lesson is operational, it also has a strategic component in that Greene had to
recreate a decimated army and decide what to do with it. Make sure that the students
understand what has worked and what did not work for the previous commanders (like
Camden). Ensure that their COAs reflect their knowledge.
Homework:
• Write Tactical Analysis Paper
Notes:
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Lesson 33: Tactical Level - Cowpens
Purpose of the lesson:
Daniel Morgan was a rare tactical genius. This lesson will depart from tradition in that the
instructor, acting as General Morgan, will detail his tactical plans to the class after the SITREP is
complete. The class can still be split into several groups, but will act as William Washington’s
cavalry, John Eager Howard’s regulars, and Andrew Pickens’s militia. Morgan will spend the
class directing his troops to make sure each knows their role perfectly. This lesson is close to a
lecture-style in that the students do more listening than anything else, but is also true to the
character of Morgan (see Buchanan, Road to Guilford Courthouse, 316).
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(5 Min) COA PLANNING
(25 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as Daniel Morgan, should brief his COA of the
TACTICAL plan.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Tactical Analysis Paper Due
Significance of the Date:
• 16 January 1781: Daniel Morgan defeats Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens on the 17th.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Status of troops
• Location of Tarleton
SITREP Questions:
• None… ensure the briefing is good, but act as Daniel Morgan — impatient to get through the
briefing so he could detail his plan.
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Map of Cowpens
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Victory
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
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Final Thoughts:
• This is one lesson where the instructor must be fully prepared to brief, in detail, the plan of
attack at Cowpens. There are no correspondences for the cadets to read, nor any material
other than the Cowpens map for them to reference. The instructor, acting as Morgan, runs
the class.
Homework:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis IX
Notes:
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Lesson 34: Operational Level - Race to the Dan
Purpose of the lesson:
The Race to the Dan was a brilliant operational move that decimated Cornwallis’s troops through
fatigue and lack of supply. Greene stretched the Redcoat logistic system so thin that Cornwallis
had no choice but to turn back; it was precisely at that point that Greene engaged the British.
Though Guilford Courthouse will be discussed on lesson 36, the purpose of this lesson is to
highlight the operational maneuvering and ability to project, plan, and prepare for the needs of
the army as it moves through the Carolinas with the Redcoats giving chase. In January, Greene
wrote Washington and described the deplorable situation of the troops. The students should plan
on how to simultaneously build, equip, and maintain a force able to confront the British.
During the process, the students should plot the progress of all forces on a map based off of the
intelligence reports and writing locations of the letters, along with the dates. This will allow them
to trace the “race” as both British and Patriot armies move through the interior.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as Nathanael Greene, should ensure that each COA
addresses the OPERATIONAL situation.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis IX
Significance of the Date:
• 1 March 1781: The Articles of Confederation were ratified on 1 March, and Greene is leading
Cornwallis through the Carolina backcountry towards Guilford Courthouse.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Status of Cornwallis’s troops, especially logistics and supply
• Patriot supply depots
• River levels and available boats for crossing the various rivers, especially the PeeDee and
Catawba Rivers.
• Standard SITREP information
SITREP Questions:
• River levels, and how the weather will affect them
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Southern Theater Map
• Map of the Carolinas
• Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, 15 Jan 1781
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Greene to Francis Marion, 16 Jan 1781
Greene to Abner Nash, 17 Jan 1781
Greene to Davidson, 19 Jan
Greene to Morgan, 19 Jan
Morgan to Greene, 19 Jan
Greene to an Unidentified Person, 1-23 Jan
Morgan to Greene, 23 Jan
Greene to Washington, 24 Jan, 28 Jan
Morgan to Greene, 24 Jan, 25 Jan, 28 Jan
Greene to Henry Lee, Jr., 26 Jan
Lee to Greene, 27 Jan
Greene to William Campbell, 30 Jan
Greene to Isaac Huger, 30 Jan
To Samuel Huntington, 31 Jan
To the Officers Commanding the Militia in the Salisbury District of North Carolina, 31 Jan
Huger to Greene, 1 Feb
To Baron Steuben, 3 Feb
To Huger, 5 Feb, 8 Feb
From Huger, 8 Feb
From Arthur Campbell, 8 Feb
Proceedings of a Council of War, 9 Feb
To Washington, 9 Feb, 15 Feb
From Morgan, 20 Feb
To Lord Cornwallis, 24 Feb
Appointment of a Commission to Deal with the Cherokee and Chickasaw Nations, 26 Feb
To Washington, 28 Feb

Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Guilford Courthouse
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
• This lesson is laden with correspondence, but unlike the burden of sifting through to find the
important information, as the students practiced earlier in the course, nearly all of the
correspondence is crucial during the Race to the Dan. Thus, the list of specific sources
that cadets need to read is longer than the other lessons. Nonetheless, the paint an
impressive picture of the campaign.
Homework:
• Articles of Confederation
Notes:
______________________________________________________________________________
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Lesson 35: Operational/Tactical Level - Guilford Courthouse
Purpose of the lesson:
This lesson continues the Race to the Dan and culminates with the Battle of Guilford
Courthouse. In keeping with the Block III standard, the students must differentiate between the
Operational and the Tactical, elucidating the differences in their COA briefings. Students should
continue to plot the progress of all forces on a map based off of the intelligence reports and
writing locations of the letters, along with the dates. This will allow them to trace the “race” as
both British and Patriot armies move through the interior.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as Nathanael Greene, should ensure that each COA
addresses the OPERATIONAL and TACTICAL situations.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Articles of Confederation
Significance of the Date:
• 15 March 1781: Greene engages Cornwallis at Guilford Courthouse
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Standard SITREP
• Recap the Race to the Dan up until the Dan River
• Recap
SITREP Questions:
• Review map of Guilford Courthouse (the Army has already camped there… it should be well
known as it was the ground of Greene’s choosing)
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Map of the Southern Theater
• Map of the Race to the Dan
• Map of Guilford Courthouse
• To Baron Steuben, 29 Feb/1 March 1781
• From Otho Williams, 1 March 1781, 2 March 1781, 3 March 1781, 4 March 1781
• From Baron Steuben, 3 March
• From Henry Lee Jr., 4 March
• To Henry Lee Jr., 5 March
• To Baron Steuben, 5 March
• From Lee, 5 March
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To Nash, 6 March
From Lee, 6 March
From Williams, 7 March
To Lee, 9 March, 10 March
To Thomas Jefferson, 10 March
To Washington, 10 March
Instructions to Colonel Carrington Concerning an Exchange of Prisoners
From Lee, 11 March
To Lee, 14 March

Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: British Pyrrhic victory because Greene retreats, Cornwallis leaves the area for
the coast
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
• The first half of the planning process will continue the Operational tempo of plotting where the
two are and when and how they should engage. The second half of the planning process
moves to the tactical, where the students should devise a battle plan on the grounds
around Guilford Courthouse. While this lesson is busy, all of the pieces are listed in the
correspondences. Greene will use similar tactics that Morgan used at Cowpens; thus,
students should rely on Morgan’s recommendations in his correspondences between
lesson 34 and 35.
Homework:
• Research
Notes:
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Lesson 36: Strategic Level - The Plan
Purpose of the lesson:
After the Race to the Dan campaign and the battles of Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse, this
lesson examines the strategic level of war in the aftermath of the Articles of Confederation and
the arrival of the French fleets. Washington saw an opportunity, but the French have been
notoriously slow to decisively engage.
Students should discuss the impact of the Articles of Confederation on the Army’s ability to
carry out its mission, as well as their ability to diplomatically deal with both belligerent and
friendly nations.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC situation.
Reading/Homework Due:
• General research
Significance of the Date:
• 1 September 1781: Cornwallis established a base of operations at Yorktown in August, a port
city that would allow him easy communication with Clinton, plus a place to receive
reinforcements and supply.
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Standard SITREP
• Recount the Siege of Ninety-Six
• Ensure good location of the troops and naval vessels
SITREP Questions:
• Cornwallis is at Yorktown, is Clinton coming to help?
• Where are the British and French ships?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Overview Map
• Washington to Greene, 27 February 1781
• Greene to Washington, 18 March 1781
• Greene to Morgan, 20 March 1781
• Washington to Greene, 21 March 1781
• Washington to Greene, 18 April 1781
• Washington to Ménonville, 7 May 1781
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Washington to William Greene, 24 May 1781
Washington to Hancock, 25 May 1781, 2 June
Washington to Rochambeau, 17 June
Washington to George Clinton, 30 June
Washington to Rochambeau, 3 July
Lafayette to Washington, 11 Aug
Washington to Lafayette, 1 Sept

Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Battle of the Capes in September, then begin the siege of Yorktown
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
• The main goal of this lesson was to present Washington with the best three COAs that he can
discuss with Comte Rochambeau and Admiral de Grasse. They should include a
proposed assault on New York and a naval battle somewhere along the Atlantic coast,
preferably in the Chesapeake.
Homework:
• Research
Notes:
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Lesson 37: Strategic/Operational/Tactical Level - Yorktown
Purpose of the lesson:
This is the end-game; the point at which Washington is able to concentrate his forces and
hopefully trap Cornwallis in Yorktown. As he gathers as many French and American troops as
he can, there are still questions relating to all three levels of war. At the strategic level, the
French fleet has limited time as they desire to move before the weather turns. Thus, the window
to use them against the British was short, and relations between the two nations was consistently
tenuous in action. At the Operational level, Washington not only needed a sizable force outside
of Yorktown, he also needed to keep the British inside of New York. Again, his time was limited
because if they attacked while the Patriots were on the move, they could cause significant
damage. Finally, Washington knew that time was not necessarily on his side and that a direct
assault against Cornwallis could finish him off. On the other hand, if the Continental Army were
defeated, that could drag the war through another year of fighting, or worse. A siege was
preferable, but slow, and Washington had almost no experience with siege warfare. Thus, all
three levels of war converge in this lesson, and the goal is to get the students to offer the best
COA at each level.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
• Provide Primary Sources, cadets determine 3 COA’s based on strategic situation with the help
of correspondences & maps
• Preferably, cadets will get divided into 3 groups. If they do, they can decide how to split the
work so that they can develop 3 separate COAs. They will still need to coordinate
between groups between so as not to duplicate effort.
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, and TACTICAL situation.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Research
Significance of the Date:
• 28 September 1781: The siege of Yorktown begins
SITREP Student: Cadet X
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Standard SITREP
• Recap the Battle of the Capes
• Recap Eutaw Springs
SITREP Questions:
• Any movement from Henry Clinton in New York?
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Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Map of Yorktown
• General Orders, 6 Sept 1781
• General Orders, 26 Sept 1781
• General Orders, 27 Sept 1781
• Washington to the Board of War, 28 Sept 1781
• Washington to Greene, 28 Sept
Courses of Action (COAs):
• Strategic COA:
• Operational COA:
• Tactical COA:
Final Thoughts:
• Hopefully the students have a sense of apprehension and excitement as the end draws near.
They should develop a COA at each level of war knowing that while Cornwallis seems
trapped, no plan is foolproof.
• The biggest issue that the instructor will need to watch out for is the tendency to project what
we know about the outcome on the decisions of those experiencing the event. Bias runs
strong in this lesson, and the instructor should do everything possible to ensure that
cadets place themselves in a 1781 mindset.
Homework:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis X
Notes:
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Lesson 38: Strategic Level - Is it over?
Purpose of the lesson:
Cornwallis surrendered on 19 October 1781, effectively ending combat operations in America.
Unfortunately, the Treaty of Paris is not signed until 3 September, 1783. Thus, for two years the
Continental Army exists in a country fearful of standing armies. The purpose of this lesson is to
examine how Washington should strategically manage his force, and how the other instruments
of national power interact to conclude the American Revolution.
Structure of the Class:
(12-15 Min) SITREP
(15 Min) COA PLANNING
(15 minutes) COA BRIEFING
• COMMANDER: The instructor, acting as George Washington, should ensure that each COA
addresses the STRATEGIC situation.
Reading/Homework Due:
• Thomas Paine’s The Crisis X
• John Armstrong: The Newburgh Address
Significance of the Date:
• 19 October 1781 - 3 November 1783: Combat operations ended on 19 Oct, 1781, but
Washington was not able to disband his forced until 3 November 1783.
SITREP Student: Cadet X — This is a SITREP makeup lesson for any student unable to
complete two briefings. If all students are complete, then the Instructor can present the last
SITREP or allow it to become a discussion.
SITREP Areas of Focus:
• Forces remaining
• Morale
SITREP Questions:
• Is Congress upholding their promises to the Army?
Correspondences, Maps, other Primary Sources:
• Overview map
• General Orders, 18 October 1781
• To Washington from Cornwallis, 17 October 1781, 18 October 1781
• From Washington to Cornwallis, 17 October 1781, 18 October 1781
• Articles of Capitulation between Washington and Cornwallis, 19 October 1781
• Washington to Joseph Jones, 12 March 1783
• Washington: Speech to the Officers, 15 March 1783
• Samuel Shaw to the Rev. Eliot, April 1783
• A New York Loyalist to Lord Hardwicke, 1783
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Courses of Action (COAs):
• Historical COA: Washington retains most of his force as threats still abound, but only
approximately 4,000 remain by 3 November 1783.
• Backup 1:
• Backup 2:
Final Thoughts:
• The basic underpinnings of this lesson deal with the strategic necessity to keep a Continental
Army while dealing with the strong sentiment that it is not needed. The required
correspondences span two years, from the jubilation at Cornwallis’s surrender in 1781 to
the Newburgh Conspiracy in 1783. The students must understand that the end of military
campaigns is not the end of military service — a lesson all too prevalent throughout
American warfare.
Homework:
• The Treaty of Paris
• Write Reflection Paper
Notes: _______________________________________________________________________
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CHAPTER IX
IX. CONCLUSION
In 2009, NATO coalition planners created a PowerPoint slide that attempted to depict the
cultural, socio-political, military, and economic interconnections that created turmoil during the
War in Afghanistan. The planners failed. Instead, Generals were treated to a jumbled mess of
circular lines that led General Stanley McChrystal to exclaim, “when we understand that slide,
we’ll have won the war.” General James Mattis took it a step further, “PowerPoint makes us
stupid.” Brigadier General H.R. McMaster banned slideshows from his briefings, claiming that
they “create the illusion of understanding and the illusion of control.”143 If their comments were
any indication, modern strategic-level leadership despises electronic slideshows -- and two of the
three quoted individuals have history degrees -- yet, most university-level history courses rely
heavily on PowerPoint.144 That begs the rhetorical question for military history classes,
especially at the Service Academies: if commanders despise it, why do we teach with it?
Modern pedagogy supports the notion that a student’s metacognition and critical thinking
increases through various active-learning, student-centered techniques rather than the traditional
lecture. The flipped-classroom model is growing in popularity within universities. Problem based
learning, experiential learning, and gamification create environments that rely more on student

143
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while the now-former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of
North Carolina.

interaction than lecture, and technology allows learners to pedagogically engage with each other
in new ways. Works such as How Learning Works, What the Best College Teachers Do, or
Learner-Centered Assessment on College Campuses all preach for the inclusion of multiple
student-centered teaching methodologies and downplay the role of the PowerPoint-driven
lecture.145 This paper presented an American military history course that incorporated the
student-centered, active-learning model with aspects of gamification and a flipped classroom.
Further, History 999, “The Tactical Implementation of Strategic Guidance during the
American Revolutionary War” was designed to meet seven of nine USAFA institutional
outcomes in an engaging, informative manner. Critical thinking; the human condition, cultures,
and societies; leadership, teamwork, and organizational management; clear communication;
ethics and respect for human dignity; national security of the American Republic; and warrior
ethos as airmen and citizens are the outcomes directly achieved through H999. In the process,
cadets will inundate themselves with Revolutionary warfare across the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels of war.
The United States Air Force Academy is a unique institution of higher learning. As a
Service Academy, its primary mission is to create leaders of character for the U.S. Air Force. A
well-rounded liberal arts education is critical to accomplish that goal, and USAFA has a
pronounced core curriculum that includes numerous required courses across a variety of
disciplines, including an introduction to Military History and an introduction to World History.
The larger Air Force that the cadets will enter after graduation is a technologically advanced,
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technologically forward-looking organization dedicated to the command of air, space, and
cyberspace. As such, attention to pre-airpower history is often shortened to make time for
twenty- and twenty-first century history. While modern warfare is important, without colonial or
early American military history, cadets lose the appreciation that warfare revolves around human
decision-making. In an effort to develop military officers that understand the complexities of
warfare, it is essential that students realize that wars will continue regardless of technological
innovation. There is no magic technological invention that will end conflict. Thus, professors
must convey the human aspects of war to the next generation of military officers.
Military History classrooms do well in elucidating the notion that wars are complex
affairs that integrate many, if not all, aspects of society. Unfortunately, some classrooms rely on
confusing, vague, or broad classifications of warfare that require continual and repeated
explanation necessitating excessive lecture. The Threads of Continuity, Spectrum of War, and
the DIME model are important to understand but largely unnecessary during an officer’s first
few years in the military. Instead, officer-candidates, like the cadets at the U.S. Air Force
Academy, would be better served gaining a complete understanding of the levels of war. Since
they will graduate at the tactical level, cadets must comprehend their role within the tactical
environment and how their actions influence the operational and strategic environment. While
young officers will rarely need to make strategic-level decisions in the twenty-first century
military hierarchy, their decisions at the tactical level can have impacts across the three levels of
war. Further, their knowledge of the strategic and operational levels can affect their tactical
decisions. Thus, professors must ensure their cadets completely understand the three levels of
war. Moreover, the three levels of war are simple, comprehensive, and applicable. They apply to
any conflict that contains a traditional state military with a hierarchical chain of command that is
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subservient to a higher political power. This definition of conflict applies to every major
American war since the creation of the Continental Army in 1775.
While no war is simple, the American Revolution offers the least amount of ambiguity
compared to more modern American wars because the Continental Congress gave George
Washington, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, authorization to prosecute the war with an
unprecedented amount of freedom. The creation of the office of the Presidency in 1789 added an
extra strategic layer to future wars that the Revolutionary War did not contain. Further, the lateeighteenth century delineated separate campaigns and usually sought a single, decisive battle that
reflected traditional European warfare. In that vein, the War for American Independence offers
clearly defined levels of war that are simpler to differentiate and articulate to cadets. While no
war is formulaic, the Revolution provides an excellent starting point for teaching military history
at USAFA.
Indeed, war is not formulaic despite Antoine de Jomini’s insistence to the contrary. Carl
von Clausewitz’s “fog and friction” ideals hold more sway, but his belief in a military genius
negates the ability for a military to create superb officers, which is the purpose of the U.S. Air
Force Academy. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s quest for the destruction of an enemy’s maritime fleet
would lead to economic freedom for the victor; a notion that could apply to early America.
Though the Continentals did not have a maritime fleet powerful enough to challenge the British,
their privateers wreaked havoc on international trade and the combined French-Spanish naval
force created a worldwide economic problem for Britain. Thus, Mahan’s combination of the
decisive battle and the economic fortunes of a nation did play a role in the American Revolution.
Further, the civil-military interaction of the populace was a massive issue during the war.
Giulio Douhet sought to use the airplane to bypass the front lines in an effort to reach the civilian
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populace with the theory that the population drives the war. Much of the American Revolution
dealt with the “hearts and minds” of the Americans, and British behavior often pushed the
colonists into the Patriot’s camp. Between Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation in 1775, the
Philipsburg Proclamation in 1779, Henry Clinton’s Decree in 1780, and the Redcoat’s actions
against civilians in the South, the British lost American “hearts and minds.” Therefore, even
though Douhet wrote in the airpower age about the strategic use of airplanes, one could still
adapt his theories to eighteenth-century military history.
While this is a short list of military theorists, the point is that cadets at the Air Force
Academy can apply what they are learning across academia to American Military History. As the
levels of war combine with military theory and military history, the students understand that
there are unchanging aspects of warfare despite technological advancement. Warfare is human.
As with any human endeavor, human relationships rarely change with the advent of new
technology. Technological innovation may alter the manner in which wars are fought, but
leadership and decision-making remain human. Leadership, at any level of war, is relational. In
History 999, cadets will come to grips with the leadership decision-making process across the
three levels of war during the American Revolution. In doing so, they will understand how they
can impact the twenty-first century American military machine at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels of war.
H999 itself was designed to combine several pedagogical and historical methods within
the backdrop of military service. First, in an effort to maintain historical integrity and focus on
the historians’ craft, primary sources became the paramount text. If students needed more
information about the Revolutionary War, as they most likely did, they had to research the
information on their own time, albeit with their instructor's guidance. The provided sources only
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scratched the surface of the volumes of correspondences during the American Revolution, but
they elucidated the nature of historical research; namely, dealing with the original material and
basing conclusions on that rather than on the interpretations of others — a skill especially
paramount in modern society. Second, the course used the pedagogical methods of a studentcentered, active-learning framework with embedded elements of gamification. As cadets placed
themselves in the role of eighteenth-century planners, they prepared and briefed potential courses
of action for their instructor, who role-played various commanders during the Revolutionary
War. Sometimes their plans were adopted, sometimes not, and after class the students had the
option to research the actual events in order to compare their plans with history. Finally, as future
military officers, cadets gained valuable briefing experience with the Situation Reports and the
COA briefs, both of which mirror the modern military. Further, throughout the class the cadets
gained a firm grasp on the three levels of war and how they interacted. They saw that a tactical
defeat could become a strategic victory, but a strategic failure had dire consequences despite a
tactical success.
In all, the cadets enrolled in History 999, “Tactical Implementation of Strategic Guidance
during the American Revolutionary War,” gained a greater appreciation for primary source
material, military correspondence, and the hierarchy of warfare. Hopefully, their curiosity was
piqued in the process, leading to self-learning, increased metacognition, and higher complex and
critical thinking skills. If successful, cadets will graduate from USAFA and enter the U.S. Air
Force able to project American capabilities in combat wherever and whenever the nation calls.
They will proudly and confidently carry on the tradition of the American military sworn to
defend the Constitution of the United States of America.
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APPENDIX
The attached syllabus is an exact representation of History 999, “Tactical
Implementation of Strategic Guidance during the American Revolutionary War.” Its formatting
and appearance exactly mirrors what cadets will receive at the U.S. Air Force Academy on the
first day of History 999. The names, office locations, and phone numbers of the course director,
department head, and chief of the military history division have been removed and replaced with
“xxxx.” Besides that minor omission, everything that follows is the proposed syllabus for H999
at the United States Air Force Academy.
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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
HISTORY 999
TACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Syllabus
Fall 2018

Course Director and Instructor
Lt Col Ryan Menath
Office: 6D-XXX
Office Phone: 333-XXXX; Cell Phone: XXX-XXX-XXXX
Email: ryan.menath@usafa.edu
Department Head
Col Xxx Xxxxx
Office: 6F-XXX
Phone: 3-XXXX

Chief, Military History Division
Dr. Xxx Xxxxxxxx
Office: 6F-XXX
Phone: 3-XXXX

I. U.S. Air Force Academy Outcomes
USAFA has a distinct set of ultimate objectives that are met in a variety of ways,
including course work. Of the nine major objectives defined in the Cadet Handbook, this course
will directly focus on the following seven:
1. CRITICAL THINKING
Upon graduation, our graduates will be required to identify and solve complex problems
and effectively respond to situations they have not previously confronted. Acting responsibly in
an ever-changing world of ill-defined problems requires critical thinking. At USAFA, critical
thinking is defined as: The process of self-aware, informed, and reflective reasoning for
problem-solving and decision-making in the absence of ideal information.
2. THE HUMAN CONDITION, CULTURES, AND SOCIETIES
Our graduates will be required to interact successfully with a wide range of individuals,
to include those representing cultures and societies different from their own. To foster their
success in these interactions, the Academy has created a three-phased approach to help cadets
better understand the human condition, cultures, and societies: (a) knowing oneself; (b) knowing
others; and (c) constructive engagement. Being able to prudently interact with individuals from
different milieus resides at the heart of intercultural or cross-cultural competence and includes
both domestic and international environments.
3. LEADERSHIP, TEAMWORK, AND ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT
The Academy develops leaders through implementation of the Officer Development
System, particularly the PITO model, which organizes leadership capabilities into four broad
categories of (a) Personal Leadership (i.e., leading oneself in ways that enhance mission
accomplishment); (b) Interpersonal Leadership (i.e., leading one or more other people); (c) Team
Leadership (i.e., leading an interdependent group toward accomplishment of a common goal);
and (d) Organizational Leadership (i.e., guiding an organization to success while understanding
that it is embedded within a larger institution and environment).
4. CLEAR COMMUNICATION
Clear communication is a complex, nuanced and teachable practice essential for
successful officers and leaders of character. Effective use of oral, visual, written, and aural
modes of communication signifies the professional competence and knowledge expected in a
leader while engendering the trust of those being led. Officers must routinely assess context,
understand purpose, develop processes, know audiences, and employ the materials necessary to
plainly convey intentions in documents that range from staff work and simple orders to strategic
plans and systematic designs: in short, tell the Air Force story.
5. ETHICS AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY
When deciding how to act, Air Force leaders of character comprehend moral knowledge
and ethical alternatives, respect the dignity of all affected persons, use ethical judgment in moral
decision-making as leaders to select the best alternative, and act consistently with that judgment
so as to develop habits of moral excellence.
6. NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
“National Security” commonly refers to “the ability of the state to protect the
fundamental values and core interests of a society.” Within the broader objective that cadets be
prepared to “defend our nation in air, space, and cyberspace,” this Outcome emphasizes not only
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the operational, tactical, and technological capabilities necessary to do so but also the broader
political context in which military force must be employed.
7. WARRIOR ETHOS AS AIRMEN AND CITIZENS
Warrior ethos is the embodiment of the warrior spirit: tough mindedness, tireless
motivation, an unceasing vigilance, a willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the country, if
necessary, and a commitment to be the world’s premier air, space and cyberspace force. The
warrior ethos proficiencies comprise a structure that is based on the intellectual development
inherent to the Profession of Arms, and the values development prescribed by the Air Force Core
Values.
For more information on the USAFA Outcomes, see the Cadet Handbook or visit
www.usafa.edu/academics/outcomes

II. Department of History Outcomes
DFH believes history courses in general, and the history major specifically, are ideally suited
not only for the basic acquisition and research of historical facts, but also for developing critical
thinking, application, and communication skills. The first three outcomes (acquisition, critical
thinking, and application) tend to build on each other, with each subsequent outcome dependent
upon the previous one. Furthermore, there is an increasing level of difficulty inherent in the
three outcomes, with “application” representing the highest order of thinking. The fourth
outcome, the development of communication skills, is related to the other three previous
outcomes, but is especially applicable to critical thinking and application skills. With this in
mind, DFH has defined the outcomes for its history courses as follows:
1. Cadets will be able to acquire and comprehend factually accurate historical data and
concepts.
a. Acquisition of historical data and concepts:
i. observation and recall of information
ii. knowledge of dates, events, places
iii. knowledge of major ideas
b. Comprehension of historical data and concepts:
i. understand information
ii. grasp meaning
iii. interpret facts, compare, contrast
iv. order, group, infer causes
2. Cadets will be able to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate historical data and concepts
critically.
a. Analysis of historical data and concepts:
i. recognize patterns
ii. organize parts
iii. recognize hidden meanings
iv. identify components
b. Synthesis of historical data and concepts
i. use old ideas to create new ones
ii. generalize from given facts
iii. relate knowledge from several areas
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iv. draw conclusions
c. Evaluation of historical data and concepts:
i. judge and discriminate between data and concepts
ii. assess value of data and concepts
iii. verify value of evidence
iv. make choices based on reasoned argument
v. recognize subjectivity and alternative viewpoints
3. Cadets will be able to apply the above critical analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of
historical data and concepts to historical and modern contexts.
a. Application of historical data, concepts, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation:
i. use information to create new theories
ii. use data, methods, concepts, and theories in new contexts
iii. solve problems using required knowledge or critical thinking skills
4. Cadets will be able to communicate the acquisition, comprehension, analysis, synthesis,
evaluation, and application of historical data and concepts effectively.
a. Communication methods:
i. written
ii. oral

III. Course Objectives
For each student to:
1. Demonstrate acquisition of historical knowledge. (Outcomes: The Human Condition,
Cultures, and Societies; National Security of the American Republic; Warrior Ethos as Airmen
and Citizens; Ethics and Respect for Human Dignity; Clear Communications)
Historical knowledge in this course includes names, places, dates, and events associated
with American history during the American Revolution. You will demonstrate this
knowledge in classroom discussion, oral briefings, and written assignments.
2. Understand early American history through various primary-source documents and be able to
analyze critically each of the readings assigned this semester. (Outcomes: Critical Thinking;
Ethics and Respect for Human Dignity; The Human Condition, Cultures, and Societies; National
Security of the American Republic; Clear Communications)
Through written assignments, you will demonstrate an understanding of, and evaluate the
arguments of multiple viewpoints regarding the impact and importance of the American
Revolution.
You will be able to apply the historical knowledge gained from classroom discussion and
readings to arguments formulated around the various decisions during the War for
American Independence.
3. Analyze established interpretations within a closed context and communicate analysis. (Outcomes: Critical
Thinking, Clear Communications)
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You will accomplish this in daily discussions that will analyze the primary sources and formulate a plan
based on your knowledge of the situation and the information available. A closed context refers to the
students’ use of limited sources, such as the availability of sources or material read in class.

4. Frame an original, interpretive argument from an open context. (Outcomes: Clear
Communications; Critical Thinking)
In your daily tasks, you will critically analyze a combination of sources to both assess
their value and synthesize the arguments made by the authors as well as formulate theses
from which you will construct your arguments. You will present your argument on a
near-daily basis.
5. Judge multiple interpretations of historical events. (Outcomes: Critical Thinking; Ethics and
Respect for Human Dignity; The Human Condition, Cultures, and Societies; National Security of
the American Republic; Clear Communications)
History is interpretation. In your writing assignments, graded material, and class
discussions you will be required to analyze the merits of historical arguments. By
studying the various interpretations of early American history, you should gain a great
deal of understanding of the perspectives and methodologies that historians used in
reaching their conclusions.
6. Gain proficiency in employing techniques of historical methodology within a wartime
context. (Outcomes: Critical Thinking; Ethics and Respect for Human Dignity; The Human
Condition, Cultures, and Societies; National Security of the American Republic; Clear
Communications; Leadership, Teamwork, and Organization; Warrior Ethos)
In your writing assignments, you will learn and perfect methodological-based skills, such
as assessing source material and conducting research.
7. Synthesize various interpretations of the evolution of early American warfare across the
levels of war (Outcomes: Critical Thinking; Leadership, Teamwork, and Organization; Warrior
Ethos; National Security)
To achieve these objectives each student must be able to:
1. Read critically and comprehensively.
2. Analyze ideas effectively in classroom discussion.
3. Communicate syntheses clearly in oral and written form.

IV. Course Structure
History 999, “Tactical Implementation of Strategic Guidance during the Revolutionary
War,” is a one-semester examination of our nation’s break with Britain and subsequent
independence. Surveying the broad landscape of mid- to late- eighteenth century America, we
will explore the people and institutions that helped shape the political, intellectual, social,
military and economic change during the War for American Independence. During this course,
we will rely heavily on primary sources to critically analyze the wartime decisions of the
leadership across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. We will also examine
the dynamics of military orders and how strategic guidance was implemented at the operational
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and tactical levels. Ultimately, this course should help you arrive at a clearer and more
meaningful understanding of our nation’s past, your relationship to that past, and your ability to
carry out your duties as a citizen-airman in a free society.
In addition to gaining further insight into the American Revolution, this course will equip
you with skills designed to facilitate historical inquiry and analysis. As you study the primary
sources, you will be asked to formulate significant questions about the decisions made during a
wartime environment. You will further analyze evidence in the search for answers to those
questions and will communicate your results both orally and in writing. Further, provided with
the same sources, you will be expected to postulate your interpretation and expected actions. We
will conduct a number of focused activities throughout the semester to enhance your learning
experience. Honing your critical thinking skills will serve you well in this and other courses at
the Academy and will be invaluable to you as you enter the Air Force as a commissioned officer.
The majority of the course will be dedicated to combining primary source analyzation
with strategic, operational, and tactical problem-based learning. Using sources no more recent
than the date listed in the syllabus for the corresponding lesson, you will act as a military
staff to provide the commander with solutions to the problem of how to win the war. Thus,
your grade depends largely on your own research, preparation, and participation. Understanding
the social, cultural, diplomatic, economic, informational, political, and military factors that
underpinned eighteenth-century American life will allow you to thrive in this course as well as
provide you will invaluable experience in historical military affairs as you enter the Air Force.

V. Textbooks and Materials
You will not be required to purchase any materials at this time. All materials can be found online
at various websites or at http://menath2001.wixsite.com/leadershiptriad

VI. Course Grading
Graded events include:
Event

Lesson

Points

Situational Report (SITREP) Briefing #1
Daily Tasks and Objectives
Strategic Level Analysis
Instructor Prerogative*
PROG TOTAL
SITREP #2
Daily Tasks and Objectives
Operational Level Analysis
Tactical Level Analysis
Reflection Paper
Instructor Prerogative*
COURSE TOTAL

Various
Various
Lsn 10
Various
Various
Lsn 21
Lsn 32
Lsn 40
-

100
100
100
50
350
100
100
100
100
200
50
1000

*Instructor Prerogative Points. I will determine your IP score largely on class participation.
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VII. Calendar
Lsn - Date
1
2
3
4
5

*See blackboard or http://menath2001.wixsite.com/leadershiptriad

Read Prior to Class*

SUBJECT

DUE

Syllabus
H100 notes
* See Blackboard
* See Blackboard
* See Blackboard

Course Introduction
Review of Terminology and Warfare
French and Indian War
Growing Discontentment
Hostilities
Strategic/Operational/Tactical – It begins

7 - 5 July
8 – 12 Nov
9 – 18 Dec
10 – 30 Dec

Patrick Henry’s speech,
Letters of a Farmer
Spaulding, Declaration
Dunmore Proc./Response
Wright
N/A – Write Paper

11 – Mar 18
12 – Aug 25
13 – Oct 30
14 – Nov 19
15 – Dec 24

Morison, Common Sense
D of I, Common Sense
Common Sense
Waddell/Porterfield
The Crisis I

Strategic – British evac Boston… victory?
Strategic – Independence! Strategic reassess?
Operational – NY Campaign
Operational – Forts fall
Tactical – Trenton & Princeton

16 – May 30
17 – Sept 10
18 – Sept 18
19 – Oct 3
20 – Oct 7

The Crisis II
The Crisis III
Aunbrery’s Letters 30-37
Crisis IV

Strategic – Saving an Army
Strategic/Operational – Protecting Philly
Operational – Saratoga I, Freeman’s Farm
Tactical – Germantown
Tactical – Saratoga II, Bemis Heights

21 – Feb 6
22 – May 30
23 – Jun 19
24 - Jun 28
25 – Later

N/A – Write Paper
Steuben’s drill manual
Crisis V
Character Research
Martin, Chapter 5

Strategic – Winter Training
Strategic – State of the Army / DIME
Operational - Watching the British
Tactical – Monmouth Courthouse
Tactical Aftermath – Strategic Results?
Strategic – State of Affairs

27 –Aug 20
28 – Oct 18

Philipsburg Proc.
Crisis VI
Crisis VII
Banishing Tories

29 – May 30
30 – July 11
31 – Oct 7
32 – Dec 2

Crisis VIII
HC’s Proclamations
News of Arnold
Hamilton/Shelby

Strategic – The Winter
Strategic – The South
Tactical – Kings Mountain
Operational – Greene in the South

1775
6 - May 10

Strategic - GW Arrives in Cambridge
Operational –Montgomery’s Campaign
Operational/Tactical – Prep for Quebec
Tactical – Assault on Quebec

DEMO
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP
Strat Analysis

1776
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP

1777
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP

1778
Op Analysis
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP

1779
26 – Jun 22

Strat/Operational – Stony Pt & Paulus Hook
Op/Tactical – Jt Ops: Recapture of Savannah

SITREP
SITREP
SITREP

1780
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP
Tac Analysis

1781
33 - Jan 16
34 – Mar 1
35 – Mar 15
36 – Sept 1
37 – Sept 28
38 – ’81-‘83
39
40

N/A - Write Paper
Crisis IX
Articles of Confed.
General research
General research
Crisis X
Treaty of Paris
N/A – Write Paper

Tactical - Cowpens
Operational - The Race to the Dan
Operational/Tactical – Guilford Courthouse
Strategic/Operational – The Plan
Strategic/Operational/Tactical - Yorktown
Strategic – Is it over?
Reflection – Class Discussion
Reflection – Class Discussion
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SITREP
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP
SITREP
makeup
Final Paper

VIII. Assignments
Situational Reports (SITREPS) - 100 points each
You are preparing to be military officers. You must understand the proper way to
effectively convey issues using appropriate Air Force methods. Briefings are an integral part of
being an officer in the United States military, and you are thus expected to become comfortable
presenting detailed and wide-ranging information in an efficient manner.
This assignment is intended to be research intensive. To do well, you must dive into the
primary source material. Secondary source material will greatly help you with your searching,
and your instructor can point you to scholarly works, but you must not brief anything beyond the
date on the syllabus that corresponds to the lesson.
You will present two SITREPs throughout the course. The goal is to brief the
“commander” about the situation they are facing at that point in time during the American
Revolution. You may include anything that you think is important for them to know in order to
make the best decisions, but you must NOT look into the future. In other words, your research
must only include information PRIOR to the historical date of your SITREP. It should last
between 12 and 15 minutes.
The content of each briefing should include, but is not limited to, troop strength, troop
locations, troop morale, supply levels (including food, gunpowder, and ammunition), weather,
enemy locations, enemy strength, potential enemy movements, civilian morale (including Patriot
or Loyalist sentiments), diplomatic affairs, prisoner status/exchanges, financial status and
geography. While these may not all be available for each lesson, most of them will discoverable
through dedicated research. Additionally, you should tailor your briefing to the level of war at
which you are presenting. For example, a SITREP dedicated to the strategic level of war should
highlight the diplomatic, economic, and overall logistics. A tactical level of war briefing will
focus more on troop supply levels, weather, geography, and enemy locations. In short, tailor your
briefing to the “commander” of the day.
Some notes: be thorough with your research, you will get questions. Do not be
anachronistic or look into the future. Do not make up history – brief only what you can verify. If
something is widely regarded but unverified, make sure you highlight the dubious nature of the
information. Finally, be confident.
As part of this, you will need to:
- Know your sources. You may (and should) use secondary sources in your research, but
you may NOT present unverifiable information or anything that occurs past the date of
the SITREP.
- Time your presentation to be between 12 – 15 minutes (I will subtract ½ a letter grade per
minute over or under the allotted time).
- Your grade will be based on the depth of your historical research, critical thinking, ability
to cover the most relevant information, and your presentation skills.
Your briefing should cover the following material:
1. Recap of any significant events between lessons
2. Troop numbers, readiness, supplies, morale
3. Enemy numbers, locations, suspected movements
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Diplomatic efforts (don’t forget about Native Americans)
Civilian morale, loyalties, tendencies
Economic and financial constraints
Weather, geography, location-specific issues
Political debates
Any level-of-war-specific information

Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Level Analysis Papers (100 points each)
* Use the Tongue and Quill as the formatting source for this writing series but cite IAW
Turabian.
The Levels of War analysis papers are designed to be short (1000 words or less), critical
works examining the level of war in question. Each one should make a historical argument, have
a solid thesis, and present researched evidence supporting your position. You must use scholarly
secondary sources in your research by authors in the list provided. Finally, be sure to answer the
questions posed below. Do not forget to think about any economic, social, cultural, diplomatic,
or military issues.
-

How effective was the American (or British) strategy to this point in the war? What
was the strategy, and what were its challenges? Why did the Commander believe it
was the correct strategy to win the war?
How effective were the American (or British) operational methods to this point in the
war? Did they support the strategy, and what were their challenges?
How effective were the American (or British) tactics by this point in the war? What
were they, and why did the Tactical Commanders believe that their tactics could
defeat the enemy?

Reflection Paper (200 points)
Prepare an overarching Reflection Paper of 1500-2000 words (5-7 pages) assessing the
levels of war throughout the American Revolution. The final paper should use at least 8 sources,
2 of which must be primary sources, and 1 of which must be a journal article. This is your
chance to argue for the effectiveness of the commanders and address their ability to win the
American Revolution. Feel free to see me to discuss specific research questions regarding the
paper, or if you are having difficulty with the analysis. This assignment is designed to be broader
than the other assignments in the course, hence you must seek input early if you want to do well.
It is due by the start of Final Exam week.
Daily Tasks and Objective (200 points total)
During every lesson, you will be split into groups and will act as the commander’s staff.
Your job is to provide him with three options that further the cause of American Independence
based on the primary sources available to you at that time. You must also convince him which
one is the best course of action (COA). He will give you any relevant correspondences, maps,
charts, or military intelligence that has not already been briefed during the SITREP. You must
assess the information, analyze it, synthesize it in relation to the objectives of the appropriate
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level of war and create three options. Your group will argue for the best COA during that last 15
minutes of class.
In your argument, you must show that the objectives are (1) realistic and achievable, (2)
fit into the overarching objective of the cause for independence, (3) are not anachronistic, and (4)
adhere to any guidance from higher level commanders.
After these Courses of Action (COAs) are briefed at the end of each lesson, the
“commander” will determine daily grades based on the four criteria listed above.
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Writing Guidelines
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Be aware of tense changes and change tenses with a purpose.
Be sure to place the titles of books, newspapers, magazines, and journals in italics. Place the title of book
chapters in quotes.
Note that a “novel” is a work of fiction; a historical monograph or biography – the book you are reviewing
– is NOT a work of fiction.
Do NOT use block quotes, i.e., quotes, which are longer than four lines, indented, and single-spaced.
Use short quotes sparingly and with a purpose! Do NOT quote excessively to pad your paper; do NOT
place extra spaces between paragraphs to pad your essay.
Only capitalize proper nouns, including the North, the South, Northerners, Southerners, Democrats, Whigs,
Republicans, Free Soilers, Fire Eaters, the Civil War, Reconstruction, Confederates, Federals, the
Emancipation Proclamation, the Fugitive Slave Act, the Battle of Fredericksburg, General Robert E. Lee,
etc.
Do NOT randomly capitalize nouns. Be consistent in your capitalization.
Avoid verb, adjective, or adverb echoes, i.e., using the same verb, adjective, or adverb more than one time
in the same paragraph.
Do NOT use a title page. Do NOT put your review in a binder. NUMBER your pages.
Do NOT use the first person (I, me, my, mine) to refer to yourself in your own review – this is redundant
and ineloquent. When offering your own interpretation or evaluating the author’s persuasiveness, merely
assert your opinions and the ABSENCE of citations to other scholars will indicate that it is your own voice.
Do NOT use contractions – don’t, won’t, isn’t, it’s, etc. – in formal writing.
Avoid using “very” as this superlative is so overused that it adds nothing to scholarly writing.
Be sure to place ending punctuation - ., ,, ?, and ! – INSIDE the ending quotation marks.
Use [Brackets] for missing words or beginning capitalization, which you add to quotes for context or good
flow WITHIN the quotation marks. Do NOT use (parentheses) for this function.
Use single quotation marks – ‘quotation’ – to begin and end a quote WITHIN a quote.
If the author or a source makes an error in spelling or grammar, put [sic] after the error and inside the
quotation marks to indicate the error is intentional and not your own.
There is no need to begin or end quotes with “…” – merely place the relevant excerpt in quotation marks.
Avoid “ghost quotes” by identifying the person or source quoted explicitly within the text of your review.
Your citation number for footnotes should come OUTSIDE the ending punctuation.
Note the difference between ITS and IT’S; THEIR, THERE and THEY’RE; and WHERE, WE’RE and
WERE.
Give the full name of all persons at the first reference and give only the last name for subsequent
references.
Do NOT raise points in your review which you do not cover. Also, do not raise a new point in your
conclusion.

MECHANICAL RULES
•
•
•
•
•

Using spell checker is necessary but does not satisfy all of the requirements for
proofreading your work. Document any help you receive on the paper.
Avoid excessive quotations.
Your final paper should be typed, double-spaced with 1-inch margins in Times New
Roman 12-point font.
On the top of the first page, type your name, name of the course, and section in the upper
right-hand corner.
Do not include a title page, but insert page numbers

A hardcopy to your instructor AND a softcopy uploaded to Turnitin.com are both due at the
beginning of the lesson (in class) designated as the due date.
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IX. Course Administration
1. Plagiarism: Plagiarism is a serious academic and professional issue. Broadly defined,
plagiarism is the failure to give credit in your paper for the original ideas advanced by other
writers. Be certain to avoid even the appearance of wrongdoing by carefully consulting your
instructor and course materials in order to ensure proper documentation. Your final word for
understanding documentation is the style manual listed in this syllabus. We encourage you to
discuss your written work with instructors and other cadets before you turn it in, but we
require you to document any outside help received. That help may range from developing
ideas for a paper to proofreading the final product for content or grammar. You must specify
those individuals who provided any assistance. Statements such as "Cadet Thickglasses read
my paper" are inadequate. You must cite the exact nature of the help (e.g., "C1C
Poorgrammar read my paper for grammar and spelling" or "Major Pain helped me develop
the idea that technology played an integral role in warfare").
Instructors have the right to award no credit for an assignment that they believe to be
intellectually dishonest regardless of any conclusions reached by wing honor boards. A zero
on any major assignment can lead to a failing grade in the course regardless of final
percentages. The Department of History reserves the right to use any methods at its disposal
(including on-line plagiarism software) to detect plagiarism. Papers with major
documentation problems will result in a minimum of a 50% grade reduction.
*Each assignment is expected to have a Documentation Statement, even if no outside
help was received.
2. Paper Policy: Cadets are not allowed to pass in the same paper for two different courses.
Cadets may write papers on the same topic for different courses, but there should be no more
than 25% commonality between papers. Each paper should include substantially different
bibliographies and footnotes that reflect significant additional research.
3. Penalties: If you are aware of an impending absence or other problem that could prevent you
from turning in the project on time, you must make prior arrangements with your instructor.
"Late" is defined as any time after the beginning of the period on which your assignment is
due or time designated by your instructor. Weekends count as two days late. Late assignments
must still be turned in even if they receive no credit. The academic penalty for late work will be
a reduction in grade as described on the following page.
Up to One Day Late
Two Days Late
Three Days Late
More than Three Days Late

25% reduction from grade awarded
50% reduction from grade awarded
75% reduction from grade awarded
100% reduction from grade awarded

There are several other mistakes that can hurt your grade. Here are the penalties involved.
No Works Cited Page
No Documentation Statement
Not meeting the stated requirements

10% reduction from grade awarded
10% reduction from grade awarded
10% reduction from grade awarded

For further guidance see Chapter One, Section Three in the DFH Cadet Handbook.
http://tinyurl.com/dfh-handbook
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X. Additional Information:
Detailed information on departmental policies, scholarship opportunities, etc. can be found at:
http://tinyurl.com/dfh-handbook-2012
AFH 33-337, The Tongue and Quill, can be found on SharePoint or on http://www.epublishing.af.mil by searching for “The Tongue and Quill.”
( http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/saf_cio_a6/publication/afh33-337/afh33-337.pdf )
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Name:

_______________

Section: _

SITREP Grading Rubric

Quality of Presentation

(15% = 15 points)
Poor

Excellent

Purpose
Voice
Movement
Gestures
Eye Contact
Logic
Support
Other

Relevance/Significance to Current Lesson

(35% = 35 points)
Poor

Excellent

Summary: Covers the major events since the previous lesson
Historical Significance: Contextualizes level of war within larger historical events
Intel: Gave accurate statistics: number of troops, locations, supply levels, etc.
Socio/Political/Economic Factors: Brought in applicable socio-political, diplomatic, or economic factors that could impact the L.o.W.
Other:

Depth of Critical Thinking

(35% = 35 points)
Poor

Excellent

Clearly focused SITREP to the appropriate level of war (L.o.W.). Tactical – Operational – Strategic
Incorporated all applicable instruments of power: Alliances, finance, logistics, geography, morale, food, weather, etc.
Anticipated appropriate questions and problems relating to the historical date.
Other/Comments:

Met Criteria

(15% = 15 points)
Poor

Excellent

Covered syllabus requirements
Used outside scholarly sources
12 – 15 minutes in length

Additional Comments:

Grade
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/100

Paper Rubric
Paper Rubric

Excellent- 100

Great - 90

Student displays sufficient knowledge of the topic
and has put effort into the final product.
Thesis - 20% Clear and
concise. Original. Defines
argument/position. Lets
reader know what the paper
is about.

Analysis - 25% Shows
understanding of the
subject. Able to combine
subject matter across
multiple areas to reach a
clear conclusion.

Format - 5% Adheres to
proper syllabus and
formatting guidelines.
Excellent = no mistakes.

Fair - 70

Student displays knowledge of the topic, but is
unclear on some information or does not
sufficiently display mastery.

Sub-Par - 60

Poor - 50

Non-Existant - 0

Student has missed the point or has not put in the required effort.

Thesis is clear, concise and
easily identifiable. It gives
framework to the paper,
defines and provides
evidence to support the
argument. Learning outcomes
clearly identified.

Thesis exists, but is
unclear and difficult to
identify. The structure of
the paper is not
immediately evident to the
reader. Learning outcomes
are difficult to find.

No thesis or sufficient
support exists or are
so muddled that they
are unidentifiable.
Framework of the
paper does not match
the thesis.

DNE

Main points are thoughtfully
analyzed and discussed
thoroughly. They are
synthesized into a coherent
main argument that is
sufficiently justified. The
reader can understand its
application and/or lessons
learned.

Main points are discussed,
but analyzation is lacking.

There is almost no
analyzation of the
topic.

DNE

Regurgitates arguments,
but does not evaluate
assumptions nor propose
solutions.

There is little
demonstratable critical
thought involved.

DNE

Grammar, spelling,
readability, structure,
punctuation, word choice, etc.
does not detract from the
paper.

Adherence to formatting
standards with few
mistakes. Grammar,
spelling, readability,
structure, punctuation,
word choice, etc. makes
the paper difficult to read.

Poor adherence to
formatting standards.
Many grammar,
spelling, structure and
punctuation mistakes
throughout. Word
choice makes the
paper unreadable.

DNE

Excellent adherence to
formatting standards with no
mistakes.

Adherence to formatting
standards. Some mistakes,
but they do not distract
from the paper.

Poor adherence to
formatting standards
or wrong formatting
altogether.

DNE

Meets standards with
scholarly sources.

Does not meet
standards. Either too
few sources or nonscholarly sources are
used.

DNE

Fair paper.

Terrible.

DNE

Crit Thought - 25% Goes
beyond the text. Able to
Clearly displays informed and
synthesize new theses. Able
reflective reasoning. Identifies
to apply the lessons outside
assumptions, evaluates
of the framework of the
arguments, and proposes
question/course.
alternative solutions. Explains
how altered assumptions
change the framework.
Style - 10% Readability.
Word choice. Passive voice.
Spelling. Grammar.
Punctuation. Repetitive.

Good - 80

Support - 5% Uses enough
reputable/required sources
for a scholarly work. Finds
Exceeds standards with
the balance between too
scholarly, reputable sources.
much citing and not enough.
Overall - 10% Subjective.
Great paper.
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